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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

What are the future implications
of Emerging Disruptive
Technologies (EDTs) on the future
of Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMD) warfare? How might
EDTs increase the lethality and
effectiveness of WMDs in kinetic
warfare? How can civic leaders
and public servants prepare for
and mitigate projected threats?

Problem

Solution

In the coming decade, state and nonstate adversaries will use EDTs to attack
systems and populations that may initiate
and accelerate existing geopolitical conflict
escalation. EDTs are expected to be used
both in the initial attack or escalation as
well as a part of the detection and decisionmaking process. Due to the speed of
EDTs, expected confusion, and common
lack of human oversight, attacks will also
be incorrectly attributed, which has the
capacity to escalate rapid geopolitical
conflict to global military conflict, and
ultimately, to the use of nuclear WMDs.

To combat these future threats,
organizations will need to conduct research
and intelligence gathering paired with
exploratory research and development
to better understand the state of EDTs

The use of EDTs in the shadow of nuclear
WMDs is also expected to create an
existential threat to possible adversaries,
pushing them to “lower the bar” of
acceptability for using nuclear WMDs. EDTs
will enable and embolden insider threats,
both willing and unknowing, to effect
geopolitical conflict on a global scale.
In addition, the combination of multiple
EDTs when used together for attacks
will create WMD effects on populations
and governments. Furthermore, EDTs
will be used by adversaries to target and
destabilize critical infrastructure systems,
such as food, energy, and transportation,
etc. that will have a broader effect on
populations and governments. EDTs
will enable adversaries to perpetrate
a long-game attack, where the effect
and attribution of the attack may not be
detected for an extended period -- if ever.

and their potential impacts. With this
information, organizations will need to
conduct collaborative “wargaming” and
planning to explore a range of possible and
potential threats of EDTs. The knowledge
gained from all of these activities will
inform future training and best practices to
prepare for and address these threats.
Organizations will also need to increase
their investments in EDT related domains,
necessitating countries to not only
change how they fight, but also evolve
their thinking about deterrence. Expanded
regulation, policy making, and political
solidarity among members will take on an
increasingly more significant and expanded
role. Broader government, military, and
civilian cooperation will be needed to
disrupt and mitigate some of these future
threats in conjunction with broader public
awareness. All of these actions will place
a higher value on cooperation and shared
resiliency among NATO members.
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INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION TO
T H R E AT C A S T I N G

Threatcasting is a methodology used to
help multidisciplinary groups envision
future scenarios. It is also a process that
enables systematic planning against
threats for up to ten years in the future.
Utilizing the Threatcasting methodology1,
groups explore possible future threats and
how to transform the future they desire into
reality while mitigating a set of threats.

FIGURE 1

Technical

Threatcasting is a continuous, multiplestep process with comprehensive inputs.
They range from social science, technical
research, cultural history, economics,
trends analysis, expert interviews, and
science fiction storytelling. These inputs
inform the exploration of potential visions
of the future.

Cultural
History

Economics

A cross-functional group of practitioners
was gathered for two days in March 2022,
to explore the future of WMDs and EDTs.
The outcome is the beginning of a set
of possible threats, external indicators,
and recommended actions, that if taken,
are expected to mitigate the threats. The
projected outcomes, etc. are not definitive,
but they give the organization a starting
place. Participants synthesized the data
into workbooks by drawing research inputs
from a diverse data set of subject matter
expert interviews and then conducted four
rounds of Threatcasting sessions.
These Threatcasting sessions acted as
simulations, which generated numerous
separate scenarios, each with a person in
a place, experiencing their own version of
the threat. After the workshop concluded,
analysts methodically analyzed these

Trends
Data with
an Opinion

Social

scenarios to categorize and aggregate
novel indicators of how the most plausible
threats could materialize during the next
decade and what the potential implications
are for “gatekeepers” to mitigate the
threats.
The output of the methodology provides
organizations and decision-makers with
a framework to plan, prepare, and make
decisions in a complex and uncertain
environment. Threatcasting often guards
against strategic surprise. When a crisis
occurs or an opportunity presents itself,
a decision-maker or a leader is better
prepared. With this, their response is more
likely to be, “We have talked about this
before. We know where to start…”
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• Vision for 10+ yrs
• Threat futures
• A person in a place
experiencing the threat

Science Fiction
Prototype

Begin
Here

Vision
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Present
Gate
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Disrupt
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EVENT

1 Johnson, B. Vanatta, N. Coon, C., Threatcasting. pg i-285
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BACKGROUND AND DEFINITIONS

EDTS, WMDS, AND THE
W O R L D I N 2040

In this section, we provide definitions,
a background, and context to frame
subsequent discussions of the findings,
implications, and recommended actions.

THE WORLD IN 2040

This report asks the question, “How might Emerging Disruptive Technologies (EDTs)
increase the likelihood, lethality, and effectiveness of Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMDs) in kinetic warfare in 2040?” Before answering, it’s necessary to ask further
questions, such as: What does the world look like in 2040? Who are the actors creating
and escalating conflicts? What exactly are EDTs and WMDs?

While every strategic foresight exercise
runs the risk of simply extending present
trends, we can expect that the future
will not be a case of “either/or”, but
one more of “yes/and”. For instance,
we can reasonably assume the world
of 2040 will simultaneously be more
connected and fragmented. While new
information technologies continue to
increase the speed, scope, autonomy, and
interdependence of globally networked
systems, the COVID-19 pandemic was a
stark reminder of nation-states’ power
to close borders, restrict travel, and use
technology for biological surveillance and
control.
Over the next decade, software and
hardware will continue to relentlessly
bombard us worldwide, becoming more
deeply embedded in physical systems.
In doing so, however, they will introduce
systemic vulnerabilities and expand
cyberwarfare attack surfaces to an
unprecedented degree, producing an
interconnected world that is also buggy,
brittle, and hacked2. In fact, it is entirely
probable that cyberspace will be more
fragmented in the future as authoritarian
states increasingly impose sovereign digital
controls and aim to separate from the
global Internet.

The struggle for the commanding heights
of technology will intensify, as nationstates and their private-sector surrogates
race to stay ahead in such critical areas
as artificial intelligence and quantum
computing — where conceding advantage
to a rival is apparent only after it’s too late.
The rapid advances in these technologies
— as recently seen in OpenAI’s GPT-3 and
DALL-E 2 — will also empower individuals
to an unprecedented degree, granting them
access to tools that were unthinkable only
a few short years ago.
This tension between connection and
fragmentation will manifest in geopolitics as well. Great power rivalries
will persist, as China’s rise and Russia’s
invasion of Ukraine will alternately produce
new spheres of influence, splintered
technological systems, and isolated
financial systems. These rivalries will
be joined on the world stage by a new
generation of super-empowered individuals,
organizations, and other non-traditional
actors, ranging from technology moguls
to terrorist networks as well as groups
knowingly or unknowingly manipulating
people at scale through the use of selective
misinformation.
This will, in turn, produce new adversaries
whose motivations may defy traditional
models of deterrence. Their activities and
attacks will focus less on clear, legible
military targets and more on civil and
private infrastructure and institutions, such
as healthcare, agriculture, and energy.
This is also expected to lead to the slow,

2 Townsend, Smart Cities: Big Data, Civic Hackers, and the Quest for a New Utopia.

13

nearly imperceptible degradation of state
capacity. In fact, many institutions will
deny being attacked at all. In the past, civil
critical infrastructure has been a target for
adversaries, but the use of EDTs will allow
for broader, multi-faceted attacks across
multiple domains and targets to an extent
not yet seen.
The same is expected to be true for
climate change. By 2040, the mounting
destruction due to climate disasters will
be undeniable. Whether it will be extreme
storms, heat, fires, flooding, and/or the
impacts of rising temperatures, effects
will be disproportionally felt by poor and
marginalized communities (food scarcity
and reduced access to health care). This
will worsen social fragmentation, and
further erode basic prosperity and security
– also contributing to an overarching
trend of pervasive volatility and instability
in social norms and institutions whose
resilience was once taken for granted. As
new threats to both democratic societies
and rules-based international order emerge,
they will repeatedly test the adaptability of
our interconnected global systems, ranging
from the mitigation of carbon emissions
to supply chains to public health. All of this
will depend on a consensus reality that will
be under attack.
Consider a potential scenario whereby
another few decades of misinformation,
individually-tailored media, AI-driven
“deepfakes”, and the like will also wreak
havoc on domestic and international
politics. This may have the potential to

increase the strain on NATO nations in
the absence of an explicit threat of kinetic
warfare from a traditional adversary, such
as Russia. By 2040, the military capabilities
of NATO could be tautly stretched as the
alliance faces concurrent requirements to
monitor, police, and neutralize potential
adversaries before they directly threaten
Europe. This, in turn, could lead to NATO
members being vulnerable to “strategic
shocks” as military and civilian resilience is
tested.
The world of 2040 is one in which EDTs
threaten to exploit a connected world with a
“strategic shock” that leaves it exceedingly
fragmented.

WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION
Narrow definitions of WMDs include
nuclear and radiological weapons (all
types and yields), chemical weapons, and
biological weapons. The United Nations
refers to WMDs as a “class of weaponry
with the potential to, in a single moment, kill
millions of civilians, jeopardize the natural
environment, and fundamentally alter the
world and the lives of future generations
through their catastrophic effects.”³ The
United States Department of Defense
defines WMDs as “chemical, biological,
radiological, or nuclear weapons capable of
a high order of destruction or causing mass
casualties.” 4
These definitions fail to capture the broader
context of WMDs as weapons designed
to both terrorize and deter. The very idea

of these weapons is “weaponizable.” This
means the threat of deploying WMDs
is often as effective as the weapons
themselves (as it’s seen as a significant
escalation of both political and military
intent), which in turn causes a vastly
greater hesitation to use them.
Images of poison gas, mushroom clouds,
and horrific plagues deliberately and
effectively enhance fear and confusion.
Nation-state and non-traditional actors
alike typically resort to WMDs during long,
painful, and involved struggles in which the
mounting pressure to break a stalemate
sufficiently erodes norms against their use
and leads to further escalation.
The notion that WMDs are in a special
category unto themselves is codified both
in the elaborate models and doctrines
designed specifically for their use (e.g.,
mutually assured destruction) and in
decades of treaties against their testing,
use, and proliferation. This also makes
them ideal for false flag operations,
conspiracy theories, and great power mind
games used for strategic shaping. They are
more often wielded as imaginary weapons
to terrify and confuse, which only requires
that rare examples be made. For example,
even before dropping the first and only
atomic bombs on Hiroshima & Nagasaki in
August 1945, US Army Air Force (USAAF)
created a WMD-like effect with the
indiscriminate fire-bombing of Japanese

cities. Later, both the Cuban Missile Crisis
and U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (i.e.,
“Star Wars”) demonstrated how the threat
to deploy or defang nuclear WMDs could
alter the strategic and diplomatic global
standing in an instant.
In addition to being an exceptionally
powerful threat, WMDs are deadly weapons
to the extreme. When they are combined
with human manipulation, they become
even more terrifying. As such, it may be
the technologies of propaganda that most
amplify their effectiveness and lethality.
Not only does the threat of WMD use
increase the likelihood of actual use, it also
creates confusion about the definition of
who and what are considered “legitimate”
targets. This is where WMDs intersect
with the increasing lethality and shock of
such terrorist attacks as the 1983 suicide
bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut,
the Tokyo Subway sarin nerve gas attack
more than a decade later, and then in 2001
with 9/11. Strategic shocks such as these
ultimately create a paradigm shift on how
security and defense are considered.
Nature, of course, is the original WMD.
Some of the largest mass casualty events
have been natural disasters, such as the
COVID-19 pandemic and the 2004 Indian
Ocean. Today, the world faces climate
change. At one extreme, there is the
latest IPCC report that suggests a global
temperature rise of 3.2C by 2050 and at the

3 Jamshed, SARS-COV-2 AND THE WAR AGAINST WMD (COVID-19 SERIES).
4 Department of Defense, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 258.
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other, nuclear winter. Recent efforts to model interactions
between WMD use and climate systems suggest that
even limited use — a mere 100 Hiroshima’s worth of
yield — would lead to catastrophic global cooling, with a
subsequent shortfall in total food supply.5
WMD Weapons Platform
When this report refers to a traditional WMD, it is referring
to the entire system required to design, manufacture,
transport, store, command and control, target, and finally
deliver that weapon to its target. In this context, the report
explores how EDTs might increase the effectiveness and/
or lethality of WMDs by addressing at least one component
of such a system.

EMERGING DISRUPTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES (EDTS)

Additionally, two EDTs are potentially
forthcoming:

As the title would indicate, Emerging
Disruptive Technologies (EDTs) are an
umbrella term for a number of disparate
technologies that are both emerging —
from the laboratory stage to a step away
from mass production — and disruptive, in
that they pose opportunities and challenges
to the existing technological status quo.
Taken together, EDTs possess outsized
potential to

•
•

1) Accelerate conflict escalation and
lower the bar for the use of WMDs;
2) Replicate and/or enhance the lethality
and/or long-term destructiveness of
WMDs when paired together or used in
tandem; and
3) Offer dual-uses with defense and
security applications.
What qualifies as an EDT? Definitions vary
depending on which organization you ask.
NATO HQ, for instance, provides a number
of examples of EDTs, which are considered
the most disruptive. These include:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

AI,
Autonomy,
Quantum Technologies,
Bio-technologies and human
enhancement,
Hypersonics,
Space, and
Big Data.

Novel Materials and
Manufacturing & Energy and
Propulsion.

Another list of “game changing
technologies” by 2035 is offered by the
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC), including the following list:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Robotics,
AI,
Computing (Quantum, Big Data,
Sentient Data),
Cyber,
Additive Manufacturing,
Electronic Warfare,
the Internet of Things,
Swarms/Semi-Autonomous Systems,
Camouflage/Cover/Concealment/
Deception, and
Anti-Satellite technologies.

Turn the clock ahead to 2050, and TRADOC
adds:
•
•
•
•

Hypervelocity weapons,
Synthetic biology,
Power, and
Directed energy weapons and
energetics to their list

A third opinion is offered by the U.S.
National Intelligence Council, which
highlighted a number of emerging
technologies in its quadrennial Global
Trends 2040: A More Contested World
report published in March 2021. Their

5 Robock, A., Oman, L., Stenchikov, G. L., Toon, O. B., Bardeen, C., and Turco, R. P., Climatic consequences of
regional nuclear conflicts, Atmos. Chem. Phys., 7, 2003–2012, https://doi.org/10.5194/acp-7-2003-2007, 2007.
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future landscape is awash with yet a
different set:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Robotics,
the Internet of Things,
AI,
Virtual Reality,
Advanced Computing,
New Materials, and
Human-Machine Interfaces, to name
just a few.6

Finally, the U.S. White House published
its own list of “Critical and Emerging
Technology” affecting national security in
February 2022. This long list includes:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Advanced Computing,
Advanced Engineering Materials,
Advanced Gas Turbine Engine
Technologies,
Advanced Manufacturing,
Advanced and Networked Sensing and
Signature Management,
Advanced Nuclear Energy
Technologies,
Artificial Intelligence,
Autonomous Systems and Robotics,
Biotechnologies,
Communication and Networking
Technologies,
Directed Energy,
Financial Technologies,
Human-Machine Interfaces,
Hypersonics,
Networked Sensors and Sensing,
Quantum Information Technologies,

•
•
•

Renewable Energy Generation and
Storage,
Semiconductors and Microelectronics,
and
Space Technologies and Systems.7

There are many similarities between these
lists (and others), but also some important
differences.

For the purposes of this report, we only
chose EDTs that have the capacity to
increase the effectiveness or lethality
of WMDs. They are listed below in
alphabetical order and not necessarily in
terms of importance:

•

Advanced Computing (including
supercomputing, edge
computing, new architectures,
big data, and sentient data),

•

Advanced manufacturing,

•

Artificial Intelligence (including
human-machine teaming),

•

Autonomous Robotics,

•

Biotechnologies (including
synthetic biology, or “synbio”),

•

Cyber,

•

The Internet-of-Things
(especially relating to
government or municipal IOT for
infrastructure),

•

Hypersonics, and

•

Quantum Information
Technologies.

When EDTs are mentioned throughout
this report, we are referring to one or more
of the technologies on this list. Refer to
Appendix 1 for a brief explanation of the
EDTs with their respective current “state of
the state”

WMD EFFECTS
International law conclusively defines
WMDs. In this report, we do not suggest
that this definition be modified at this time.
Instead, during the workshop, we explored
what it would take, by a combination of
EDTs, to create an effect comparable to a
WMD.
Using Hiroshima and Nagasaki as the
standard by which to measure the effects,
we arrived at three unique features of a
(nuclear) WMD, described directly below:
• Shock-and-awe. The spectacle of
instantaneous and near-total mass
destruction of a city or other target.
• Horrific, catastrophic losses. Horrific both
in how they died and how many died in the
moments after detonation.
• Long-term effects. This refers to radiation
poisoning and fallout (medical long-term
impacts for individuals), but also applies
to the cumulative effects and generational
trauma of suffering from a WMD.
Given these factors, the question presented
to workshop participants was whether
EDTs paired with each other or traditional
kinetic weapons (i.e., anything but a WMD)
could achieve a similar level of destruction,
fear, and long-term destruction

6 The National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2040 - A More Contested World, 54-65.
7 Fast Track Action Subcommittee on Critical and Emerging Technologies, Critical and Emerging Technologies List
Update.
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DETERRENCE
To understand the problem of this report’s central research question, it’s necessary
to understand the concept of deterrence. One definition of deterrence is a “strategy
to prevent a target from taking an action that the deterrer finds undesirable through
manipulating the target’s perception of the costs, benefits, and risks of cooperating versus
defecting.” 8
As an example, while early military thinkers considered it approvingly in the context of
strategy, it wasn’t until the Cold War that a mix of conventional deterrence and nuclear
deterrence took center stage. NATO is an alliance of nuclear power counties and nonnuclear powers, expressly designed to deter the Soviet Union from a conventional invasion
of Europe. Nuclear deterrence was the “sword” of NATO deterrence, but conventional
deterrence was the “shield”.
The history and theory of deterrence is too comprehensive to address here, but we can
draw lessons from the Cold War that are still relevant in a future of EDTs. Below, we list six
primary lessons learned from related historical events:
1. Context and perception are critical. Motives are not always what they initially appear
to be, and each side sees through its own lens. The act of “signaling” is important
for deterrence strategies because the aim of the action is to shape an adversary’s
perception and to get them to behave in a certain way. In order to understand and
control what you are signaling, you need to understand how adversaries view those
signals. This requires we read signals and events in the light of an adversary's social,
cultural, economic, cognitive, and political environment. Throughout the Cold War,
each side told itself a story about their strategic situation and needs. Understanding
an adversary's story requires an understanding of the context in which it is written and
told.
2. “Know your enemy”. In the Cold War, we thought we knew who "The Communists"
were and based all strategies around that single perception. The U.S. spent
considerable resources and lost a great deal of global respect by supplying troops and
money to imperialist and anti-communist dictators around the world. This did not help
the U.S. cause, nor did it serve those locals who were caught in the crossfire. In fact,
these actions damaged stability worldwide. It took the U.S. many years to figure out
that the Chinese communists had different interests and perspectives than Moscow,
which in turn artificially limited our efforts to create stability for decades to come. Not
“knowing the enemy” was one dominant factor in the failures in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq,

and Afghanistan while creating a disconnect between political and military strategies.
One of the best strategic moves we can now make is to be hyper prepared for several
potential scenarios and outcomes. For instance, understanding China deeply will
be critical for us in the coming years, (e.g., China thinks about nuclear weapons and
strategy very differently than the U.S. does).
3. Learn from the past with nuance. History isn't a script, it's an epic set of interacting
patterns. We can learn a lot by following how past actions have unfolded, but we need
to think of this less as a rote lesson and more as a kind of intellectual fitness exercise.
We need to learn from the mistakes of the past. Understanding the way human beings
have interacted during times of crisis (and peace) teaches us what general things to
look for. Healthy observation and pattern analysis helps us think in non-habitual ways,
so we may anticipate the future in a realistic way. The following are three examples
that illustrate how we have, in a way, sabotaged ourselves due to limited thinking:
1. Nation states tend to plan for the last war that they have engaged in. For
instance, for decades U.S. strategy was fixated on the shock of Pearl Harbor;
therefore, nearly all they planned for during those decades was a massive sneak
attack from a totalitarian regime obsessed with destroying the west.
2. The lessons of the Cold War cannot be easily abstracted. Putin is “riding the
wave” like the one Hitler “rode” in the late 1930s. It would be a mistake, however,
to cast him in a role, even that of Stalin, which only fits a little better.
3. We've learned to wield the idea of
nuclear weapons, but it's not entirely
clear what we would do if presented
with the choice to initiate nuclear
war. Leaders often respond to the
existential threat of nuclear weapons
in unexpected ways. Eisenhower
leveraged nuclear weapons to
compensate for a conventional “drawdown”. Kennedy was prepared to press
the button over West Berlin. Nixon
played "madman". Reagan was almost
fanatically committed to nuclear
abolition.
8 Lonergan and Montgomery, What is the Future of Cyber
Deterrence?.
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4. It's easy to get sidetracked by a strategic plan. The concept of developing a nuclear
strategic plan is a problem and puzzle that has been worked on by generations of
smart, capable people. The U.S. government has spent billions of dollars on strategic
plans for global nuclear war over the course of decades. Many aspects of these
projects have amounted to little more than mental gymnastics and theoretical games
because we don’t have concrete data to test nuclear theories against. Many plans
have not been executable. The communication of the plans themselves is often
unclear with inconsistent and faulty “command and control”. Theoretical thinking can
take plans only so far and has a tendency to abstract things, like culture, geopolitical
context, domestic politics, and finance in a way that obfuscates and distorts reality.
Another thing to note is that if a strategic plan appears to be too logical and perfect,
it should throw up a warning flag. This is mostly because it is difficult or impossible
to test the plan against the abstractions of culture, etc. While it seems logical to
focus all efforts on planning for the worst, as was the case with both the U.S. and
USSR throughout the Cold War, a deceptively narrow focus tends to weaken strategic
flexibility. The value should remain in the action of planning, not the actual plan.

5. Complicated, seemingly stable systems can collapse with harsh speed. The U.S. was
not prepared for the collapse of the Soviet Union. As a result, we ended up fostering
conditions of economic chaos like those in Weimar Germany. As the Soviet Union
collapsed, the U.S. never envisioned, and thus had no plan to, contain the political
and economic shrapnel that resulted. One emerging threat was the proliferation and
control of nuclear material and delivery systems that occupied U.S. strategy for an
extreme length of time after the collapse.
6. People don’t want to use nuclear weapons. The fact that nuclear weapons have
not been used in war since 1945 is actually quite surprising. Nuclear weapons have
been threatened for deterrence or coercive purposes and used once before there
was stable nuclear deterrence to compel an end to a world war. This marks a distinct
difference from using the threat of nuclear weapons for coercion short of war. Given
the many close calls, both accidental and strategic, it's reasonable to call it a miracle
that we have avoided general nuclear war to date.
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INTEGRATED DETERRENCE
Integrated deterrence is the current change
in focus for the Department of Defense
(DoD) deterrence strategy. The U.S.
Secretary of Defense explicitly calls out
integrated deterrence as the way forward
for the Indo-Pacific area, with the goal of
signaling to China and its allies that the
U.S. and its allies will have technological
and operational overmatch. Secretary
Austin describes, “What we need is the right
mix of technology, operational concepts
and capabilities — all woven together and
networked in a way that is so credible,
flexible and so formidable that it will give
any adversary pause. We need to create
advantages for us and dilemmas for
them.”9
Deterrence activities are integrated across
all instruments of national power, including
diplomatic, military, informational, and
economic. Calculating deterrence will no
longer be a one-to-one matching of nuclear
weapons or a buildup of conventional
forces. Instead, it will be the ability of
allies and partners with common values to
quickly respond to international threat that
makes integrated deterrence a many-to-one
strategy against adversaries. In testimony
to the Senate Armed Services Committee
in 2021, U.S. Pacific Fleet commander,
Admiral John Aquilino, discussed deterring
China from invading Taiwan as a primary
objective for the Indo-Pacific region. He
said, “Those forces combined with the
international community, with our allies and

partners…would position us very strongly
for the deterrence required.” 10

and cyber vulnerabilities on their networks.”

The key ingredients of integrated
deterrence are unity with allies who
combine their available national strengths
(such as: inter-service integration between
land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace) as
well as superior strategy, which pushes the
boundaries of technology’s use to provide
deterrence against grey zone aggression.

In a White House summary of the strategy,
they state that “We will drive initiatives that
reinforce deterrence and counter coercion,
such as opposing efforts to alter territorial
boundaries or undermine the rights of
sovereign nations at sea.”14 In the future,
these deterrent initiatives will be joint,
multi-domain, as well as synchronized with
allies, and integrated across instruments of
national power.

Furthermore, cyber’s role in integrated
deterrence will be much more profound
than during the Cold War. Cyber operations
“are at their best not when they are
designed to create an effect in a moment
in time, but instead when they are part of a
larger strategy of obfuscation, deception,
and sabotage.” 11 Often, cyber effects are
temporary and the damage they inflict
can be reversible. This dynamic gives
policy makers options to lower tensions
when adversaries deescalate or be more
aggressive when indicators of increased
escalation are observed.
In fact, activities within cyberspace have
demonstrated how NATO and partners
might develop better integrated deterrence.
In July 2021, the European Union, NATO,
and the United Kingdom joined the United
States in exposing the malicious cyber
activities of People’s Republic of China
and its attacks on Microsoft Exchange
systems.12 Allies have also supported
the United States’ Cyber Command in
conducting over a dozen “hunt-forward”
operations against “adversary operations

13

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
The North Atlantic Treaty is the
foundational document of NATO, which was
formed to implement signatories’ intentions
“to safeguard the freedom, common
heritage and civilization of the peoples,
founded on the principles of democracy,
individual liberty and the rule of law.”15
Ratified in April 1949 by the twelve original
members of NATO and signatories, the
treaty contains 14 articles, three of which
are most relevant to this report. Outlined
below are excerpts from and interpretations
of these articles:
Article 3: “In order more effectively to
achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the
Parties, separately and jointly, by means

of continuous and effective self-help and
mutual aid, will maintain and develop their
individual and collective capacity to resist
armed attack.”
Interpretation: This is seen within NATO as
a mandate for member states to increase
their resilience in the face of natural
disasters, humanitarian crises, and armed
attacks. In 2016, the alliance adopted
seven baseline requirements against which
member states can measure their level
of preparedness. These requirements
include: contingency plans for continuityof-government and energy supplies;
maintaining the integrity of borders in
the face of uncontrolled movement of
people; and resilient food, water, health,
communications, and transportation
systems – all to ensure NATO forces and
civilian services are able to effectively
respond during a crisis.
Article 4: “The Parties will consult together
whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the
territorial integrity, political independence or
security of any of the Parties is threatened.”
Interpretation: Invoked only seven times
in the alliance’s history, most recently
following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, this
article is seen as the diplomatic precursor

9 Lopez, C. Todd, Defense Secretary Says “Integrated Deterrence” Is Cornerstone of U.S. Defense.
10 Shelbourne, Mallory, Military Takeover of Taiwan Is Top Concern for INDOPACOM Nominee Aquilino.
11 Lonergan, Erica, and Jacquelyn Schneider, Cyber Challenges for the New National Defense Strategy.
12 The White House, The United States, Joined by Allies and Partners, Attributes Malicious Cyber Activity and
Irresponsible State Behavior to the People’s Republic of China.
13 Williams, Brad D, CYBERCOM Has Conducted “Hunt-Forward” Ops in 14 Countries, Deputy Says.
14 The White House, Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States, 12
15 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), The North Atlantic Treaty
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to mobilizing NATO forces during a crisis
or emergency. In practice, it means one
or more members bringing an issue of
concern to the North Atlantic Council, will
result in political consultations that may or
may not lead to a joint decision or action
by the alliance as a whole. Any decision
requires consensus among all NATO
members.
Article 5: “The Parties agree that an
armed attack against one or more of
them in Europe or North America shall
be considered an attack against them
all, and consequently they agree that, if
such an armed attack occurs, each of
them, in exercise of the right of individual
or collective self-defense recognized by
Article 51 of the Charter of the United
Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so
attacked by taking forthwith, individually
and in concert with the other Parties, such
action as it deems necessary, including the
use of armed force, to restore and maintain
the security of the North Atlantic area.”

Article 5, provided the attack reaches
the level of an armed attack .16 This is
ultimately a political decision based on the
consensus of NATO members. NATO has
repeatedly affirmed that Article 5 extends
to cyberspace, and at the NATO 2021
summit in Brussel, it amended this to clarify
that the accumulation of cyber incidents
could warrant Article 5. At the same time,
the alliance has maintained strategic
ambiguity about the precise conditions
under which Article 5 might be triggered.17
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Interpretation: This most famous article
of the treaty has been invoked only once,
following the attacks of 9/11. Article 5 is
the heart of the alliance, assuring members
will come to the military aid of their
counterparts in the event of any attack,
but what constitutes an Article 5 violation
is not so clear in an era of disinformation,
cyberwarfare, “little green men,” and now
EDTs.
It is also important to note that an “attack”
does not necessarily have to be a kinetic
attack in the traditional sense to trigger

16 Upeniece, Conditions for the legal commencement of an armed attack.
17 Lonergan and Moller, NATO’s Credibility Is on the Line with its Cyber Defense Pledge. That’s a Bad Idea.

FINDINGS

INTRODUCTION

FOCUS AREA 1: EDTs Effects on
Traditional WMDs
Finding #1: Geopolitical Conflict
Escalation
EDTs initiate, facilitate, and escalate
existing geopolitical conflicts, increasing
the risk of general conflict and the use of
WMDs.

The primary data of this report comes from dozens of subject matter expert interviews
and multiple threat futures, and was generated in a series of workshops in March 2022.
Afterwards, a team of analysts conducted a post-analysis to identify patterns and clusters.
With a focus on the central research question, six main categories or “threat spaces”
emerged from the analysis.
In this Findings section, we describe all six “threat spaces” within two separate categories
that encompass two different focus areas.
The first three “threat spaces” focus on nuclear WMDs and how EDTs will increase
their effectiveness and lethality. These threats explored how EDTs may accelerate the
escalation of geopolitical conflicts, “lower the bar” for the use of nuclear weapons despite
longstanding taboos, and how they might afford insider threats an outsized impact on the
global security landscape.
The second three “threat spaces” have a focus on how EDTs might be combined with
each other to attack critical infrastructure, producing a “WMD effect” without resorting
to the use of traditional WMDs. This might in turn lead to “long-game” attacks on civilian
infrastructure or systems, such as energy grids or agriculture. A combined assault has the
capacity to eschew mass casualties from WMDs in favor of nearly imperceptible attacks
that degrade a target’s integrity, eventually equaling the long-term effects of a traditional
WMD attack.

The advent of nuclear weapons, followed
by a growing Soviet arsenal, led to the
adoption of “escalation theory” in the
1960s intended to understand, predict, and
strategize how a localized crisis between
state actors might trigger a cascade of
events leading to a general conflagration.
EDTs accelerate, complicate, and scramble
these classical models of escalation and
deterrence.
In 1962, RAND strategist, Herman
Kahn, developed a 16-18 (later 44-) step
escalation ladder19, which mapped out
the conditional shows of force, acts of
violence, and confrontations leading to an
“all-out” war. Crucial to Kahn’s model is the
importance of both context and thresholds.
Successful de-escalation depends on
opposing actors’ mutual ability to perceive
and interpret each other’s motives and
intentions — without risking runaway
escalation. Relatedly, escalating crises
never proceed smoothly or inevitably from
one rung to the next, but are tripped up at
critical thresholds that act as firebreaks

on decision-making.20 During and since
the Cold War, WMDs acted as the ultimate
firebreak, which even the Korean War or
Cuban Missile Crisis could not cross.
EDTs short-circuit Kahn’s and others’
models in several respects. They scramble
contexts through the use of AI and other
rapid detection- and decision-making
technologies that may obfuscate or
deliberately mislead opposing plans
and intentions. They can be used after
an initial provocation to misdirect and
misinform, creating strategic ambiguity,
while running the risk of escalation through
misattribution. These risks are amplified by
non-state actors’ enhanced capabilities. For
them, EDTs potentially carry more “bang for
the buck” than either WMDs or conventional
weapons when it comes to effects versus
cost and complexity.
There are numerous EDTs that rely on
AI in some form. Examples show up in
many forms, such as an autonomous
drone swarm deployed by a state actor
or terrorist organization; a hacked civilian
infrastructure leading to self-crashing cars;
or a compromised NC3 system. Instances
such as these run the risk of escalation
through their sheer speed, lack of human
oversight, and confusion. Unsupervised
AI systems threaten to overwhelm human
decision-makers’ OODA loops. Specifically,
their ability to “observe, orient, decide, and
act” in response to adversarial moves, while

18 Kahn, Thinking About the Unthinkable. 185.
19 Davis and Stan, Concepts and Models of Escalation
20 Kreps, S. Schneider, J., Escalation firebreaks in the cyber, conventional, and nuclear domains: moving beyond
effects-based logics
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remaining opaque to human judgement.
These in turn create overwhelming pressure
to “trust the system”. Contrast this with
the case of Soviet Lt. Col. Stanislav Petrov,
whose snap decision in 1983 to disregard a
launch detection by a malfunctioning earlywarning system, may have averted nuclear
war.21
Future leaders like Petrov may not have
the ability to intervene in a world of
highly automated, autonomous, and
interconnected systems. For example, in
one of the 2040 scenarios created for this
report, an enterprising German researcher
unwittingly penetrates sensitive systems
related to China’s Social Credit System.
His intrusion is interpreted by Chinese AI
as a state-sponsored attack, automatically
triggering retaliation against Germany’s
energy infrastructure. This in turn leads
to consultation among NATO allies as to
whether the incursion rises to the level of
invoking Article 5. In no case do humans
enter the loop until after autonomous
systems’ moves and countermoves had
created and escalated a crisis.
Some well-meaning actors might trigger
a crisis of misattribution unknowingly.
While other malicious state- and non-state
actors will do so intentionally, perhaps
in concert with the use of other EDTs or
even WMDs. Using emerging technologies,
such as generative AIs (e.g. deep fakes;
GPT-3; DALL-E 2) nested within nextgeneration social media networks, actors
will find it increasingly cost effective to

create confusion at scale, while the rapid
deployment of countermeasures will only
grow more time-consuming and difficult. As
a result, EDTs are a recipe for escalation.

Finding #2: Lowering the Bar
EDTs will “lower the bar” for using WMDs.
One reason the nuclear WMD threshold
hasn’t been crossed since Nagasaki may be
the “nuclear taboo”22, a normative stigma
powerful enough to “stay the hand” of even
the most rational strategist. Other WMDs
also carry taboos about their use, however,
these taboos may be weaker and only
elicit condemnation or outsized reactive
policy responses. Conventional weapons
and EDTs don’t carry the same stigma
as WMDs. This is probably because the
policies governing EDTs are not mature or
widely agreed upon across international
bodies. Societies also rarely understand the
cause and effect of their weaponization.
For instance, they do not fully understand
how extensively a weaponized EDT can
damage or disrupt normal life, whereas
nuclear explosions produce glaring
destructive outcomes.
EDTs risk facilitating and accelerating
the crossing of escalation thresholds,
and threaten to lower the bar for the
deployment of WMDs. This is partly due to
the expanding pool of potential participants
to include non-state actors and others who
have never lived in the shadow of WMDs
or ever had reason to consider the nuclear
taboo within their planning cycle.

For example, in one such scenario from
Threatcasting participants, members
of Boko Haram, supplied with sarin
gas by Russia in a proxy struggle with
NATO, deploys a swarm of camouflaged
autonomous drones to disperse the nerve
agent across Lagos. This action kills
hundreds of thousands of people and
results in millions of refugees fleeing to
Europe. As a local proxy, Boko Haram
makes what they believe to be an accurate
assumption that the traditional deterrent
of force on their operations by NATO is
mitigated by both Russia’s support and the
threat of a rapidly escalating humanitarian
crisis. Combining EDTs such as robotics,
AI, and mimetic camouflage enhance the
potential efficacy of WMDs. It also places
them within reach of non-state actors
whose acceptance of escalation insulates
them from typical deterrence.
For state actors, the risk is the opposite.
Attacking with EDTs may create a rung
on the escalation ladder that trumps the
nuclear taboo. In such a case, the presence
of EDTs and/or WMDs on both sides might
heighten tensions and lead to a situation in
which one decides to either strike first or
escalate with EDTs. This in turn, runs the
risk of the perpetrator being met or counterattacked with overwhelming force with
seemingly no other choice than to use a
nuclear WMD

Finding #3: New Insider Threats
EDTs will enable, embolden, and amplify
both old and new insider threats.
The use of EDTs will introduce
new vulnerabilities and produce
disproportionate effects from insider
threats with widely varying behavior. The
intentions and effect of insiders can only
be detected and modeled with difficulty.
EDTs will amplify their roles as vectors,
enablers, and unwitting accomplices in
an unpredictably exponential manner,
propelling them to the global stage and
enabling them to affect “geopolitical
dominos”.
In contrast to adversaries with clearly
stated or observable intentions,
insider threats may arise from things
such as a sense of injustice, personal
desperation, ignorance, or even unknowing
manipulation. In addition, they may serve
as deployment-and-delivery systems,
such as ferrying drones and otherweaponized robotics through criminal
logistics networks. In another scenario,
one might imagine them doubling as
unsuspecting carriers of personalized
synthetic bioweapons that target world
leaders or other persons-of-interest.23 They
could conceivably act as radicalized “lone
wolves” abusing access to dual-use EDTs,
such as cyber or quantum.
In yet another Threatcasting scenario,
a Seoul National University quantum

21 Chan, Stanislav Petrov, Soviet Officer Who Helped Avert Nuclear War, Is Dead at 77.
22 Tannenwald, Nina, The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use, 433–68.
23 Hessel, Goodman, and Kotler, Hacking the President’s DNA.
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researcher deceives their naïve assistant
into hacking North Korean nuclear
command, control, and communications
systems (NC3) under the guise of a
simulation. This researcher’s mentor, a
North Korean refugee whose family was
purged and persecuted by the regime,
consequently, obtains control of the DPRK’s
nuclear arsenal and retargets one of its
weapons to detonate above Pyongyang.
The surviving leadership, understandably
assuming a first strike by the West, orders
nuclear retaliation against Seoul and a
hypersonic attack on Seattle. The first
salvo’s death toll is in the millions.
In addition to the above-mentionedscenarios, EDTs can be used to create or
augment insider threats themselves. Cyber
and AI manipulation are projected to be
applied to compromise the mental health
and security of personnel with access to
critical systems. In this manner, EDTs can
be combined to create novel pathways for
escalation. Combatting such threats will
require a comprehensive approach that
moves beyond traditional vigilance and
deterrence to encompass mental health,
domestic disinformation, and corruption.

FOCUS AREA 2: EDTs and Combined
EDTs That Bring About WMD Effects
Finding #4: WMD Effects
Combining EDTs will create a “WMD effect”
— novel attacks with the hallmarks of WMDs
although not typically classified as such.
One reason the nuclear taboo exists is that

even in the absence of further escalation,
nuclear WMDs create effects that are
different in kind as well as magnitude.
The horrific spectacle of instantaneous
destruction, mass death, and chaotic
disruption…ranging from millennia of
contamination to nuclear winter24 …places
WMDs in another category altogether.
However, by pairing or combining multiple
EDTs, such as robotics, AI and autonomous
systems, quantum, and hypersonics, state
and non-state actors can achieve the
speed, scale, and destruction of WMDs
without crossing the nuclear threshold.
As noted above, this will simultaneously
escalate and lower the bar for the actual
use of WMDs.
While unlikely to replicate the full scope
of WMD effects in a single attack, novel
pairings of EDTs will succeed in achieving
both immediate shock-and-awe and longterm degradation of the target’s strategic
resource. For example, cyber and quantum
weapons might be deployed against civilian
energy or transportation infrastructure to
instigate a local or regional attack with
global shocks. Examples include such
attacks on Ukraine’s power grid in 2015
and 2016 (and allegedly in 2022)25 , or
conceivably hacking personal vehicles to
create widespread collisions, chaos, and
deaths. More subtle attacks on critical
social systems, such as healthcare,
agriculture, finance, industry, and politics
will have less visibility, but potentially more
profound effects over time.

Such strategic combinations of EDTs will
embolden actors who would otherwise
be unwilling or unable to employ WMDs
and risk nuclear escalation. Workshop
participants proposed a future scenario in
which China pairs a hypersonic show-offorce — sinking a pair of its own vessels
in international waters off the coast of
the United States with an unprecedented
autonomous drone strike on Taiwan’s
military infrastructure. In this case, with its
now-established hypersonic capabilities
acting as a deterrent against naval
intervention, China’s swarm destroys the
island’s defenses in startling fashion,
achieving a fait accompli backed by the
implicit threat of nuclear escalation.
This participant’s Threatcasting scenario
is notable for the absence of conventional
forces. Rather than attacking the island
with amphibious landings and capital ships,
EDTs are capable of attaining strategic
goals on their own. In this way, combining
EDTs offers more “bang-for-the-buck” for
non-state actors traditionally denied access
to WMDs and states that will find them
more cost effective than nuclear options.

Finding #5: Destabilizing Critical
Infrastructure
EDTs will be deployed to destabilize
complex systems to achieve the long-term
effects of a WMD.
The initial shock and destruction of
combined EDT attacks will be accompanied
by more pervasive and insidious efforts

to achieve the long-term degradation of
the opponent’s strategic resources and
capabilities. In turn, reducing its will and
capacity to fight. The primary targets of
these incursions will be the complex and
interdependent systems undergirding
nations and the international rules-based
order. Examples of these systems are
energy and infrastructure; healthcare;
agriculture and food production; trade and
finance; industry and raw materials; and
other institutions essential to a functioning
society.
The second- and third-order effects
of these repeated attacks will be an
erosion of trust in the affected systems
and institutions with the ability to create
crises, unrest, and strategic paralysis. In
the absence of an antagonist through an
explicit attack with WMDs, the effects of
these EDTs will be internalized, politicized,
and increasingly intractable amidst
domestic disputes. Breakdowns of social
systems will manifest unpredictably
through public disorder, infrastructure
failures, domestic terrorism, and eventually
large-scale effects that will present
themselves as collapsing birth rates,
rising deaths, and a steady decline in life
expectancy.
This type of destabilization will
be accelerated through outright
misinformation and manipulation. Once
again, EDTs such as cyber and AI will
be instrumental in both maximizing the

24 Robock, Oman, Stenchikov, Toon, Bardeen, and Turco, Climatic consequences of regional nuclear conflicts.
25 Conger, Ukraine Says It Thwarted a Sophisticated Russian Cyberattack on Its Power Grid.
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efficacy and concealing perpetrators
responsible for attacks. An early example
of this dynamic is the 2016 “Heart of
Texas” protest secretly fomented by
the Russian Internet Research Agency
through opposing Facebook groups used
to galvanize interest.26 With recent rapid
advances in generative AI, it is not difficult
to imagine how EDTs combined with insider
threats will continue to corrode public trust
and potentially spur populations to war.

Finding #6: The Long Game
EDTs enable a new “long game” approach
to creating WMD effects over time.
The greatest threat posed by EDTs
compared to WMDs is their imperceptibility.
Through the creative and deliberate use of
EDTs to attack, destabilize, and undermine
critical systems, political will, and social
cohesion, opponents might achieve the
strategic effects of a WMD without their
target’s population even being aware they
were the victims of an attack.
In addition to economic inequality and
political polarization, EDTs might also
be employed to explicitly attack entire
populations without detection. The
COVID-19 pandemic has underscored how
even a virus with a low positivity and deathrate has the propensity to trigger global
upheaval. This is seen through broken
supply chains, closed borders, and a longterm public health crisis. Future advances
in virology and genetics raise the possibility

of deliberately infecting and debilitating
populations over years – to include
indirect effects in rising healthcare costs,
declining productivity, skewed dependency
ratios, and other phenomena with dire
consequences.
Another domain of concern is agriculture
and the environment, which are both
currently under stress in the West due to
climate change. The global struggle by the
U.S., China, and regional powers to secure
a global food supply has already produced
allegations of agricultural espionage,
intellectual property theft, and genetic
tampering.27 For example, imagine a
modified virus attacks wheat or soybeans
rather than human beings, which would
trigger crop blights, soaring food prices,
and societal breakdown. This could, with
relative ease, be fueled by information
EDTs.
The implications of this imperceptible
“long-game” attack vector are sobering.
EDTs may simulate the effects of WMDs
without detection, and unlike the detonation
of a nuclear missile above a city, society
itself might be the attack surface

26 Riedl, Strover, Cao, Choi, Limov, and Schnell, Reverse-engineering political protest: the Russian Internet Research
Agency in the Heart of Texas.
27 Genoways, Corn Wars.
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BACKCASTING

1.

FLAGS

EDT Technical Progresses and Break Throughs

FLAGS DEFINITION
The Threatcasting methodology maps out possible and potential threats 10 years in the
future and attempts to identify the flags or indicators that serve as signals that a specific
threat future is underway. Sometimes referred to as “signals”, these flags can give an early
warning that a possible future threat is in progress or beginning to form. Often, flags are
sequential with less apparent precursors and with more alarming flags over the horizon.

EDT AND WMD THREAT INDICATOR AREAS:
The data from the workshop provided three cluster groups of flags that will signal the
progression and development of EDTs. These groupings apply to all six findings listed
earlier in the report. Listed below, they are a place for organizations to begin to monitor the
progression of EDTs:
1. EDT Technical Progress and Break Throughs,
2. Geopolitical, Cultural, and Business Trends, and
3. Early Use, Rehearsals, and Attacks.
In this section, we provide details for each flag grouping as well as examples pulled from
the workshop data. These indicators are not complete or definitive; however, are a place
to start. An organization should investigate its own monitoring activities and use the
following as a beginning guide

Monitoring the progress and potential technological break throughs for emerging
disruptive technologies is the primary landscape to monitor. It will be important to monitor
the progress of multiple EDTs at the same time, as it is the combination of multiple EDTs
that have the potential to increase the lethality of traditional WMDs or WMD-like effects.
Below, we provide an overview of the most critical EDTs to monitor as well as where to find
and how to monitor them.
Review of Critical EDT(s)
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Advanced computing - including supercomputing, edge computing, new architectures,
big data, and sentient data;
Advanced manufacturing;
Artificial Intelligence - including human-machine teaming;
Autonomous Robotics;
Biotechnologies - including synthetic biology;
Cyber;
Industrial IoT - especially governmental or municipal IOT for infrastructure;
Hypersonics; and
Quantum Information Technologies.

Where to Look and How to Monitor
The indicators will occur in multiple areas, including academic research, private industry,
corporate research and product offerings, as well as government and military research.
The first two areas, academia and private industry, should be generally simple to monitor,
while the remaining areas are likely more difficult to identify because of the efforts of
nation states and militaries to protect their secrets
Academia and Private Industry
It may seem like monitoring the progress and development of EDTs is a daunting task.
However, there are specific key areas that can be observed to give an organization early
and robust indicators on the development and use of EDTs.
A large part of the early-stage experimentation and development of EDTs will occur in
academic and research institutions. A key metric to observe in this area are publications,
presentations, and public lectures. Academia follows the motto of “publish or perish”,
which pushes university researchers, professors, and students to produce a constant
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stream of papers and lectures, which publicize the successes and progress of their work.
An academic search and monitoring of these areas focused on EDT development will
provide insight into their progress.
Additionally, academic research is often funded by government and foundation grants.
These calls for research proposals, funding award notifications, progress reports, and final
results are publicly searchable and trackable.
Private industry research and development is not as transparent. The strategic value of the
development of EDTs will be seen as a corporate secret. However, progress can be tracked
through patent fillings, early product offerings, and support staffing.
Patents are typically filed five to ten years before the technology or breakthrough is ready
for public use. Patents need to be filed with various global patent offices. These patent
documents outline, in detail, the progression and uses for the technology requiring a
patent. The constant monitoring of patent filings for specific EDT technologies will give a
long-range window into the development progress as well as who is submitting patents in
these areas.
A more short-term indicator of the progress of EDT development can be found in publicly
available product descriptions and early-stage marketing. The information may be about a
hardware or software offering with an overview of the technology and its capabilities. Like
patents, the product offering will also indicate which organizations and companies are
participating in the development.
Finally, hiring notices or support staffing can give a mid-term indicator of EDT technology
development in industry. For an organization to bring an EDT to market, they need a
specific set of expertise and skills associated with the technology. Monitoring calls for
applicants around key EDT terms will give organizations a clear indicator that an EDT is
being prepared for release
Government and Military
Successful monitoring of the EDT development progress within government and military
organizations will also be key. It is anticipated that some of these EDTs will be designed
and developed within various security environments, and therefore, not discussed in public
forums.
For instance, the U.S. Intelligence Community scientific and technical intelligence

organizations will need to use a comprehensive set of ways to capture intelligence,
including:
•

•
•
•
•
•

•

Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) - to include Communications Intelligence (COMINT),
Electronic Intelligence (ELINT), Technical ELINT (TechELINT) and Foreign
Instrumentation Signals (FISINT);
Human Intelligence (HUMINT);
Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) - to include Imagery (IMINT) and geospatial
information;
Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) - to include such things as
thermal infrared heating imaging, acoustic signatures, and seismic data;
Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) - to include foreign open source acquisitions
(gray literature) and patents;
Foreign Materiel exploitation - to develop knowledge on the capabilities and
performance of foreign weapon systems, including chemical and biological
weapons, future weapons concepts, and developing technologies that have
potential military applications; and
Counter-Intelligence (CI) Activities – to determine foreign collection priorities
in order to secure U.S. knowledge. This includes CI agents gathering foreign
technology development knowledge to augment U.S. technology development
efforts.

In addition, these organizations need to use horizon scanning for early detection and
assessment of emerging technologies and threats. Identifying intelligence analytics
will integrate data with behavioral, biometrics, forensics, and other associated identity
signatures. This will in turn further identify key academics, engineers, and scientists
developing new technologies and weapons. Organizations will need to model and simulate
weapons capabilities and performance based on their understanding of technology
developments. Assessing what technologies are needed based on the expected future
operating environment will be important as well as conducting doctrinal gap analysis
to determine required weapon systems and technologies. Additionally, there will be a
need to track technology proliferation, production, and manufacturing capabilities. These
organizations will work with U.S. technology and weapons developers to understand both
obstacles to development and capability results.
There is a need to prioritize intelligence collection on the most stressing threats to U.S.
national interests, key adversaries, competitors, and technology innovators. Functional
areas of concern include WMDs and cyber. Priorities for further intelligence collection will
also be based on identified knowledge gaps in the intelligence communities’ analysis.
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Example Indicators of EDT Progress

•

•

These are some of the indicators (flags) on the technological progression and
breakthroughs associated with the development of EDTs. They were taken from the
Threatcasting workshop and then synthesized and clustered by the analysts. Additional
indicators from current and projected trends for each ET area are also included. The
results indicate that organizations should monitor:
•

•
•
•
•
•

Advances in virtual, augmented, and mixed reality (AR/VR/MR) systems to the
point that they are fully immersive with limited technological barriers.
Supercomputing, which reaches speeds of hundreds or thousands of exaflops
(50 or more times faster than the fastest supercomputers of 2022)28 and pushes
artificial intelligence and scientific discoveries into new territories.
Overly restrictive domestic (United States and European Union) regulations on
supercomputing, high-performance computing, and AI applications that allow
unregulated markets to have an advantage.
A reduction in funding from federal sources that slows the development of
national advanced computing objectives.
The corporate appetite for more data, which makes industry a better source of
intelligence than national intelligence systems.

A broad range of S Y N T H E T I C B I O L O G Y A D VA N C E S , including:
•
•
•
•
•
•

•

•
•
•

Advances in A D VA N C E D C O M P U T I N G , such as:
•

Further development to perfect synthetic biology and virus creation, lowering the
complexity and cost.
Pairings of synthetic biology technology with other EDTs.29
Synthetic biology specificity that improves microtargeting at the individual level.
The expansion and deepening of the connection between cyber technologies and
synthetic biology.
The expansion and deepening of the connection between nanotechnology and
synthetic biology.
Government approval for greater genetically modified organism use in food,
medicine, and other industrial applications (e.g., plastics, clothing)

Expansion of A RT I F I C I A L I N T E L L I G E N C E adoption and applications, including:

•
•

The development of Adversarial AI applications that attack other AI and
cybersecurity systems.
Widespread adoption of synthetically fabricated video, audio, and pictures (socalled Deep Fakes) with cheap (“as-a-service” model) or open-source tool sets.
AI education and career opportunities that reach a tipping point and pushes China
into a position of global dominance within the field of AI.
Widespread adoption of AI-generated “social credit” programs that reward or
restrict citizen behavior.
Demonstration of human-out-of-the-loop decision making for nuclear command
and control systems.

Advances in the development and use of A U T O N O M O U S T E C H N O L O G I E S ,
such as:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Progress and implementation of autonomous systems for uses in supply chain
and shipping.
Industrialization of an autonomous credit ranking system that is ready for
deployment and use in the market.
Further development of perfect drone swarms’ autonomous behavior and
navigation, especially in a GPS-denied environment.
Novel weaponized applications of drones in all environments (e.g., air, land, sea,
space), including the use of drones to deliver WMDs30.
Standardization of counter-drone policies and technologies31 that provide
malicious users knowledge of legal and technical boundaries to push against.
Expansion and regulation of the drone insurance and liability industry.
Demonstration and doctrinal employment of drone swarms in combat situations32.

Advances in A D VA N C E D M A N U FA C T U R I N G , including:
•
•
•
•

The creation of new materials capable of being 3D printed.
The development of chemical weapons that can withstand explosive kinetic
delivery systems.
Nanotechnology that enables objects to harvest energy from their environment.
“Self-healing” or self-assembling materials through nano-scale engineering

28 Department of Energy, U.S. Department of Energy and Cray to Deliver Record-Setting Frontier Supercomputer at
ORNL.
29 Scown and Keasling, Sustainable Manufacturing with Synthetic Biology, 304–7.
30 Kallenborn and Bleek, Swarming Destruction: Drone Swarms and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
Weapons, 5–6.
31 Garrett-Glaser, Drone Security Near Airports a ‘Wicked Problem,’ Says FAA.
32 Kallenborn, The Era of the Drone Swarm Is Coming, and We Need to Be Ready for It and Hambling, What Are
Drone Swarms And Why Does Every Military Suddenly Want One?
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•

Within the C Y B E R D O M A I N :
•
•
•

•

INDUSTRIAL IOT:
•
•

•

A greater coupling of IIoT sensors with edge computing and localized, automated
decision-making processes (e.g., artificial intelligence or modeling).33
Increased automated decision making on the controls and outputs of IIoT rather
than just the sensor data (e.g., adding water treatment chemicals, opening and/or
closing of dam flood gates, and other cyber physical systems).

HYPERSONICS:
•
•
•
•
•
•

•

Global clarity on where the “red lines” exist for malicious cyber activities and the
nations that are following through on promises to defend those red line intrusions.
Further development of regulations and policies about data collection, storage,
processing, privacy, and ownership.
The deepening of connections between cyber technologies and other EDTs (i.e.,
through connectivity, speed, data, security, or risk management frameworks).

Construction of advanced testing facilities that can support wind tunnels beyond
Mach 10.
Multiple successful tests of hypersonic glide vehicles prior to proof of fielding.
Russian or Chinese hypersonic technology sales to other nations.
Development of hypersonic weapon detection and interdiction technologies.
Progress towards international standards for hypersonic weapon controls.
Continued advancement of on-board, edge computing technologies that improve
targeting response once a hypersonic vehicle is launched.

Q UA N T U M T E C H N O LO G Y:
•
•
•
•

Further development of quantum technologies to the point where solutions and
activities are observable, such as proof of breaking sophisticated encryptions.
Improvement in sourcing materials for manufacturing quantum computers, such
as improved purity, reduced defects, and reduced “noise” in materials.34
Scalable technical advances, such as error correction techniques, room
temperature capable quantum computers, and chip miniaturization advances.
Increased investment in logistics and financing of quantum development.

Projected Threat Curves for EDT Development
As an organization monitors the progression and development of EDT technologies, it is
possible to identify key changes and influences in the development cycle that can disrupt,
slow down, and/or hasten the deployment of the EDT. Additionally, it is important to
identify if the EDT has a dual-use35 , and where the technology has both a positive effect
and negative impact. For example, nuclear technology is a dual-use technology. It can be
used for good, as is the case in developing power plants, but can also be used to harm the
population, as is the case in developing nuclear weapons. In addition, by recognizing the
influences and dual-use capabilities of EDTs, organizations can make informed decisions
about their response to the development of EDT technologies.
The following is a breakdown of the threat curves for each EDT:
Advanced computing, which includes supercomputing, edge computing, new
architectures, big data, and sentient data. Influences on advanced computing mainly
come from academia and private industry. Over the decades, as advanced computing
has become more normalized into global society, it can be seen as an “environment” or
condition from which many opportunities and threats can arise. The market success and
capitalization of these technologies drive their development - with strategic shocks or
innovations coming from new products and the application of advanced computing to
new uses. Developing advanced computing within government and military applications,
especially those that are government funded, can advance or hasten the speed of its
development.
The disruptions in this area can come from the two areas of business or implementation
failures and government regulation. Just as industry supplies the capital to fund the
development of this technology, the failure of the technology to be monetized can disrupt
its development. As industrial use of advanced computing solutions grows and turns into
“big business”, there is a physical point where governments will step in to regulate the
technology. This can slow down the development of the technology and place restrictions
on its use – normally, for the safety of consumers.

33 Boyes, Hallaq, Cunningham, and Watson, The Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT), 1–12.
34 Leon, Itoh, Kim, Mehta, Northup, Paik, Palmer, Samarth, Sangtawesin, and Steuerman, Materials Challenges and
Opportunities for Quantum Computing Hardware
35 Dual-Use Definition: Traditionally, the term “dual-use” is used to describe items that can be used for both
military and civilian applications. Throughout this report, we use the term to describe EDTs that can be used for
both good and bad purposes
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Advanced computing is a strong dual-use
technology, as it provides a platform for
business and social benefit, while at the
same time, providing a platform for crime,
information warfare, infrastructure attacks,
and civil unrest. However, over the decades,
advanced computing has become woven
into the fabric of 21st-century life, making it
hard to completely disrupt its progression.
Advanced manufacturing. Advanced
manufacturing is mainly driven by
industry, as its advances are integrated
into existing business processes. This is
also true for militaries that have similar
use cases to incorporate its applications.
The advances in its development are tied
directly to monetization efforts and industry
investment.
Disruption as well as strategic shocks
or innovations are generally rooted in
materials science, especially in the case
of 3D printing. Advances in the materials
used to manufacture different industrial
and biological products have both a great
positive and negative influence. Currently,
government regulation is not a large factor
in the development of this technology. As
the industries around the technology grow,
however; it may be possible to imagine
government restriction in this area.
Advanced manufacturing is also a dual-use
technology. However, it has mostly positive
uses with industrial applications. The
main negative purpose it’s used for is in
the manufacturing of weapons, especially
nuclear and biological weapon systems.
This could also change the nature of

weapon systems in that weapon systems
could be designed and built as “individuals”
for a specific purpose, and therefore
would be harder to build systems to defeat
them. It would also allow for individuals
or less powerful states an opportunity to
build advanced systems, as they would

Artificial Intelligence (which includes
human-machine teaming) and
Autonomous Robotics. Artificial
Intelligence (AI) and Autonomous Robotics
are two separate EDTs that share similar
threat curves. They are different in that
AI is solely a software platform, where

industry design fall within the 80% center
of the curve, where a lot of data exists, and
the impact of errors may cause a company
to lose market share. In contrast, the use
cases for defense applications exist within
the lower percentage tails of the bell curve.
Here the data is sparse, the environment

just need to steal the CAD drawings, and
use advanced manufacturing methods to
create the weapon systems.

autonomous systems are a mix of software
and hardware.

is actively contested and congested, and
the results of errors can lead to unintended
deaths. Similarly, defense use cases for
autonomous robotics differ from general
society needs. Therefore, R&D for these
EDTs will occur in a multitude of different
locations.

Industry, academia, and government have
all driven the research and growth of these
technologies. Early-stage development
was typically funded by the government
in research labs and academia. When the
technology had sufficiently progressed,
it was transitioned to industry for
commercialization. Currently, the majority
of investments for these technologies
occurs in industry. Like most industrydriven technologies, commercialization and
monetization are key drivers for success.
However, these technologies are unique in
that they serve a role outside of exclusive
consumer usage.
Another fact, however, is that AI and
robotics are and will be continuously used
in military and defense environments. This
will give them a more stable development
pipeline as opposed to those developed as
purely commercial technologies. Because
military and defense use cases are different
than industry, basic R&D will continue
in military and academic settings until
they have progressed to the point where
they can be transitioned to industry. For
instance, consider AI development within
a bell curve. Most of the use cases that
36 Nield, Is Deep Learning Already Hitting its Limitations?

Disrupters to these AI technologies fall
into the two categories of regulation and
innovation. Currently, both technologies
are being investigated and debated about
where and when they need to be regulated.
This regulation could limit development and
slow progress. Secondly, there are currently
significant technological hurdles that need
to be crossed in order for EDT innovation to
advance.
During the last two decades, AI has also
progressed mainly in one specific area,
called Machine Learning (ML). These
advances have been commercialized and
are being used successfully in multiple
industries. However, there is a debate as
to whether advances are still possible in
AI.36 The debate revolves around the types
of AI that might be the next frontier for
innovation. DARPA describes that we are
currently in the 2nd wave of AI (statistical
learning) and is investing in high-risk, highpayoff projects associated with the 3rd
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wave of AI (contextual adaptation).37 In
this wave, the systems will think and reason
much more like humans and be able to
understand what is going on contextually,
based off of only a handful of data points
or examples.

and academia.

Robotics has also seen explosive growth
in the past two decades. This has been
driven by the cost of computational
power dropping as well as the physical
hardware (e.g., servers, motors, sensors,
batteries, etc.), which has been dropping
in cost as well. Continued advancement
of this EDT will depend on a long string
of breakthroughs and advances in the
machinery, sensors, connectivity, and
supply chain as well as cost, business
models, and materials. The slowdown
of any one or more other of these could
disrupt the large-scale development of the
EDT.

The scrutiny of biotech is high because
many aspects of it touch living organisms,
the production of living organisms, and
at times, the altering of human DNA. If
regulated, it could limit development and
slow down progress significantly. It is
important to note that this debate and
possible regulation does not apply to all
countries.38 The COVID-19 global pandemic
has also made the world more aware of
the consequences of a biological or viral
threat. Furthermore, the hesitancy or
misunderstanding of the field could disrupt
its progress.

Both EDTs have a strong dual-use. They can
be used for a wide range of industrial and
civil activities, while at the same time, being
weaponized.
Biotechnologies, including synthetic
biology. Industry, academia, and
government have all driven the research
and growth of biotechnologies. Earlystage development was typically funded
by the government in research labs and
academia. When the technology sufficiently
progresses, it’s then supposed to transition
to industry for commercialization. This
transition has not happened yet. The
majority of investment for biotechnology,
therefore, is now occurring in government

Disrupters to these technologies fall
within the two categories of regulation
and innovation. Currently, this EDT is being
investigated and debated as to where,
when, and how they need to be regulated.

In addition, there are significant
technological hurdles that need to be
crossed to allow this EDT to advance. These
hurdles center around commercialization
and realistic applications areas.
Biotech has a strong dual-use. It can be
used for a wide range of industrial and
civil activities, while at the same time, be
weaponized.
Cyber. The main influences on cyber are
from government, academia, and industry.
Over the last decades, cyber has been used
as a broad term, focused more on cyberattacks and cyber defense or cybersecurity.
As the field has become normalized into
global society, it is now also seen as an

“environment” or condition from which
many threats have arisen. Government
and military applications, especially
development that is government funded,
can advance or hasten the speed of the
development. The market success and
capitalization of cyber has been focused on
defense and security with strategic shocks
or innovations coming from new products
and applications.
The disruptions in this area can come from
increasing regulation, currently focused
on infrastructure and the use of cyber
as an offensive weapon. Because of its
implications to national and international
security, this EDT is likely to be intensely
watched and debated over for the
foreseeable future.
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Cyber is a strong dual-use technology that
provides a platform for crime, information
warfare, infrastructure attacks, and civil
unrest, while also providing an industrial
and government opportunity for defense
and security. Unlike other EDTs included
in this report, it is the intent behind the
deployment of cyber capabilities that
determines if the use is positive or
negative. This dichotomy of intent is similar
to the difference between the use of a
nuclear warhead or a nuclear power plant.
The science and technology are the same,
but the intent and desired effects are in
complete opposition with each other.
However, over the decades, cyber has
become woven into the fabric of 21stcentury life, making it difficult to disrupt its
progression.

37 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA), DARPA Perspective on AI.
38 Inglesbya, Ciceroa, Riversa, and Zhangb, Biosafety
and biosecurity in the era of synthetic biology.

Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT), especially, government or
municipal IIoT incorporated into critical infrastructure. Industrial
IoT is mainly driven by industry, as its advances are integrated into
existing business processes. The advances in its development
are tied directly to monetization efforts and industry investment.
Additionally, most recommendations for the incorporation of this
EDT into military or defense forces have an almost identical usecase model to industry use cases.
Currently, there are few signs that this EDT will see government
regulation since it has been seamlessly merged with existing
industrial applications. Often in the U.S., the decision to regulate
is strongly correlated to the application’s industry versus the
technology on its own merits. However, this may not apply if the EDT
is used in applications where public funds are invested or civilian
lives could be endangered by its misuse or failure. The use of public
funds and the possible danger to the lives of citizens differentiates
this use of IoT from IIoT. With these two factors, there is a high
probability that it will be more heavily regulated, which in turn is
likely to slow its progress and adoption.
Innovation is a second area that could disrupt IIoT, such as with
robotics. In the past ten years, we have seen the wide commercial
adoption of IoT, and the drop in cost of computational power and
physical hardware (e.g., microphones, sensors, batteries, etc.).
Continued advancement of this EDT will depend likewise on a long
string of breakthroughs and advances in the machinery, sensors,
connectivity as well as supply chain, cost, business models, and
materials. The slowdown of any one or more of these could disrupt
the large-scale development of the overall EDT.
IIoT has a weak dual-use. Most of the applications are positive
and are compatible with current business activities. However, the
increased use and adoption of this EDT does make it a platform
that can be hacked or hijacked to be used for an attack. This means
that the IIoT devices themselves are not being weaponized, but
the interconnectivity of them provides new attack opportunities for
adversaries.

Hypersonics. Of all the EDTs, hypersonics is the most unique. Their development and
advances are so expensive that they are almost entirely driven by government and
military applications. Technology innovation hurdles and global regulations will be the
key disruptors, as hypersonic missile systems have a direct effect on national and global
security. In particular, hypersonic and glide-boost systems compress the decision-making
timelines and emphasize first-strike doctrine that may lead to crisis instability.39
Hypersonics are also unique to this list because they are a weak dual-use technology
because their main purpose is to be used as a weapon. The U.S. has made it a point to
research hypersonics with the intent to arm them with conventional warheads, but China
and Russia have not ruled out the nuclear option for their programs.40
Quantum Information Technologies. Quantum technologies are still in the theoretical and
early-stage of development. Currently, the potential of this EDT far outweighs the reality of
its effects. However, if perfected, it will have a considerable impact on encryption, digital
security systems, and the advancement of new materials productions. The influences
and development of this EDT are taking place across all sectors, including academic,
government, and industry. There are considerable efforts underway in scientific research
and development of potential counter measures to mitigate the effects of Quantum
technologies.
The disruption to quantum information technologies is considerable and mainly technical
and scientific in nature. To bring this EDT into broad use, significant scientific advances
need to be made in the field of quantum mechanics, materials design, technological
design, and software development. If any one of these scientific categories is not
developed to the degree it needs to be, then the progress of the EDT will be disrupted.
Because of the massive effect that Quantum technologies could have, regulators are sure
to keep a close watch on developments and breakthroughs. When the technology does
become viable, considerable regulation will disrupt its progress.
This EDT has a strong dual-use. Currently, most parties are focusing on the potential ill
effects, as mentioned above. However, it could also bring about significant advances in
materials technology and new materials creation.

39 Sayler and Woolf, Defense Primer: Hypersonic Boost-Glide Weapons.
40 Kunertova and Dominika, Weaponized and Overhyped: Hypersonic Technology.
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2.
Geopolitical, Cultural, and Business Trends
The threat futures in this report depend heavily on the
conditions in which the EDTs are deployed to increase the
lethality of WMDs or produce WMD-like effects. This scope
is beyond the monitoring of the technological progress of
EDTs, and the conditions or trends will span geopolitical,
cultural, and business applications.
If an organization monitors these indicators, it will improve
their ability to see the developing conditions that contribute
to the increased probability and susceptibility to threat
futures. The grouping of these trends is broken into the
following three areas, since the places and people needing
to be monitored will be different.
•
•
•

Geopolitical - refers to nation states, local and national
governments, and militaries, etc.
Cultural - refers to civilians, the general public, and
media opinions, etc.
Industry - refers to the private sector, corporations,
industry, and trade associations, etc.

Geopolitical
The global geopolitical stage can provide organizations with a clear environment to
monitor changes, shifts, and advances. Observing the political shifts of different countries
as well as their approach to international relations will be key indicators. These changes
will lay the foundation for an atmosphere that will make the six findings and possible
threats more likely to occur.
Organizations should monitor:
• The escalation and rise of tensions and loyalties between state vs. federal entities.
• The increase of local and national government affiliations with separatist movements.
• Evidence of the weakening of treaties with specific examples of treaties being
violated.
• Several nuclear issues, including broad international calls for denuclearization,
evidence of the sale of fissile material to individuals (not states) as well as the
emergence of the development and availability of tactical nukes.
• Changing policies and behaviors indicating an acceptance of the usage of limited
tactical nuclear devices.
• The escalation of minority suppression under the guise of terrorist threats.
• Increased economic and cultural divisions within societies.
• The exclusion of specific groups or countries from the national or international
conflict resolution process.
• If the U.S. intelligence community is slow to adapt to EDTs.
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Cultural
As the geopolitical landscape can indicate
actions and attitudes of governments, so
too can cultural shifts indicate changes
in public sentiment. These shifts can be
subtle at first or initially documented by the
media or special interest groups. Changes
in culture influence both geopolitical and
business sectors as well. They can have
a powerful effect on the atmosphere and
norms around the use of WMDs and EDTs.

and/or if increasing urbanization
continues to strain infrastructure for
those who cannot afford to move.
•

Organizations should monitor:
•

Changing consumer opinions and
behaviors, such as when they begin
to express a high trust in autonomous
systems decision-making, show signs
of blind faith in security and security
breaches. Other signs include when
they exhibit dependence on poorly
secured IoT or a willingness to divulge
personal health info, and/or when
political divides cause them to ignore
science-based findings and facts in
favor of identity politics.

•

Purposeful use of disinformation on
the general public to confuse and fuel
tensions.

•

An increasing wealth gap that creates
two specific sets of protections for
consumers, such as those who can
afford to pay for protection and security
and those who cannot. Yet other
indicators would be the rich moving to
fortressed, off-grid rural safe havens

•

If technological improvements,
proliferation, and advances of EDTs
and adjacent technologies begin to
accelerate disintegration of society.
This condition begins with many
assumptions, namely causality and
correlation issues. Is it even possible
that disinformation could degrade
society? Think of social media
platforms competing for ad revenue
and your personal data; news outlets
“soapboxing” to be heard over the
volume of "news”; and the connectivity
of phones having immediate access
to all these information flows. Each
system contributes, but more research
is needed to show causation.
The increase of mental health
challenges, which raises questions
around rational actor theory. Extreme
stress or an overwhelming sense of
helplessness, such as death of family,
existential threats, etc. may change
someone's reservation to kill or may
push them to extreme action

Industry
Much of the development of EDTs will occur in the private sector. Monitoring the business
or industrial sector for changes and advances can provide key indicators along with the
technical progression outlined above. Because industry will drive the development and
adoption of EDTs, the adoption and use in normalized business operations will be a key
indicator of future adoption by consumers and governments.
Organizations should monitor:
• The increased commercialization of space.
•

•
•
•

The increasing of business practices that are dependent on automation at scale.
Examples of this are greater AI involvement in supply chain operations and when
industry begins to express, exhibit, and implement a dependence on poorly secured IoT.
If industry begins to express, exhibit, and implement a blind faith in security and the
belief that security breaches are a one-off.
The evidence of increasing capital investments in synthetic biology startups.
Technology services and platforms, such as GitHub that are given access to and begin
to monetize genetic data and models.
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3.
Early Use, Rehearsals, and Attacks
The final grouping of indicators combines EDT technological progress and breakthroughs
with the geopolitical, cultural, and business trends that set conditions for WMD effects.
This grouping of indicators illustrates a ramping up of severity over time. Organizations
need to track EDT early use, rehearsals, and attacks. A description of each is provided
below:
• Early Use. Early use does not necessarily indicate adversarial action, but simply the
adoption of technology or any of the practices above that improve the conditions for
an adversary’s advantage.
• Rehearsals. Rehearsals are generally tests that take place to prove that a strategy
works, to show a technology can achieve a specific effect, and/or to show others that
an attack is possible.
• Attacks. Attacks are the final step as an indicator. These early attacks may have a
greater magnitude than a rehearsal, but they are early enough for organizations to
mitigate their effects and prepare for recovery

Rehearsals
Rehearsals are the next step in the indicator process that can show an organization that
an EDT attack is imminent. In many attacks, adversaries will practice or rehearse their
attacks. They are, in fact, testing the attack(s) to make sure that it is possible and to
refine their approach. These activities have been seen in military41, law enforcement and
terrorist attacks42. Often these rehearsals take place in environments with less security or
oversight, so that the test will go undetected.
Organizations should monitor:
• Evidence of groups practicing and perfecting new EDT tactics in simulations.
• The practice of maneuvers and the development of hardware and software
technologies to perfect the effective use of drone swarms.
• The practice of tactics and the perfecting of hardware and software technologies to
combine synthetic biology, virus creation, and/or nanotechnology.
• Early evidence of individuals and/or groups manipulating the IoT outside of a
laboratory or research setting.
• Evidence of the use of camouflaging technologies to mask EDT delivery systems.

Early Use

Attacks

The early use of EDTs is the first step that will indicate that an EDT threat is likely to occur.
For many organizations when early use is detected, activities shift from disruption of
the threat to mitigation tactics. In other words, the threat cannot be stopped and now its
effects must be lessened.

Attacks are the final step in the monitoring process. When early-stage attacks are
discovered, organizations can move from disruption and mitigation tactics to recovery
plans. Because the evidence of attacks is highly evident, this report does not focus in
detail on them. However, the specific attacks below could indicate that a larger attack is
imminent. These attacks are typically just the first step in a long and more destructive
chain of events.

Organizations should monitor:
•

•
•

Early use and adoption of Autonomous Systems, such as connecting NC3 to
automated decision making; the acceptance and use of greater AI involvement in
intrusion detection; and the publication of doctrinal changes in how these systems
can be used.
Evidence and increased instances of adversarial hackers given leeway to do what the
official state cannot.
The emergence and evidence of multination coordinated cyber attacks.

Organizations should monitor:
• Evidence of attacks on critical electricity and water infrastructure.
• Evidence that NC3 upgrades can be hacked from outside the system.
• Observed changes in the norms of greater nuclear use that shift to using tactical
nuclear weapons.

41 Sevastopulo, US defence chief warns of China ‘rehearsals’ for attack on Taiwan.
42 JCAT, Counter Terrorism Guide.
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M O T I VAT I O N S
A significant part of creating an effects-based model is to imagine a threat actor and
what things need to be in place for them to be successful. Participants in Threatcasting
workshops spend considerable effort thinking about what variables enable the actor’s
success. Main factors to consider are the motivations, values, and objectives that drive the
threat actor’s actions.
WMDs have a potential for death and chaos on such a massive scale, that they have been
front-and-center in U.S. national defense narratives since the time of President Eisenhower,
and were formalized in the U.S. National Security Strategy of 1990.43 Articulating the
influence of WMDs on national strategy, the Council on Strategic Risks suggests, “Beyond
the use of nuclear weapons for deterrence, it is clear that some actors likely consider using
WMD in order to capitalize on their disproportionate psychological effects and for their
significant advantage of mass publicity.”44 In other words, NATO members must consider
the advantages provided to the wielder of WMDs. They need to identify the motivations
of those with access to nuclear weapons who often differ significantly than those “homebrewed” synbio agents in a makeshift lab. It is to the latter type of actor that we consider
having different motivations.
We assessed that threat actors fall into three general categories with a fourth category
that describes certain conditional states that take the threat further. Each actor category
contains several broad motivators. These actor categories and respective motivators are
discussed below.

43 Bajema, Definitions Matter: The Role of WMD in Shaping U.S. National
Security Strategy.
44 Ibid.
45 Nesser, Single Actor Terrorism

SINGLE ACTOR, WITHOUT
SUPPORT
In our data, the single actor category
(usually described as an individual) tends
to use EDTs to create WMD-like effects
without external support or funding from
a nation state. Often, insider knowledge or
access is critical to single-actor success.
Petter Nesser, writing in Perspectives on
Terrorism, illustrates current terrorism
literature in separating “lone wolf” terrorists
acting on their own from solo terrorists
acting with support from a larger group.45
These actors are motivated to use EDTs
or WMDs for three reasons. The first is for
personal financial gain, where the actor may
use the threat of WMDs to coerce a ransom
or payment from their victims. Additional
motivators explored by our models in this
category include criminal theft or fraud,
getting the “life one deserves”, or even a
seeming altruistic goal of providing for one’s
family.
The second motivator for single actors
is to vindicate an ideological slight or a
personal grudge. For example, one of the
Threatcasting teams imagined how Dr.
Kaitlen Barnes uses an experimental form
of a topical chemical weapon transfer
to kill her less-qualified, yet more rapidly
promoted male coworkers. Dr. Barnes then
takes the weapon global to further liberate
women from male oppression. Likewise,
another Threatcasting team considered
the driving effect of a hyper-intelligent
quantum researcher who sought additional
recognition for his unappreciated research.

“Dude”, the name of the story’s threat actor,
sells his quantum research to a terrorist
organization via the dark web and assists
them in assembling a 3D-printed nuclear
device that detonates at a New York City
New Year’s Eve party.
The third motivation was unknown.
Namely, some single actors become
threats for unknown reasons, or may
even be tricked into enabling a WMD-like
effect. This category is the most terrifying,
simply because there are fewer indicators
preceding the WMD event. Threats in this
category may be enabled by misinformation
or disinformation, and the actor might even
believe they are correcting the natural order,
according to their beliefs.

NON-NATION STATE GROUP
The next category of actors are non-nation
state groups. We distinguish these from
single actors without additional support
because the models separated out
several individuals with interconnected
responsibilities. However, the non-nation
state group includes incidents of violence
or terrorism conducted by a single actor, but
with explicit support from a group, which
is often associated as a named terrorist
organization, religious cult, or ideological
faction. Our distinction is that non-nation
state groups also are not misled or tricked
into their attacks, and normally take their
actions because of financial or ideological
reasons. Actual examples outside of the
Threatcasting simulations include the 2017
suicide bombings in Mogadishu, Somalia,
that killed at least 588 people, injured
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another 300; and the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo
sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway that
injured over 5500 people.46
Over the next decade, non-nation state
groups will continue to employ EDTs
to make their attacks more lethal. For
example, a Threatcasting team imagined
hackers from Hackers of Planet Earth
(HOPE) whom setup quantum relays in
China to investigate how the Chinese
national military command uses AI to direct
their nuclear forces. In this scenario, HOPE
inadvertently triggers China’s AI-based
detection program and escalates nuclear
tensions around the world.
A different Threatcasting team visualized
the impact of camouflage technologies in
preserving Boko Haram’s growing stockpile
of AI-enabled drone swarms in the group’s
efforts to demonstrate their dissatisfaction
with the Nigerian government’s
modernization plans.

STATE ACTORS
The third category of actors are clearly
linked to nation states, even if that country
uses a “single person” as part of their
purposes. Although it is rare for a single
actor to represent the interests of an
entire nation, the effects-based models of
Threatcasting purposefully use the story
of a person experiencing the threat. The
motivators for state actors are distinct from
the motivators of a single actor, and include
furthering offensive strategies, reacting
defensively, and/or improving sovereignty,
ethnic, or national superiority.

Offensive strategies are nation-state
actions that indicate aggressive changes
or political dominance often through
coercion or threats of force. As an example,
a Threatcasting team envisioned how
Pakistan begins to normalize and accept
the use of “miniaturized conventional
physics devices” or small tactical nuclear
bombs. Continuing with this scenario,
Prabal, a Pakistani artillery battalion
commander, receives authorization to fire
one of these tactical nukes on a larger
Indian force, which successfully wins the
skirmish.
In a similar vein, a different Threatcasting
team imagined China using multiple
EDTs, including drone swarms, AI, robotic
amphibious vehicles, and hypersonic
weapons to rapidly seize Taiwan, and
directly confront the United States’
political position towards Taiwan. In this
scenario, Chinese leaders declare any U.S.
interference would be cross their nuclear
red line.
There are several models in which the
Threatcasting participants imagined state
actors using EDTs to progress a position of
sovereignty, ethnic, or national superiority.
In these models, the state focuses inward
on its own population or to neighboring
countries to influence a localized or regional
response.
In a model imagined by a Threatcasting
team, China used advances in synthetic
biology, combined with DNA collected
from on-going population suppression
operations in the Xinjiang Province, to

develop biological weapons that specifically
targeted Uyghur phenotypes. This model
illustrates the Chinese Communist Party’s
position on the genetic superiority of Han
ancestry.

CONDITIONAL STATES
Rather than requiring a threat actor to
actively become involved in creating a
threat future, there are circumstances in
which no actor is involved, yet the threat
continues to escalate. In these situations,
there is no threat actor attempting to meet
a criminal, ideological, or nation-state
objective. A conditional-state threat appears
as an unforeseen circumstance when a
combination of one or more EDTs interact
together to create a WMD-like effect. A new
conditional state might appear when EDTs
collide with a changing environment, such
as climate change. This includes natural
disasters, especially a disaster that causes
nuclear fallout to contaminate a wide area.
For example, a Threatcasting team
imagined how many unforeseen
interactions exist with current technologies
and future quantum devices. In this model,
China develops a quantum-based radar that
is capable of detecting submarines under
the water. An accidental interaction with the
quantum radar technologies and nuclear
material causes a U.S. submarine carrying
nuclear missiles to explode. Tsunamis and
long-term radioactive fallout affect millions
along the coasts of Taiwan and China.

46 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), The Global Terrorism
Database (GTD).
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A C T I O N S T O B E TA K E N

To develop responses to future threats, NATO uses a framework of “Outs”. These Outs
are actions intended to out-compete adversaries. They describe aspects of strategic
preparation and operational readiness to confront and defeat adversarial uses of EDTs and
WMDs. The six Outs are Out-Think, Out-Excel, Out-Fight, Out-Pace, Out-Partner, and OutLast. They frame our analysis and help us to synthesize our workshop participants’ visions
for NATO actions, investments, and responses to future threats. Additionally, each of the
six Outs has multiple subcategories we consistently apply across each of our six findings.
Some subcategories were more relevant to a particular finding than others. Additionally,
the number of recommended actions does not imply importance or priority. Each alliance
member will need to consider how best to implement these recommendations individually
and collectively.

OUT-THINK THE ADVERSARY
How and what should NATO and alliance members do to out-think their adversary?
How can they anticipate the adversary’s plans, create awareness of their actions prior
to an attack, and make faster, more effective decisions once threats are revealed? To
start, members must have correct information. NATO’s mutually trained intelligence
processes and personnel are critical for gathering and understanding the vast amounts
of data, information, and processed intelligence needed to out-think the adversary. Our
data suggests this understanding arrives from several mutually reinforcing activities,
including exploratory basic and applied research, detection and sensing, data sharing, and
anticipatory decision-making informed by wargames at the individual country level

1. RESEARCH AND INTELLIGENCE GATHERING.
Examples are utilizing detection and surveillance
technologies along with sensemaking, data sharing,
and anticipatory decision-making processes. This
category includes intelligence activities which enable
NATO members to explore, understand, and anticipate
new threats, actors, and events in which EDTs can
escalate conflicts and heighten the risk of WMDs. It
includes three subcategories..
a. Research and anticipatory decision-making. NATO
must redefine the threat landscape around EDTs
through research and anticipatory decision-making
that explores potential incidents and actions
related to WMDs. Broader research in this area will
give NATO and members a better understanding
of the possibilities and threats from EDTs. These
activities should include:

63

•

•

•

•
•

•

Understanding the ramifications of non-traditional, non-nation-state actors
with access to WMDs or EDTs capable of producing WMD effects as well as
how these alter alliance preparations and decision-making.
Enhancing resilience by investigating vulnerabilities to attacks aimed at
industrial and critical infrastructure, designed to destabilize national and
international stability.
Exploring potential benefits from human-and-machine-paired systems aimed
towards halting conflict escalation and aiding in rapid decision-making during
attacks.
Investigating further potential threats from dual-use EDTs, the pairing of EDTs
for WMD effects, and how such threats alter decision-making and preparation.
Considering how the development of EDTs may shift the advantage to
an adversary, and therefore change their typical posture to seize new
opportunities.
Exploring the ramifications of a nation-state or organization at odds with
NATO which are achieving dominance in a specific EDT, especially those
associated with decision-making and disinformation

b. Sensing and sharing. NATO can begin the sensing phase of the global
development of these technologies once corresponding EDTs have been
researched and defined, and their possible applications explored. The research
and anticipatory decision-making (outlined above) will inform NATO about the
factors to watch out for. Once the indicator of the progression and use of EDTs
have been established, NATO can begin sharing this information across member
organizations.
Traditionally, disruptive technologies emerge as poorly understood and marginal
threats to the business practices of well-entrenched competitors. Only later, does
the combination of their low costs, unforeseen uses, and new adopters prove to
be troublesome. Given the dangers posed by EDTs, NATO must raise the bar on
sensing the emergence and potential of new threats and technologies as well as
share the information among members and institutions in time to coordinate an
appropriate response. Below, we recommend actions for NATO to take in both the
Sensing and Sharing categories.
i.

Sensing
•

Develop sensing networks and partnerships to monitor the development and
progress of nascent EDTs on their path to weaponization, such as 3D-printed

•
•

•

ii.

explosives, biogenetics, human enhancement, and quantum, etc. Monitoring
should take place in government, private industry, academic, and criminal
settings.
Monitor adversarial nation-state actors, such as China, Russia, and Iran as
well as their cooperation on the development and use of EDTs.
Expand capabilities to monitor EDT acquisition and testing by non-state
actors and individual, insider threats motivated by ideology, financial gain, or
other reasons.
Develop early indicators-and-warnings (I&W) systems to watch for the
weaponization of EDTs and/or their association with WMD development.

Sharing
•

•

•

Strengthen partnerships to monitor and exchange information regarding EDT
development, testing, and associated misinformation regarding nation-state
actors, non-nation-state, and/or non-traditional groups, as well as individuals’
actions.
Enhance the sharing and utilization of information and real-time analysis to
create better situational awareness and security agency collaboration across
member states.
Create formats for intelligence sharing and communication that are salient,
actionable, and digestible through all levels of partner countries and
organizations.
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2. EXPLORATORY R&D This refers to partnering with private industry, academia, and
research institutions to guide and accelerate the development of EDTs and their
countermeasures. Recommend actions for NATO are to::
•

Not limit themselves to addressing EDTs as they emerge, but rather actively
conceptualize, partner, and develop critically important EDTs and their
countermeasures. Some EDTs, such as cyber and quantum, require more
robust security measures, while others such as AI, biogenetics, and robotics
will be critical for the alliance’s own deterrence capabilities. Understanding the
possibilities and limitations of EDTs are instrumental in predicting their evolution
and countering them effectively.

•

Encourage and coordinate with alliance members and organizations to draft and
execute a research agenda for high-priority EDTs. Development should be pursued
with both the aim of better understanding these technologies and designing
effective countermeasures and actions to prevent adversarial use.

•

Focus this research agenda on considering the novelty and unique features of
each technology, rather than attempting to retrofit EDTs to existing doctrine and
scenarios.

•

•

3. COLLABORATIVE WARGAMING AND PLANNING. This refers to simulating,
exercising, and considering how threats might behave as well as the anticipatory
and post-event actions a NATO member might take at an individual level to disrupt,
mitigate, and recover from a threat event.
The recommend action for NATO here is to conduct new wargames and similar
exercises at both the alliance- and individual-member level to explore threats and
events involving EDTs that may lead to conflict escalation and the use of WMDs.
These events will test members’ current communication and collaboration around
such threats and start the development of new playbooks for countering EDTs. In
these exercises, members should explore how:
•

•
•

Coordinate closely with partners in private industry to encourage the investment
and development of critical EDTs. High priority areas for development include AI,
autonomous robotics, hypersonics, biotechnologies, and quantum, etc.

•

Liaise with members and partner organizations to explore rebalancing defense
spending away from kinetic capabilities and toward infrastructure and capacity
building in technological regulatory and enforcement bodies

•

•

New combinations of actors, threats, cultural divisions, and EDTs create scenarios
which simultaneously heighten the potential for escalation and lower the bar for
WMDs. Answer the questions, what conflict thresholds are crossed more easily,
and under what conditions might WMDs be conceivably used?
Non-traditional, non-nation state, and irrational actors with access to EDTs alter
traditional strategies and methods for deterrence.
EDT attacks on critical infrastructure might produce systemic failures, and what
the consequences of those failures — along with accompanying second- and
third-order effects — might look like.
NATO’s steps to recover from an attack with WMDs or paired EDTs that may
create WMD effects.
EDTs enable “long game” attacks on critical infrastructure and industrial targets
that might otherwise go undetected.
Best to detect, deter, and disarm insider threats armed — knowingly or
unknowingly — with EDTs. Address what safeguards, deterrence mechanisms,
and civil society programs might be effective in lowering risks posed by actors
who are financially desperate or ideologically radicalized.
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OUT-EXCEL THE ADVERSARY
In this section, we address how and what NATO and alliance members should do to
out-excel the adversary. We answer: How do they strive for excellence in development,
detection, and deterrence? What research and investments should they make? What
initiatives should they design? -And what actions must occur across the spectrum from
peace-to-crisis-to-conflict, both simultaneously and continuously? Achieving excellence
depends in part on understanding adversaries’ motivations and capabilities; investing in
the training, expertise, and tools necessary to counter potential threats; and developing
shared infrastructure and capabilities to guide and regulate the evolution of these
technologies.
1. DEVELOPMENTAL RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT (R&D). This refers to the
preparation of technologies, systems, institutions, and regulations for the evolution
of EDTs from exploratory R&D to full-scale production, commercialization, and
weaponization.
As EDTs evolve beyond proof-of-concepts and prototypes, NATO and its members
must be prepared to develop, manufacture, operate, and regulate these technologies
at scale. This requires building the necessary skills, supply chain, production
capabilities, and training as well as the legal and policy frameworks needed to ensure
responsible use and avoidance of proliferation. With that said, recommended actions
for NATO in this category are to:
•

•
•
•

Develop new detection systems and counter-measures for biological WMDs (and
dual-use medical research) aimed at both humans and agriculture, that can be
paired with EDTs.
Support research into quantum sensors and appropriate counter-measures to
prevent the detection of submarines in the nuclear triad.
Encourage investment in biodiversity through sponsorship of academic R&D and
assistance in research with commercial partners.
Develop a data protection scheme for open-source data sets used in training EDTs
to prevent exploitation by adversaries and data corruption.

2. TRAINING AND BEST PRACTICES. Here we mean the establishing of best practices
for the detection and monitoring of EDTs, intelligence gathering, and sharing. Included
with these is investing in the creation of training and research centers for educating
NATO staff on the dangers of escalation and WMD effects.

Understanding EDTs’ potential to transform conflict, accelerate escalation, and
produce WMD effects without the actual use of WMDs will require broad investment
in the research and development of new best practices for their detection and
monitoring. This in turn will require NATO and its members to invest accordingly in
new training and skills to instill these best practices at every level of the alliance.
Doing so demands the creation of new facilities, centers of excellence, and tools
to prepare NATO staff to meet these challenges. In order to accomplish this, we
recommend NATO:
•
•

•

Lead the development of a cross-alliance training environment for EDTs, with an
emphasis on their potential to escalate conflicts and create WMD effects.
Lead the creation of a research center to better understand the motivations of
traditional adversaries, non-nation-state actors, and insider threats as well as the
ramifications of their access to EDTs.
Coordinate with members to invest in tools and establish standards and best
practice for EDT detection and monitoring, intelligence gathering, and tracking
development of dual-use technologies (e.g., AI).

3. PURCHASES & INVESTMENTS. In this section, we are referring to the
recommendation of expenditures for the mature or nearly-mature technologies,
processes, and systems needed for safeguarding critical infrastructure and systems.
One of the most dangerous aspects of EDTs is their ability to achieve long-game
WMD effects with minimal warning or detection. Attacks on critical infrastructure and
social systems, such as agriculture, health, and energy can lead to an overall erosion
in quality of life, public trust, and ultimately political will that degrades the alliance’s
ability to fight. As EDTs reach maturity, NATO must invest in both their development
as well as the creation of safeguards against threats from adversaries, non-traditional
actors, and insider threats. Recommended investments and activities for NATO
include:
•

•

•

Encouraging alliance members and partner organizations to strategically invest
in private industry and academia to create industrial policies that prioritize the
development of critical EDTs.
Urging members to increase investment in critical infrastructure for national and
global defense. Specific emphasis should be placed on systems most vulnerable
to long-game attacks, including food security and agriculture, energy, health, and
democratic processes.
Creating a biogenetic, weapon-sensing apparatus for early detection, along with
established plans for mitigation and recovery in the event of an attack.
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OUT-FIGHT THE ADVERSARY
How does NATO out-fight the adversary? How does it deliver deterrence, defend the
integrity of the alliance, enhance security outside its members, and ensure it maintains
both a decisive military advantage and political cohesion? Combatting potential threats
from EDTs will require doctrinal, operational, and strategic changes to both deterrence and
preparing for conflict. How should NATO expand-and-enhance its warfighting capabilities
to meet adversaries armed with EDTs?
1. CHANGE THE WAY WE FIGHT. Here we refer to doctrinal, operational, and strategic
formation changes as well as updates to ideology, communication methods, resource
staging and distribution plans, and information operations. An example of this is
counter-disinformation programs.
An EDTs’ ability to simultaneously escalate conflicts while lowering the bar for WMD
use, creates a new level of complexity when capabilities are massed. This scenario
could rapidly escalate through the overwhelming creation of multiple dilemmas (both
in frequency and magnitude). This in turn, would create multiple, inter-locking wicked
problems resulting in decision paralysis. Additionally, non-nation-state actors armed
with EDTs may create outcomes that are beyond the scope and capabilities of a
traditional military alliance response. NATO should coordinate closely with members
and organizations to adjust tactics in preparation for EDTs’ unique capabilities by
drawing on lessons from previous “Outs”.

Institutional and operational resilience must be assured
in order to ensure offensive capabilities can be enacted
without significant repudiation. This will require NATO
to further invest in:
•

Expanding its information warfare capabilities to
combat disinformation and create more effective
cross-cultural international communication. These
operations should include more time for factchecking, validation, and attribution of activities,
attacks, and consequences.

•

Embracing AI-aided decision-making, keeping
humans integrated in the process rather than relying
on unsupervised automated systems.

•

Building relationships with international, national,
and local law enforcement in member nations to
regulate dual-use EDTs and interdict weaponized
threats by non-nation-state actors and insider
threats.

•

Preparing for hard-power aggression by China and/
or Russia using kinetic and non-kinetic EDTs.

•

Preparing for the incidental and non-traditional use
of WMDs and the required, subsequent recovery
efforts. Begin deploying forward defenses into
densely populated areas to increase local resilience.

•

Researching critical resources and reserves needed
to mitigate attacks by EDTs or EDTs paired with
WMDs.

•

Exploring what it means to fight against non-human
actors. Address what TTPs, doctrine, preparation,
and educational tasks will need to be incorporated
into the military and political bodies within NATO.

•

Developing agile, secure, and resilient
communication systems that can operate in both
contested and congested data environments across
alliance members. These networks should be
integrated with member states.

•

Determining a nation’s “sacred cows” and question
whether these long-standing assumptions hold true
against EDTs (see sidebar for more information).
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SACRED COW
A “sacred cow” is an idea, custom, or institution so
strong that people believe in it without question,
even when criticism is warranted. Considered
central to an organization’s culture or belief system,
these ideas risk becoming a critical weakness if
they prevent the organization from adapting to a
future environment in which the assumptions are no
longer true.

Figure #2. Military Innovation?

2. ASSESS DETERRENCE’S ROLE WITH EDTS. With this, we refer to activities that
legitimize EDTs as a distinct category of threats and incorporating them into updated
models of deterrence.

U.S. military history is filled with “sacred
cows”. A classic example in the U.S. Army
is the importance of cavalry. As automatic
weapons and motorized vehicles were
developed simultaneously in the early
20th century, the idea of horse-drawn
transportation remained so ingrained, that
battlefield commanders tried at first to fix
machine guns on horse-drawn carriages.
The gradual transition from horses to
motorized formations required a cultural
and doctrinal change as much as it did a
technological one.
A non-technical example of a sacred cow
within the U.S. Army is the size of an infantry
squad, which is the keystone of Army
doctrine and operations. In 1946, after WWII,
the U.S. Army reduced the size of an infantry
squad from 12 to 9 personnel. However, even
given the changes in the social dimension
of war, technological dimension of war, and
logistics in the last 75+ years, the size of the
basic fighting element of the U.S. Army has
not changed.47
NATO’s world view is that of a world of
nation-states operating as nation-states
do. However, future threat actors within
this space could be non-nation state actors
including multi-national corporations. This
could be another sacred cow.
47 Hassan, Rethinking the U.S. Army Infantry Rifle Squad

EDTs pose a particular challenge to models of deterrence designed in the 1960s
for nuclear WMDs. Given they were designed to deter or de-escalate conflicts with
nation-state actors, and were later updated to include non-nation-state actors who
were deterred in part through non-proliferation agreements, EDTs may fall outside that
particular mental construct. For example, how does one deter an unknowing insider
threat who is unaware of the consequence of their actions? Can traditional deterrence
theory even be modified to work with EDTs - many of which have a significant digital
component?
Building off of the “Outs” in previous sections, new training and best practices
for EDTs must include updated methods and thinking around deterrence. Our
recommended actions for NATO here are to:
•

Broaden deterrence strategies beyond nuclear WMDs to include EDTs, nontraditional actors, and insider threats as well as the consequences of paired EDTs
to create WMD effects.

•

Rethink deterrence in the context of a post-Ukraine invasion and geo-political
conflict escalation, with a focus on preventing the emergence of a Russia-China
political and economic block.

•

Conduct a Table-Top Exercise (TTX) on how an Article 4- or Article 5-based
response to a non-kinetic EDT attack might play out through the political and
military processes of NATO
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OUT-PACE THE ADVERSARY
How can NATO and its members out-pace the adversary, using new policies, processes,
and technology to minimize the risks of WMD use and disrupt the adversary’s decisionmaking process (OODA loop) in an EDT environment? This will not only require preemptive regulation and restrictions on EDTs, but also rethinking logistics, communications,
and planning to adapt in the face of new- and emerging threats.
1. REGULATIONS AND POLICIES. We refer here to the passing of laws, signing of
treaties, drafting of regulations, and formulation of policies to specifically address
potential threats posed by novel uses of EDTs.
Decades of nuclear arms reduction- and non-proliferation treaties, coupled with
international monitoring efforts and national restrictions on the export of dual-use
technologies have all been instrumental to reducing the risks of WMDs. A new
generation of EDTs will require similar policies and institutions to regulate dual-use
technologies, such as robotics and AI, while restricting EDTs and WMDs, such as
the biological agents capable of being paired with EDTs to create WMD effects. The
recommended actions for NATO are to:
•

Establish a NATO-wide cybersecurity verification process for industry. NATO and
its members should adopt a rating system and incentives to create a “race to the
top” in cybersecurity investments.

•

Establish international standards for the regulation and restriction of the use
of EDTs and corresponding dual-use technologies. These standards could be
modeled on current export controls and other procedures. They should also be
compatible with previous recommendations (see above) to create an international
detection and monitoring apparatus.

•

Implement new regulations and restrictions on the import-, export- and use- of
foreign (i.e., non-alliance) technologies in critical areas, such as agriculture and
energy. Given the potential for long-game attacks, infrastructure in these systems
must also be held to higher standards of sourcing and security, etc.

•

Expand regulation of biological weapons development to further explore the
potential for developing counter-measures.

•

Actively engage broad swaths of the population in reshaping norms and
institutions for democratic governance in the face of EDTs.

2. SPEED OF ACTION. Speed of action means prioritizing events, technologies, and
decision-making processes in which a rapid response is essential to maintaining a
strategic and operational advantage.
Given EDTs’ potential to rapidly escalate conflicts and create long-game WMD
effects through attacks on infrastructure, it is incumbent on NATO to redesign its
communication and supply lines to accelerate its responses to threats. NATO must
expand and tighten communications between members, traditional partners, and
new partners to match the sheer speed and disruption posed by EDTs. It must also
reconceive “resilience” as a proactive capability in terms of how quickly NATO can
meet and mitigate new threats, rather than simply have the capacity to recover from
them. To accomplish this, our recommended actions for NATO are to:
•

Strengthen defenses and supply lines to bring medical assistance and
infrastructure to the “front lines” in the event of an attack.

•

Harden supply chains and create contingency plans for EDT attacks by nonnation-state actors and long-game scenarios.

•

Draw on new capabilities and investments (See: Out-Excel the Adversary) to
reconceive resilience as a strategic capability.

•

Open and re-open “red” communication lines with members, traditional allies, and
new partners to rapidly meet and mitigate threats.

•

Use the skills and best practices developed previously to identify and monitor
motivations and communications of non-traditional actors. Develop a faster
tempo of operations and couple that with additional time and precautions for the
confirmation of threats, especially when the potential of WMD effects are present.

•

Explore ways to disrupt adversaries’ decision-making processes in the EDT
environment. Understanding the adversary’s OODA loop will give NATO multiple
points to intersect and disrupt decisions making.

•

Operate under the assumption that adversaries understand NATO’s decision trees
and are actively working to undermine them. As a result, consider what countermeasures or redundancies are required in critical infrastructure and systems.

•

Develop systems and processes, so that NATO’s humans-in-the-loop aren’t
disrupted by adversaries operating without such constraints
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OUT-PARTNER THE ADVERSARY
How can NATO, its members, and affiliated organizations out-partner the adversary? How
do they foster mutually beneficial, supportive, and habitual relationships with allied entities
that can assist in such crucial areas as mitigation, deterrence, and recovery from threats?
What exercises, organizations, and relationships are necessary to forge those links? -And
how should they expand those links beyond traditional nation-states and their militaries?
We address these questions in the recommendations provided below.
1. COOPERATIVE WARGAMES. Here we refer to simulations, exercises, and scenarios
to model threat behavior along with the anticipatory and post-even actions NATO and
its partners might take together to disrupt, mitigate, and recover from threats.
Wargaming and joint exercises have been essential tools for NATO cooperation and
cohesion since the alliance’s formation. In this spirit, NATO should not only update
its wargaming and planning playbooks to account for the special characteristics
of EDTs, but also as a means to engage with new partners at different scales (e.g.,
international, national, local), among different disciplines (e.g., technological and
biogenetic), and within different sectors (e.g., governments, NGOs, private sector). To
that end, our recommended actions for NATO are to:
•

Conduct joint exercises involving rapid escalation and WMD use by nationstate actors; mass casualty EDT threats by non-nation-state actors; long-game
attacks by insider threats, and related scenarios —including selective, nonNATO participants in the process. These exercises should aim to explore both
successful mitigation efforts and attempts to recover from well-executed attacks.

•

Develop international- and national-scale emergency plans with plug-in options for
allied and partner governments as well as for private industry and NGOs, etc.

•

Conduct cybersecurity exercises with industry partners to identify and mitigate
vulnerabilities potentially exploited by adversaries.

2. POLITICAL SOLIDARITY. This means relationship-building, diplomatic programs,
values declarations, and informal policies, especially aimed at non-NATO countries
and international organizations for the development and mitigation of EDTs.
As a political counterpart to wargaming and military exercises, NATO should
strategize how best to build support outside the alliance for the types of regulations
and restrictions needed for monitoring, deterring, and interdicting EDTs (for more, see
Out-Pace the Adversary above). Here we recommend efforts be targeted to:

•

Encouraging and facilitating relationships between all nuclear powers, including
traditional adversaries to mutually enhance NC3 systems against breaches by
EDTs.

•

Building of a coalition of global economic partners to support NATO’s efforts to
steer the development of dual-use EDTs.

•

Looking for appropriate opportunities in Africa to increase cooperation, counter
adversarial use of the continent as political proxies, and building local capacity to
confront non-nation-state actors.

3. GOVERNMENT-MILITARY-CIVILIAN COOPERATION. With this, activities include
coordination efforts between civilian governments, NGOs, and national militaries
designed to successfully mitigate, deter, and/or recover from a threat.
Given the scope of both potential actors and potential targets for EDTs, it’s necessary
to cultivate a whole-of-alliance and whole-of-society response to mitigating these
threats. This will require closer coordination between NATO members’ militaries,
governments, and civil society, with the goal of forging a social consensus around the
risks of EDTs in conflict escalation. To this end, we recommend NATO:
•

Encourage engagement across each member’s military, civil, and security
communities with a focus on educating civilian institutions about the threats and
responses to EDTs.

•

Partner across member governments and private industry to influence key
international technology standards to guide the development of EDTs.

•

Expand existing relationships to include non-military defense and security
elements. Establish planning conferences to develop whole-society responses to
non-military threats and create corresponding exercises to test and validate those
plans.

•

Determine new, non-traditional partners in future mitigation-and-recovery efforts,
ranging from multinational conglomerates and supply chains (e.g., Amazon,
Walmart) to civil society organizations. Identify what the Defense Industrial Base
looks like in the future of EDTs. Determine how to positively influence global
conglomerates to lead with a sense of global social responsibility in crisis.

•

Research the social conditions and policies (e.g., poverty, inequality, racism,
marginalization) that breed non-aligned cyber actors, which may intentionally or
inadvertently interfere with national security capabilities. Share best practices
among alliance members to resolve these conditions.

•

Open doors to anyone with the skills and experience to serve the NATO defense
community, even in cases where physical disability or neurodiversity preclude
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conventional military service.

•

•

Consider alternative criteria to meet NATO membership. In the era of EDTs,
answer the question: what do defensive non-military contributions look like?

Create an early-stage talent pipeline through partnerships with schools, private
industry, non-NATO member states, and hacker communities.

•

•

Consider alternative criteria to meet NATO membership. In the era of EDTs, what
do defensive non-military contributions look like?

Practice the inclusion of marginalized and underserved communities, increasing
communication and expanding efforts for conflict resolution.

•

Invest in a fusion approach, convening diverse communities with global subject
matter experts to discuss problems and strategize mitigation and recovery from
an EDT or WMD attacks.

3. DEVELOP RESILIENCY. Here, we refer to programs and processes ensuring
redundancy of essential services and infrastructure, and the development of a societywide will to fight through difficult and uncertain circumstances.

OUT-LAST THE ADVERSARY
How does NATO, its members, and their societies out-last the adversary? How do
they achieve and maintain a long-term perspective on potential threats and cultivate
a culture of resiliency in response? We answer these two questions with the following
recommended steps.
1. EDUCATION. Activities that fall within education include workforce education and
training, vocational education, and retooling education pipelines to build the necessary
skills for understanding, developing, and mitigating EDTs.
Many of the technologies under the heading of EDTs, including robotics, AI, and
biogenetics are already at the center of conversations around the future of talent, jobs,
and economic growth. Building an alliance capable of meeting the threats posed by
EDTs will require cultivating a workforce and a talent pool equal to the challenge of
developing and/or combatting them. Recommended activities for NATO include:
•

Forging a consortium of global subject matter experts (SMEs) to address the
implications of EDTs and their cultural impact.

•

Revamping members’ immigration policies to support, resettle, and re-train
educated refugees.

•

Broadening public awareness of disinformation, with continuously updated
examples of its use by adversaries to sow mistrust.

2. INVEST IN AND INCLUDE PEOPLE. Here we refer to investigating and investing in
human and social programs, including marginalized groups, subject matter expertise,
and programs allowing for the redress of grievances.
Perhaps the best preventative measure against future EDT attacks by non-traditional
actors and insider threats is to turn potential adversaries into allies before a potential
attack occurs. NATO and alliance members should do this through investing in people,
which not only means developing talent, but also resolving conflicts, reaching out to
marginalized communities, and eliminating the conditions that foster radicalization.
To accomplish this, we recommend NATO:

When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, many in the national security
community predicted a swift outcome favoring the aggressor. However, the tenacity
exhibited by Ukraine’s civilian leadership, military, and society took many by surprise,
including Russian leaders. What can NATO do to develop this type of resilience in the
face of an adversary armed with EDTs and/or WMDs? How should members prepare,
train, and rehearse for attacks on their armed forces, infrastructure, and shared
identity? In order to plan for the unthinkable, we recommend NATO:
•

Foster a cross-member and cross-sectoral approach to resilience, specifically
focused on the aftermath of WMD attacks or long-game WMD effects. These
strategic preparations and rehearsals should include both physical assets and
systems as well as psychological support.

•

Prepare for attacks and recovery through rehearsals with supply chains, medical
responsiveness, backing up critical infrastructure, and delivering humanitarian aid.

•

Strengthen defenses against pre- and post-attack misinformation, designed to
sow mistrust and delay recovery efforts in the wake of attacks.

•

Periodically catalog supply chains for components of both EDTs and critical
infrastructure. Determine if new supply options and commodity resources are
needed, and support alliance members’ investments in these options.

•

Prepare for attacks and recovery through rehearsals with supply chains,
medical responsiveness, preparing back up critical infrastructure, and delivering
humanitarian aid.

•

Strengthen defenses against pre- and post-attack misinformation, designed to
sow mistrust and delay recovery efforts in the wake of attacks.

•

Periodically catalog supply chains for components of both EDTs and critical
infrastructure. Determine if new supply options and commodity resources are
needed, and support alliance members’ investments in these options.
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IMPLICATIONS

OVERVIEW

IMPLICATION #1: NATO SHOULD
WIDEN THE NUCLEAR FIREBREAK TO
MINIMIZE CONFLICT ESCALATION.

nuclear risk.
A study by Marina Favaro at King’s College
London used Machine Learning (ML) to
group expert assessment of emerging

DEFINITION:
In fire sciences, a firebreak is a
purposefully carved zone of earth,
Using the Threatcasting Methodology, we envision a range of possible and potential WMD

bare of flammable vegetation that

and EDT threat futures in the 2040 timeframe. The future models assume a high level of

contains the effects of a wildfire.

EDT development between now and 2040. Our goal in providing this report is to explore

In rugged terrain and uncertain

the possible and potential attack surfaces and vulnerabilities that will be opened for EDT

weather conditions, these firebreaks

development and their use in the future as well as how they might be paired with WMDs.

must be dug where firefighters

In this section, we outline seven implications for the current state and strategic path for
NATO. We also define opportunities and critical enablers for NATO and members to prepare
for these threats. Finally, where appropriate, we explore the potential impact on North
Atlantic Treaty Articles 3, 4, and 5.

can most effectively reach them
and not necessarily at the global
optimal position. Sometimes, the
firebreaks help fire fighters prioritize
saving some parts of the landscape

Functionally, each of the following implications can feed into NATO’s existing and

over others. Attacks on critical

planned investments and activities. For each threat future, the use of EDTs and WMDs

infrastructure may be a prelude for

will necessitate an expansion of the definition and implementation for the concept of

escalating conflict into the lethal and

integrated deterrence. Additionally, many of the suggested activities can serve as the focus

nuclear zone of conflict. So how

areas of research, discussion, and challenges for the forthcoming DIANA and triple-helix

does NATO widen the nuclear

centers or programs.

firebreak, and where does the
Alliance take risks? We address
these questions below.

Current State and Strategic Path:
To understand how NATO might slow down
conflict escalation accelerated by EDTs,
effectively widening the nuclear “firebreak”,
it is helpful to understand and dissect
how EDTs might bring about an increased
48 Favaro, Weapons of Mass Distortion.

technologies into four clusters, especially
as they relate to nuclear risks.48 These EDT
effects include distortion, compression,
thwarting, and illuminating adversary
actions and intentions. Distortion,
compression, and illumination are concepts
clearly identified in our study. Favaro only
considered directed energy weapons as a
thwarting technology, which is an EDT not
within the scope of our study.
Although Favaro describes the effects
of emerging technologies to nuclear risk
at a fairly high level of abstraction, the
framework of distortion, compression,
thwarting, and illumination applies to
understanding the effect of EDTs on other
WMDs and to traditional NATO military
operations. In fact, Favaro's framework
provides a clever vocabulary that can
be further explored as an ontology of
describing a wide variety of the disruptive
effects of EDTs. Some examples follow:

1. The first cluster, Distortion, is

when adversaries interrupt data flows and
position the information landscape to their
advantage. Examples of distortion include
propaganda, mis/disinformation, and
information warfare. Their purpose is to
sow uncertainty and “undermine public trust
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in social media and damage online civic

makers. The technologies that compress

of technical elements contribute to system

culture” (p. 12). WMDs layer particularly well

decision making include AI-powered cyber

complexity and so create a new source for

with technologies of deception. They create

operations, hypersonic missiles, and swarm

errors, biases or vulnerabilities hidden from

the perfect false flags because the idea of

robotics. Experts in the King’s College report

operators.”50 To “Out-Think” adversaries,

their use is unbelievable.

assess these effects to have a high impact,

NATO must simultaneously incorporate

but low feasibility of implementation.

appropriate AI, ML, and autonomous

The most troublesome technology
that Favaro’s experts agreed distorted

The report also suggests that decision

information was the use of “deep fakes”.

makers should be wary of over-hyping

The power of deep fakes is amplified by

some of these technologies. It calls

advanced computing and social media

out that hypersonics are “merely an old

content delivery algorithms.

technology with a massive price tag and

Deep fake technologies are built on the
backs of AI facial recognition, voice
recognition (e.g., Siri and Alexa, etc.),
and speedier hardware and software
systems that create increasingly realistic
adaptations of source material. Additionally,
sophisticated deep fakes may even deceive
the ability of national intelligence to make
error-free conclusions. This means decisionmakers may have to rely on compromised
intelligence before deciding on a first-strike
option.
Much of the technological amplification
associated with distortion originates in

few meaningful advantages over existing

processes, while simultaneously studying
for new sources of errors and bias, including
whether sensors are being spoofed or
deceived. OpenAI recognizes adversarial AI
research as a potential field to study how AI
can be spoofed or deceived.51

and commercialization arm. Cooperative
partnerships from academia, government,
and private industry sectors, the so-called
triple-helix, also plays a role in assisting
NATO to develop processes to measure EDT
threat emergence, metrics of security risk,
to deterrence strategy.

ongoing crisis by compressing decision-

the forces of distortion and compression,

making time or by enabling a disarming

while encouraging illumination. NATO must

first strike”; therefore, making it the most

lobby for the recommendations in the

NATO can be a leader of defining human,

impactful EDT related to nuclear stability

“Outs” section be placed into members’

technical, and hybrid human-AI teamed

and decision making. There is no clear

budget priorities. This must be done in such

firebreaks in NC3 systems. It can also be a

consensus on an objective impact of

a way that one country does not “shoulder

critical enabler to ensure safeguards, such

hypersonics, other than the fact that they

the burden” of responding to a single

as human-in-the-loop procedures, deliberate

potentially compress decision-making

technology alone. Deconflicting research,

fact checking, and frequent rehearsals

timelines to unrealistic extremes.

development, and communal response

remain in place.

requires a focus on the distribution of tasks

Implications to the Treaty:

3. The third cluster, Illumination, refers

to how intelligence agencies illuminate

and responsibilities.

forces and organizations, much of the

automated tools and AI to sort, categorize,

EDT ecosystem spans the public-private

and make sense of massive amounts of

divide. This means that member nations

data. “Although the incorporation of ML

must invest in EDT strategies and GDP

and autonomous systems can lessen the

expenditures that consider cooperation with

happens when the speed of conflict

data searching, processing, and analysis

private research, development, and dual-use

reduces the time available to decision

burden for human command, the inclusion

2. The second cluster, Compression,

in addition to its research, development,

on the lethality of WMDs is to counteract

collect, intelligence agencies must turn to

solve it on their own.

NATO’s think-tank for EDT threat analysis,

hypersonic missiles “could accelerate an

in the “Outs” should be led by military

as a military and political organization to

supporting research centers could be

and the ability to communicate EDT threats

amount of data increases what ISR sensors

the private sector rather than leaving NATO

for the North Atlantic (DIANA) and its

The key to minimizing the impact of EDTs

While it is true that many of the actions

distortion effects must be done by engaging

NATO’s Defence Innovation Accelerator

ballistic missiles”. On the other hand,
49

adversary actions and intentions. As the

the private sector. Therefore, addressing

technologies.

Opportunities and Critical Enablers:

NATO must consider how the development
of EDTs in the private sector creates
situations that reduce the nuclear “firebreak”. Within Article 3, members must
account for the resiliency necessary to
resist pre-cursors to an armed attack.
Specifically, with the development of mis/
disinformation technologies, processes,

49 Cameron and Wright, Don’t Believe the Hype About Hypersonic Missiles, 15.
50 Favaro, Weapons of Mass Distortion, p21.
51 OpenAI, Attacking Machine Learning with Adversarial Examples, 17.
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and deliberate operations to distort truth
and compress decision-making timelines.
This may require more frequent deliberation

IMPLICATION #2: NATO SHOULD
RAISE THE BAR FOR THE INTENT TO
USE WMDS.

with the North Atlantic Council, heads of

compression technologies..

The use of EDTs on the “attack plain”
creates a sense of being “backed into a
corner” for the adversary to the extent that

state, and the European Council about
the increased use of distortion and

Current State and Strategic Path:

they feel their only recourse to restoring

overwhelming to Shia militia groups that
the latter would feel they had no recourse,
but to obtain nuclear material from Iran and
conduct a high-profile attack against allied
forces.

DEFINITION:

a power balance with NATO is a nuclear

Additionally, the threat of EDTs could find an

response. They are likely to strike hard

adversary with their “back against the wall”,

In the future, EDTs can create a

with the most powerful weapons at their

employing a combination of EDTs in concert

condition where the intent to use

disposal. The psychological pressure

with non-nuclear WMDs to deliver attacks

WMDs is increased. Lowering the

of being backed into a corner by EDT

on NATO. It is trivial to imagine Syria lashing

“taboo” or bar to using a nuclear

dominance may also apply to nuclear

out with whatever combination of EDTs and

device is the greatest threat.

powers that are not traditional nuclear

WMDs they have access to. Case in point,

Conversely, raising the bar helps

weapon states (NWS) as defined by the

combatants in Syria have attached hand

slow the spiral of escalation to WMD

Treaty on the non-Proliferation of Nuclear

grenades, mortars, and other explosive

use, most importantly in the use

Weapons (i.e.; United States, Russia, the

devices on disposable drones and flown

of non-strategic, tactical nuclear

United Kingdom, France, and China).52

them into Russian and American bases.53 It

weapons during military conflict

These “non-NWS” (e.g., India, Pakistan,

is not difficult to imagine making this tactic

situations. These conflict situations

North Korea, Israel, etc.) could feel in the

more lethal by adding chemical or biological

might include so-called “grey space”

face of EDT dominance, that all other

agents to the drones instead of grenades.

operations in the competition phase

tools of national power (e.g., diplomatic,

Ensuring the bar remains high is necessary

before force-on-force conflict occurs.

information, and economic) are not going

in this type of situation.

While most countries steadfastly
maintain that their WMD arsenals
are defensive or deterrent, the
fact remains that WMDs are most
effective as first-use weapons. The
first shocking attack generates a
surprise element. After that, however,
the enemy will almost always recover

to give them the changes they want to see
in the world. Likewise, they may think they
are out-matched or “out-teched” in the
ability to employ EDTs to accomplish their
strategic plans. In other words, an actor
may feel the push to use WMDs because of
the perceived gap in their ability to employ
EDTs.

These two conditions largely apply to "nonNWS" nuclear powers, such as Iran, North
Korea, Israel, Pakistan, India, and non-nation
states. In the language of risk management,
a threat must have both capability and
intent for the risk to materialize. Raising the
bar is the concept of inhibiting the capability
of an actor to gain access to WMDs as well

and adapt. Because of this as well

As a recent historical example, one of the

as impacting the intent of a nation-state

as the fact that they have such a

great threats of the Iraq War was the worry

actor to loosen requirements on the “taboo”

powerful psychological effect, WMDs

that U.S. and NATO’s use of force was so

of using nukes.

tend to be less effective after the first
surprise attack
52 United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
53 Woody, Drones Are Being Used to Drop Bombs on US Troops in Syria
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Non-nation state actors, especially private

use of WMDs and nuclear, biological,

corporations, control a tremendous

and chemical materials are controlled by

amount of the EDT ecosystem. This is an

international agencies and treaties. NATO

important indicator of when "non-NWS"

and its member nations are keenly tied into

nuclear powers begin to seek out private

these organizations, treaties, and laws. On

corporations to buy, build, and/or develop

the other hand, there are few controls on

EDTs. It is important to understand where

the development and use of most EDTs

the “bar” is at any given point by watching

in our study. The development of lethal

the development path of private industry

autonomous weapons systems (LAWS)

and what the global adoptions of EDTs by

is the most contested.56 Hypersonics, AI,

militaries look like. There is a tipping point

and designer drugs are EDTs from our

where EDT superiority creates a window of

data models that have been considered as

opportunity for an adversary to act.

“arms-race” topics.

Opportunities and Critical Enablers:
From a Treaty point of view, the emergence
of EDTs and their influence on an
adversary’s intent to use WMDs, is a
diplomatic and cultural problem rather than
a non-proliferation or military problem.
Prohibitions, constraints, and norms on
the use and development of many WMDs
have been in place since at least the Lieber
Instructions of 186354 and the Hague
Regulations of 1899.55

A course of action for NATO to consider is
to participate in ongoing debates on some
of these EDTS. NATO should be prepared to
accommodate potential solutions, including
limitations, moratoria, prohibitions, and
acceptable norms on the use and further
development of hypersonics, AI, LAWS, and
designer drugs. As an active participant
in recent conflicts in Iraq, Syria, and
Afghanistan, NATO has witnessed firsthand
how the future of EDT-enabled conflict is
emerging. NATO could become a trusted

NATO and the major nuclear powers have

voice in leading and participating in these

worked tirelessly to keep nuclear precursor

types of discussions.

knowledge and materials out of the hands
of non-nation states and “non-NWS”
nuclear powers. At the same time, NATO
needs to lead a strategic discussion on the
prohibitions of EDTs that lowers the bar for

Implications to the Treaty:
Article 3 of the Treaty requires member
states to develop an individual ability to

IMPLICATION #3: EXPAND NATO’S
UNDERSTANDING OF INSIDER
THREATS AND MOTIVATIONS.

resist armed attack. In the future, this might
be used in preparation for the “non-use” of
certain levels of EDTs. This translates into
the development of doctrines and norms
for acceptable and appropriate use of EDTs.
Conflict and competition could be part
of the development of a culture resisting

DEFINITION:
There are channels that connect
insiders to outside narratives,
identities, and forces that cause them

armed attack through preparedness.

to act against NATO. The increased

Article 4 consultations would be a logical

an attack from a single person are

and necessary next step if, in the future,
an EDT or combination of EDTs, meets
the threshold of an attack being imminent
or inevitable. Indicators of an imminent
threshold situation could start with
the use of non-nuclear WMDs, such as
arming make-shift drones with chemical
or biological agents and continuing the
escalation until a desperate nuclear
option is the only choice left. This would
be preceded by rapid advances in EDT
acquisition and employment by NATO
nations and slow advances by “non-NWS”
states.

speed, scope, scale, and impact of
amplified with the use of single or
combined EDTs. Insider threats pose
a threat because of their placement
and access within organizations. In
the future, it will be possible for an
individual to have an outsized effect
on NATO members using EDTs. Insider
threats are particularly dangerous
when this access and outsized EDT
effect are combined.
Typical insider threats with financial,
ideological, and/or political motives
will remain a persistent and constant
threat. However, in the future, the
“unknowing” insider threat could
become even more dangerous. An
unknowing insider threat would be a
person inside an organization who

using nuclear weapons.
On the one hand, the prohibition on the

54 International Committee of the Red Cross, Treaties, States Parties, and Commentaries - Lieber Code.
55 International Committee of the Red Cross, Treaties, States Parties, and Commentaries - Hague Declaration (IV,2)
Concerning Asphyxiating Gases.
56 Sayler, International Discussions Concerning Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems.
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has been compromised without their
knowledge, typically via their devices or
computer accounts. There is a specific
subset of EDTs that are more likely to
be used to perpetrate and amplify an
insider-based attack. These include AI,
IIoT, and autonomous systems, such as
drones, self-driving vehicles, automated
decision making, etc. This person

Centre of Excellence (CCDCoE) in Tallinn,

threats for all members. What’s also needed

Estonia, recognized the possibility of the

are metrics for measuring the impact of the

unintentional insider, largely as a vector

insider threats and their motivations.

for providing access for any number of
cyber threats or because of accidental
disclosure of proprietary information.
Unfortunately, the CCDCoE provides no
additional information about the uniqueness
of an unintentional insider as compared to
a purposeful insider, or recommendations

would then be operating inside the

about how to detect or thwart them.

organization, giving an adversary access

The strategic path to this threat requires a

without the person's knowledge.

combination of cultural and psychological

NATO should also explore the new category

IMPLICATION #4: NATO SHOULD
ADDRESS PLAUSIBLE SCENARIOS
OF EDTS INTERACTING WITH EACH
OTHER AND WITH WMDS.

of the unknowing insider threat, exploring
speed, scope, and scale of how EDTs
affect a person who becomes a carrier of
the threat. This would also include training

DEFINITION:

to safeguard people within organizations

Beyond attacks on critical infrastructure,

against manipulation and systems that can

the combination of multiple EDTs will

monitor for this type of activity.

also bring about WMD effects. It is

Implications to the Treaty:

necessary for NATO to understand the
full extent of multiple EDTs interacting

factors that will remain largely the same in

It will be important to have a well-articulated

with each other to provide sufficient

the future. The key behaviors to watch out

strategy for monitoring insider threats,

detection mechanisms, preparedness,

for are the adoption and use of EDTs in the

training for individuals within organizations,

resiliency, and changes to collective

Traditional insider threats reveal specific

organization and its staff’s personal use.

and creating an environment of resilience.

defense measures. This understanding

clues or activities, which can indicate

Culture, race, and religion are also critical

These could be seen as a part of Article 3’s

also requires NATO to consider the

preparedness.

dual-use effects of EDTs for their

What is particularly troubling about
this specific kind of insider threat is
that guarding against it will be difficult.

that the threat exists. However, in the
case of the unknowing insider threat,
there are no traditional clues. In fact,
there may be no clues at all, only the
presence of one or more EDTs.

Current State and Strategic Path:
Insider threats are a known vulnerability
within all organizations. The unknowing
insider threat is currently a possibility,
and the introduction of EDTs into an
organization and the insider threats
personal device(s) increases the likelihood
and impact of the threat. Research by
NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence

factors in the use of WMDs. It is much

intended scientific, social, and business

easier to use WMDs on people you

If the presence or activity of a singular

consider as lesser beings. Even when

insider threat has been detected, it will likely

technologies of mass destruction were

be the purview of that Alliance member

banned in European warfare, many, if not

to contain and mitigate that threat. If a

most, technologies were acceptable when

systemic insider threat materializes through

used to exterminate indigenous people in

the combination of multiple EDTs or if

colonial contexts. Culture, race, religion, and

metrics that measure the impact of the

other socioeconomic factors will remain

insider threat reach a certain threshold,

Currently, most EDTs are being developed

prevalent, in the future, about whether or not

NATO members could trigger Article 4

by private industry, especially in western

to use WMDs

for a collective response to the threat,

democracies. Apart from China and to

technology, and/or condition underlying it.

a lesser extent Russia, who both have

Opportunities and Critical Enablers:
A critical enabler for NATO is to lead
an effort to develop a clear strategy for
monitoring and training around insider

applications, while simultaneously being
used for conflict.

Current state and Strategic Path:

maintained significant state control over
research and development, advances in
57 Kont, Markus, Pihelgas, Wojtkowiak, Trinberg, and Osula. Insider Threat Detection Study
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EDTs will happen outside of the control of

NATO and other organizations, such as the

and driving the development of multi-use

Using an agreed upon future metric for the

NATO and its members.

United Nations are exploring restrictions

outputs.”

use of a single or combined EDT, members

NATO does not have a mechanism for
tracking the development of EDTs so that
members can know when an EDT has
reached a point where it can be used as a
weapon. What is essential to identify is, how
NATO knows when an EDT has become too
dangerous. Addressing this after it exists is

on the development and use of some EDTs,
including lethal autonomous devices, and
synthetic biology, etc. As expressed in
implication #2, NATO does not yet have
collective guidance on the full line up of
EDTs explored in this report, or which EDTs
require limits and restrictions.

too late.

Opportunities and Critical Enablers:

As NATO considers combinations of

As a critical enabler, NATO can create

EDTs in scenario exercises, assume

a better understanding of the impact

multiple WMDs are involved. Layering

EDTs have on warfare through deliberate

and combining EDTs massively amplifies

research, wargames and exercises, and

their lethality. This is true of cyber and just

consultation with the private sector

about any of the others. Because so much

organizations that are developing them.

about using WMDs is about mind games,

As explored earlier in the report, NATO can

deliberate confusion, and outflanking enemy

begin monitoring the development of the

expectations, WMDs are often used in

full spectrum of EDTs in this report and

concert to amplify or ensure their effect.

delegate research to all of its members and

Case in point, agriculture is an extremely

industrial counterparts.

60

Finally, NATO should develop critical
enabler processes to monitor the use of
single and combined EDTs, setting metrics
for the measurement of when that EDT or
combination of EDTs has the possibility of

that develops emerging technologies in a
cooperative manner. Conceptually approved
in NATO’s June 2021 Brussels Summit,
The DIANA was approved by allied foreign
ministers in 2022. DIANA “is designed to
harness new academic, commercial, and
entrepreneurial start-up technology, test and
develop it as potential defence capability,
and connect it more quickly to military
end-user operational requirements.”61
DIANA’s concept of nearly 50 test centers
and accelerator programs is an ideal
place for NATO to iterate and consider the
implications of EDTs as they affect strategic

because it’s not alluring nor flashy. A

the expansion of limits and restrictions on

and operational requirements.

biological weapon attack on staple crops,

the development and use of all EDTs beyond

however, could cause epic damage to

the current activities, especially as it relates

an economy, and cause famine as well

to their dual-use nature. Organizations such

As a part of the preparedness intent of

as domestic chaos. This is a real threat,

as NATO’s Advisory Group on Emerging

Article 3, members should develop tools

and a number of world powers have been

and Disruptive Technologies can lead

and processes to track, monitor, and

victims of technologies designed to attack

responses to technology innovation that is

communicate the development of EDTs to

populations indirectly through their food

driven largely by the private sector. In that

the Alliance.

IIoT

IMPLICATION #5: NATO SHOULD
MEASURE AND STABILIZE COMPLEX
SYSTEMS.

revealed plans to develop a formal program

Another critical enabler would be to explore

sources, including ransomware,

security threat is reached.

producing a WMD effect. NATO has recently

effective target that tends to get overlooked

58

can evoke Article 4 when a threshold of

Implications to the Treaty:

DEFINITION:
For EDTs or a combination of EDTs to
have a WMD effect, they primarily need
to have the capacity to attack complex
systems and/or critical infrastructure.
The destabilization of one or more
aspects of critical infrastructure is what
can produce the destabilizing and lethal
WMD effect(s) without the actual use of
a WMD. Therefore, to monitor, disrupt,
or mitigate this kind of threat, it is
important to have a functional definition
of what these complex systems or
critical infrastructure might be.
The United States Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
defines critical infrastructure in the
following way: “There are 16 critical
infrastructure sectors whose assets,

vein, NATO should “Set out objectives for

hacking, and purposeful contamination with

harnessing dual-use, multi-use technology

E. coli and Salmonella.59

developments – capitalising on already
existing technology from other domains

58 McCrimmon, Ryan, and Matishak, Cyberattack on Food Supply Followed Years of Warnings. See also: Fagan,
Critical Vulnerabilities in the U.S. Food Sector and the Next Crippling Attack.
59 Sobel, Jeremy, Khan, and Swerdlow, Threat of a Biological Terrorist Attack on the US Food Supply: The CDC
Perspective.
60 NATO Advisory Group on Emerging and Disruptive Technologies, Annual Report 2020.
61 Willett, NATO Details DIANA Technology Programme.
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Although NATO does not have an agreed

Current state and Strategic Path:
systems, and networks, whether
physical or virtual, are considered
so vital to the United States that
their incapacitation or destruction
would have a debilitating effect on
security, national economic security,
national public health or safety, or
any combination thereof.”62

functions, health, safety, security,
economic or social well-being
of people, and the disruption or
destruction of which would have a
significant impact in a Member State
as a result of the failure to maintain
those functions.”63 A European
think tank has added, “Damage or
destruction of critical infrastructures
by natural disasters, terrorism and
criminal activity may have negative
consequences for the security of the
EU and the well-being of its citizens.
Thus, it is very crucial to protect
the ECIs since they play vital role
for the functioning of a society and
economy.” 64

The sixteen U.S. critical infrastructure
sectors are:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Chemical,
Commercial Facilities,
Communications,
Critical Manufacturing,
Dams,
Defense Industrial Base,
Emergency Services,
Energy,
Financial Services,
Food and Agriculture,
Government Facilities,
Healthcare and Public Health,
Information Technology,
Nuclear Reactors/Materials/
Waste,
Transportation, and
Water/Wastewater Systems.

The European Union has a similar,
but slightly different definition.
European Critical Infrastructure
(ECI) means “an asset, system or
part thereof located in Member
States which is essential for the
maintenance of vital societal

The eleven ECI sectors are:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

.

Energy,
Information and Communication
Technologies (ICT),
Water,
Food,
Health,
Financial,
Public & Legal Order and Safety,
Transport,
Chemical and Nuclear Industry,
and
Space and Research.

Across the NATO members, there is no
universally agreed upon definition of critical
infrastructure, although many European
nations have adopted the ECI sectors. For
this report, we are using CISA’s framing
of the problem and CISA’s list of critical
infrastructure.

upon definition of critical infrastructure,67
it has reinvigorated the efforts of “civil
preparedness” that dropped in priority
following the end of the Cold War.
Resilience, as a national and collective
value, is closely tied to the protection of
critical infrastructure and to the tenets of
Article 3. The seven baseline requirements

Since 1949, as mentioned earlier, the Allies

for civil preparedness are outlined in the

have invoked Article 5 once, within 24 hours

2016 Warsaw Summit and include collective

of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United

responses to responding to terrorist

States. The Allies have also put collective

threats or nation states. These baseline

defense measures in place five times since

requirements are:

1949. These include three instances of
a request by Turkey: in 1991 with Patriot
missile deployment during the Gulf War;
in 2003 for Operation Display Deterrence
during the Iraq crisis; and in 2012 with
Patriot missiles in support of the situation
in Syria. Additional collective measures

1) Assured continuity of government and
critical government services;
2) Resilient energy supplies;
3) Ability to deal effectively with
uncontrolled movement of people;
4) Resilient food and water resources;

included: tripling the size of the NATO

5) Ability to deal with mass casualties;

response force; improving Joint Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; and air

6) Resilient civil communications
systems; and

policing over the Baltic and Black Sea areas

7) Resilient civil transportation systems.68

after Russia illegally annexed Crimea in
2014. In February 2022, NATO mobilized

Opportunities and Critical Enablers:
A critical enabler would be for NATO to

additional forces and put the NATO
Response Force into a deterrence posture

establish a working definition of complex

following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

systems and critical infrastructure for its

66

members. This includes setting standards
62 Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency, Critical Infrastructure Sectors.
63 The Council of the European Union, The Identification and Designation of European Critical Infrastructures and
the Assessment of the Need to Improve Their Protection, 75–82.
64 SPEAR Project, A Review of Critical Infrastructure Domains in Europe.
65 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Collective Defense - Article 5.
66 Ibid.
67 Lucia, Critical Infrastructure Protection.
68 Roepke, Wolf-Diether, and Thankey, Resilience: The First Line of Defence.
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for measuring levels of contributions

“armed attack” into the Articles 4 and 5

to NATO-wide civil preparedness and

counter-escalation cycle. The development

measurements to identify and describe

of threats to critical infrastructure by

emerging threats due to EDTs. NATO

EDTs is arguably the next iteration in

clearly understands the involvement that

the development of civil preparedness

the European Union has in administering

mechanisms for member nations.

the critical infrastructure architectures
and the relationship with the commercial
sector. At the same time, what’s lacking are
mechanisms and procedures on testing
how the civil sector and NATO should
cooperate during a real-event.
NATO members can engage the political

The ability for NATO members to
measure levels of destabilization on
critical infrastructure via an EDT attack is
essential to measuring the effectiveness
of NATO and civil preparedness efforts.
When a perceptible level of destabilization
is detected that threatens security, as

elements of their countries to ensure
that CIP processes expand beyond
“prevention, preparedness and response
to terrorist attacks” as outlined in a 2006
communication from the Commission of
the European Communities.69 This approach
expanded the work on critical infrastructure
protection to thinking beyond terrorism
and into an “all-hazards approach”. The
European Union recognizes that, “Threats
cannot be seen in a purely national context.
The interconnected and interdependent
nature of today's economy and society
means that even a disruption outside of the
EU's borders may have a serious impact on
the Community and its Member States.”70
Implications to the Treaty:
There are many differences between
definitions of armed attack, and it’s
probably one of the most contentious
stumbling blocks to a consensus on
including destabilizing attacks short of an

DEFINITION:
There are a number of factors that
inhibit adversaries from successfully
playing a long game. Some of
these include the compression of
decision-making time, lowering the
bar for the use of WMDs, growing
concern over insider threats, and
the societal dependence on critical
infrastructure. The use of single or
multiple EDTs will allow adversaries
to initiate long-term strategies,
using the technologies over an
extended period of time to achieve
WMD effects. Truly understanding
this requires a mindset shift. The
EDTs will enable a long-game
attack that we will not see as an
“attack”. Without ignoring the need

to occasionally interrupt or change
both the weapon and EDT systems
in the short term, NATO must see the
development of EDTs in this threat
space over a long period of time. An
example of a long-game strategy
that purposefully pushes against
the red line of aggression is Russia’s
involvement in Crimea and Ukraine.
Russia's strategy of making small
territorial and political incursions into
Ukraine (also called "salami tactics,"
reminiscent of making very thin
slices of the meat that slowly stack
up) induces a fait accompli, to which
the UN and NATO have no option
but to accept Russia's newly gained
territory, or risk escalation to war.
This challenges the world's resolve
in responding to Russia's advances
in Ukraine as Russia takes more
liberties the longer the UN or NATO
does not respond.

IMPLICATION #6: NATO SHOULD
DEVELOP A SOLUTIONS MINDSET
FOR LONG-TERM POTENTIAL
ATTACKS.
Current state and Strategic Path:
With the current definition of WMDs and
WMD effects, there is no exploration or
specific framework for how a long-game
attack might present itself. Because these
attacks are designed to remain “under the
radar”, they will present themselves as
criminal attacks, glitches in the system, or
may remain hidden completely until their
effects cannot be reversed.
The further development of EDTs by private
industry will increase the hidden nature of
their development. Additionally, because
these EDTs will come out of industry, any
attack or early indicator of an attack will
present itself as a private sector crime or
anomaly. NATO members may not even
know that they are under attack from an

measured by some standard of preestablished metrics, it could rightfully
trigger the consultation requirement in
Article 4.

adversary.
Opportunities and Critical Enablers:
Another critical enabler would be for
NATO to work with members to develop

Validation of perceptible destabilization,

processes, procedures, tools, and

such as with an armed attack with EDTs

metrics for monitoring long-term EDT

or combinations of them, could trigger

effects. This might be accomplished by

collective defense in Article 5.

methodically simulating a number of

69 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission on a European Programme
for Critical Infrastructure Protection.
70 Ibid, 8.
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plausible combinations of EDTs, WMDs,

be measured by its destabilizing effect on

and conventional attacks. This would help

critical infrastructure.

members discover common, observable
indicators that could be developed into

Implications to the Treaty:

collective defense, and security guidelines.
There is a risk, when sensing for a longgame attack, that a NATO member
could be seen as monitoring noise or
even being overzealous. For example, in

DEFINITION:
The access to and increased
effectiveness of future EDTs will
allow non-traditional adversaries
to attack NATO members. These
adversaries will include non-nation
state groups as well as corporations.

Turning Point USA founder, Charlie Kirk, to
declare on Twitter, “Our food supply is under
attack — the question is, by who?”71 In fact,
the fires were determined to be accidental
and not statistically anomalous.72 The
lesson here is that facts did not deter social
media users from continuing to push for an
investigation.
NATO has an opportunity to work with
members and their critical infrastructure
and industry partners to begin sensing
and measuring potential impacts in “grey
space”. Along with this sensing, a metric
can be established to indicate when the
activity being observed has moved from
private sector crimes or anomalies to an
EDT attack. Typically, this type of attack can

themselves into this framework.
The state is a modern political construction
that, in large part, grew out of the
experience of European conflicts like the
Thirty Years War. The state is a system of
order that, in the words of political theorist
Max Weber, "claims the monopoly of the

the supreme civil power and government
vested in a country or nation... A body of
people occupying a defined territory and
organized under a sovereign government."74
Nation: "an extensive aggregate of persons,
so closely associated with each other by
common descent, language, or history, as
to form a distinct race or people, usually
organized as a separate political state and
occupying a definite territory."75
The combination of the two into the term

a given territory." To be a state in our

nation-state implies a system of order

contemporary consideration, a system of

wherein the nation and the state are at least

Similar to section 5 above, as a part of the

human organization must have a dominant

roughly congruent. In Post-Westphalia, we

preparedness intent of Article 3, members

claim to three things: (1) an organized

see a clearer overlap of these two ideas,

could develop tools and processes to track,

administrative system that (2) holds

which develop in tandem though not always

monitor, and communicate the development

exclusive control of the use of force (3) in

in the same direction. A nation-state, then,

of EDTs to the Alliance. Using an agreed

a defined territory or space. The concept of

is a system of order that expresses power

upon metric for the use of a single or

the state, however, has evolved significantly

over both borders and peoples.

combined EDT, members would be able to

over the course of the past centuries.

evoke Article 4 when a threshold of security

Current definitions of State and Nation are

threat is reached.

provided below.

IMPLICATION #7: INTERACTION
WITH NON-NATION STATES AND
CORPORATIONS

State: "the body politic as organized for

73

seemingly suspicious number of fires at
States, leading media personalities, such as

state-based system is based on a system

abstractly, or in a particular country); hence

legitimate use of physical force within

April 2022, social media users noticed a
food processing plants around the United

The current international framework of a

Non-Europeans have learned to “shoehorn”

Alliance. A new strategic planning group
long-term strategies, contributions to

of civil government (either generally and

that was originally European in design.

formal intelligence requirements for the
would also need to be empowered to affect

colonialism.

Current state and Strategic Path:
Currently, NATO does not have a way of
guarding against or taking action against
non-nation state or corporate actors.
This is particularly troubling because of
Europe’s history with non-nation states and

It follows then, that a nation-state would
have control over all of the following:
•

Territory and space,

supreme civil rule and government; the

•

Bureaucracy and administration,

political organization which is the basis

•

Use of force and sovereignty, and

71 Kirk, Charlie (@charliekirk11). 2022. "Food processing plants don’t just ‘accidentally’ burn down at this rate and
they certainly don’t ‘coincidentally’ become landing pads for plane crashes at the rate they are…Our food supply is
under attack in America. The question is—by who?." Twitter, April 29, 2022, 6:43PM.
https://twitter.com/charliekirk11/status/1520171930325643266?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed
%7Ctwterm%5E1520171930325643266%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.reuters.com
%2Farticle%2Ffactcheck-processing-fire-idUSL2N2WW2CY.
72 Reuters Fact Check, Fact Check-Food processing plant fires in 2022 are not part of a conspiracy to trigger U.S. food
shortages.
73 Weber, Politics as a Vocation, as quoted in state monopoly on violence.
74 Oxford English Dictionary, second edition, senses 29 and 30.
75 Oxford English Dictionary, second edition.
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•

A people or peoples (i.e., the dictionary

different struggles may define the position

The emergence of EDTs will allow non-

workshop and outlined in this report have

idea of a "common descent, language,

of physical territory.

nation state actors and corporations to

different motivations. Each of these threat

influence the global security stage. The

actors relate differently to the findings.

reality of this future necessitates that NATO

Each one also has different capabilities

becomes a critical enabler in this area.

and could exploit NATO and members’

NATO will need to expand its definition

weaknesses in different ways. Furthermore,

of possible and potential adversaries to

the actors could work together knowingly

include these non-traditional actors.

or unknowingly to bring about one of the six

or history").

Both the rise and fall of colonialism are

A nation-state's legitimacy is defined by

central to our understanding of the modern

its control over those four areas, like the

nation-state. Things such as the concept of

four legs of a chair. Some challenges have

nations become defined on frontiers. These

the effect of eating away at legitimacy

are the places where boundaries need to be

like termites in the wood until the chair

defined and where people have the capacity

collapses. Other challenges are more

to work through the process together (which

To do this, NATO should convene a working

comparable to attacking a chair's legs with

has historically been done in a violent

group to define these actors, their potential

an ax. Continuing with this metaphor, with

manner).

effect, and how to monitor and measure

One of the threat actors applies to all six

their rise to power. Working with NATO

findings. It is the Conditional State. The

members, sharing information about

conditional state refers to the environment

the emergence of these actors and their

created by the development and emergence

early activities will be essential to take

of EDTs. The increasing adoption and

appropriate action at the appropriate time.

use of one or all of the EDTs together

careful balance, the chair can probably hold
up on three legs for a time, but as heavy
ideological weight puts continued stress on
the chair, it will eventually collapse.

The modern global corporation was born in
this context of the “frontier”. Corporations
have typically functioned in the hybrid space
between economics and politics, acting at

A comparable analogy is illustrated with

times to advance capitalist goals and at

20th-century anti-colonialism, where

other times to advance political or social

This could potentially be a “sacred cow”

challenging questions emerged, such as

goals. The global corporation is even more

within the NATO construct, which allows

“who gets to define who ‘the people are’?”

capable of being larger than a commercial

them to start thinking now about how

or “when is the use of force against the

organization with a simple capitalist bottom

to interact with global, multi-national

state justified?” It seems that often such

line. In many cases, global corporations

corporations, which take on more of what

challenges happen where the overlap

exercise state powers more often than most

has been considered traditional nation-state

between nation and state is critically

people would think possible.

activities and responsibilities. Doing so will

limited.

It is important that NATO countries avoid

In addition, the digital world complicates

getting too focused on the state- and

the idea of territory and space. Our current

non-state actors dichotomy. Their nature

ideas of territory and space are changing as

falls within a continuum, and they overlap.

we absorb the implications of cyberspace-

Instead, we recommend that NATO looks

-in terms of how we conceive of and use

for motives and circumstances before

physical as well as virtual artifacts to define

categorizing actors. The thought here is to

them. In the modern era, from the 15th-

observe patterns before getting attached to

20th centuries, the struggle over control of

a specific narrative about an actor.

land has been a defining characteristic. In
the new era of the 21st century with cyber,

Opportunities and Critical Enablers:

yield positive results in the future.
Implications to the Treaty:
The definition, monitoring, and information
sharing of these groups' activities should
become part of Article 3’s preparedness.
The emergence and clear presentation of
activities could be a trigger for Article 4.

threats in the findings. These capabilities
and interactions are outlined below.

increases the likelihood that any one of the
six findings will happen. Like the soil from
which seeds grow, the conditional state is
the environment from which these potential
threats will spring. Understanding this
environment and tracking it progress will be
essential for the preparation against future
threats
Single Actor without Support:
A single actor with no support from nation
states or broader groups will have a limited
potential for impact compared to the other
two threat actors. However, the speed,
scope, scale, and impact of EDTs, alone
or combined, will make the single actor a

STRATEGIC PATHS OF THREAT
ACTORS

significant threat.

Each threat actor type explored in the

threat actor will be the New Insider Threats

The greatest probability of impact for this
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(discussed in Finding #3) and The Long

The main weakness they can exploit in

Game (addressed in Finding #6). EDTs will

Finding #2, Lowering the Bar: This

these findings are influenced by the

NATO is the fact that currently, there are

finding can apply to the actors cited

same weakness. The unmonitored

enable the single actor to act as an insider

little means to deal with this kind of threat

above, especially the countries who

development of EDTs leaves NATO

threat for financial or ideological gain. Here,

actor. They operate without borders and

may be outmatched in EDT supremacy

members vulnerable to these attacks.

the threat actor exploits the inherent trust

are untethered from international laws and

and see the use of a WMD as their only

WMD effects will leave NATO

of the organization’s insider through which

treaties. This posture creates a beneficial

option. This will also apply to other

unprepared for the combination of

they work or operate. This kind of threat

environment for the actor.

actors who might gain possession of

EDTs used as weapons or other WMD

a single or small collection of nuclear

devices. This type of attack will be

devices, while feeling as if their “back

particularly attractive to non-nuclear

is against the wall”. They may also

enabled or non-WMD enabled nation

consider the use of a tactical, single

states. This will give them an advantage

nuclear device as acceptable. The

in conflicts

is not new, and it is much like a traditional
insider threat. However, it is the outside
impact of the EDTs that can make this
threat significant.

One difference between the non-nation
state group and the state actors will be
their access to a large nuclear arsenal. In
the future, it is likely that non-nation state

Like the Insider Threat, the Long Game will

groups will gain access to nuclear materials

allow a single threat actor to exploit a small

and a small number of nuclear devices.

opening or weakness to attack NATO and

Even with this, non-nation groups won’t have

member EDT systems with an attack that

the same tracking and launch technologies

will evolve over time. This longer timeframe

as a traditional nuclear weapons state.

allows the initial contact or scope of the
attack to be small. It is with time that it will
become significant.
Single actors also offer the potential for
non-nation state or state actors to exploit
an attack. This overlap could be known or
unknown to the single-threat actor. But the
small opening in NATO defenses could give
larger actors a beginning foothold for a
larger attack.
Non-Nation State Groups:

•

NATO weakness or vulnerability in this
instance might be counter-intuitive. The
weakness in this case is the strength of
NATO members’ EDT arsenal. The EDT
supremacy when used against lesser
equipped countries could push them to

State Actors:

use a nuclear device.

State actors pose the greatest and most

states sizable targets within NATO
members’ critical infrastructure. The
vulnerability lies in the complexity of each
member’s critical infrastructure as well as
the lack of definition and tracking across
member states. This Destabilization of

Finding #3, New Insider Threats: Insider

Critical Infrastructure will also slow down

a clear strategic path that touches all six

threats are a traditional and known

member states' reactions and could delay

findings. Russia, China, India, Pakistan,

attack space for nation states. Nation

the triggering of Articles 4 and 5.

North Korea, and Israel are the most

states will continue to use espionage,

critical to consider because of their nuclear

counter-intelligence, blackmail, and

capabilities. Below, we outline how all key

coercive measures to develop and

findings create vulnerabilities.

exploit insider threats within NATO.

complex threat to NATO, since they have

•

•

If left unchecked, EDTs will give nation

The new area of interest in this finding

Finding #1, Geopolitical Conflict

includes the speed, scope, scale, and

Escalation: This is most closely tied to

A non-nation state group provides a

the threat of nuclear escalation and is

considerable threat to NATO and its

exacerbated by the adoption of EDTs

members. Because of EDTs, this actor

into defense systems, the existence of

will have nearly the same capabilities as a

dual-use vulnerabilities, and industry's

state actor, and their impact is likely to be

strong control over dual-use technology

significant.

development.

impact an individual can have whether
they know they are a threat or not.
•

Findings #4, #5, and #6: All three of

Finally, the Long Game is one of the more
complex and subtle threats. It is a threat
that does not initially present itself as a
threat. If NATO and its members are not
prepared, this long game could remain
unseen for an extended period of time.
Lack of preparedness and monitoring will
leave NATO vulnerable to possible multiple
attacks of this kind.
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DETERRENCE

A N E X T G E N E R AT I O N O F
I N T E G R AT E D D E T E R R E N C E

We concur, and add that reacting to a crisis is only part of the deterrence solution. The
concept of integrated deterrence needs to incorporate the emergence of destructive
technologies to get ahead of a potential conflict escalation spiral. We have modeled
dozens of possible threats that emphasize how EDTs are making weapons of mass
destruction more lethal and more accessible. Incorporating a programmatic emphasis on
the implications of EDTs is the next step for implementing a sufficient deterrence strategy

Definition:
The emergence of EDTs and their use with WMDs will mean that a new approach to WMD
deterrence will be needed.
Current State and Strategic Path:
Currently, NATO member deterrence is not sufficient to guard against and prevent the
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effects of EDTs on WMD and WMD effects. The concept of integrated deterrence, namely
as a concerted effort to use all domains, all instruments of national power, and do so
with allies and partners to deny scenarios of conflict, is emerging as the latest iteration of
deterrence strategy76
In the 2022 National Defense Strategy, the United States explicitly calls out integrated
deterrence as its strategy to advance national defense goals. As the unclassified version of
the NDS is not yet available to the public, it is unclear how the Department of Defense will
consider emerging technology threats in its strategy. However, the U.S. strategy includes
a goal of “building enduring advantages for the future Joint Force” through “getting
the technology we need more quickly”, which implies continuing to pursue research,
development, and acquisition of emerging technologies.78
NATO has embraced integrated deterrence as a concept, although the organization has
not yet committed to it as a strategy. NATO think tanks have studied integrated deterrence
and recommend its implementation as an offset strategy or “First Reset Strategy”79
Conceptually, integration is vertical, horizontal, functional, and temporal. The goal of this
strategy is to “overhaul and re-energise [NATO’s] decision-making processes to be able to
react to a fast-breaking crisis anywhere, at any time”.80
76 Garamone, Concept of Integrated Deterrence Will Be Key to National Defense Strategy, DOD Official Says.
77 U.S. Department of Defense, Fact Sheet: 2022 National Defense Strategy.
78 U.S. Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy, p. 2.
79 GLOBSEC Policy Institute, Integrated Deterrence: NATO’s ‘First Reset’ Strategy,
80 Ibid, 16.

CONCLUSION

CONCLUSION

The nature of war, however, won’t change. It is a decision by humans to impose their
political will on their opponents by the use of violence. War will still be characterized by
“fog, friction, and chance”. Its causes will still likely be related to fear, pride, and personal
interests. Conversely, the character of war will change (i.e., how and where wars are fought,
and with what weapons, technologies, organizations, and doctrine). Namely, the “ways” and
“means” of war will change.
Throughout history, we have seen a number of examples of the changing character of war.
Consider how the smooth bore musket gave way to the rifle; how communications shifted

Given historical events and future forecasting, it’s expected that the world of 2040 will
be more unpredictable and unstable with an increased potential for international conflict
between great powers. Both China and Russia continue to develop significant military
capabilities with the intent to change the current rules-based order of the world. The world
is on the cusp of a change in the fundamental character of war.

from guidons to the radio and the internet; and how naval vessels shifted from sails to
steam. Moving forward, the next fundamental change in the character of war will be driven
by technological innovation and the development of EDTs. In the end, the challenge in every
domain of warfare is for NATO alliance members and partners to understand how EDTs
affect them individually and collectively. They need to create plans for monitoring and
affecting the development and adoption of these technologies, and create strategies that
help NATO maintain peace and order.
For NATO members, the ultimate goal should be to deter great power war and maintain
great power peace. To be successful, we can’t cling to the concepts, weapons, and
organizations of the past because they are familiar and comfortable to us. The future
battlefield demands more. It will be highly complex, decisive in urban areas with large
civilian populations, non-linear, and non-contiguous in time and space. This project was
done jointly between the Army Cyber Institute at West Point, NATO ACT, and Arizona State
University. Our goal was to examine how the future of 2040 is likely to operate and provide
recommendations on how to prepare for, mitigate, and respond to the threats associated
with it.
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However, each nation’s approach to development differs. The United States, for example,
relies on academia for basic research, which is funded by government institutions and
non-profit foundations. There, commercialization is ultimately left to private investors
and later publicly-traded corporations. China, by contrast, drafts five-year strategic plans
including industrial policy, then channels state funding into academic, industrial, and
research functions.

ADVANCED MANUFACTURING
ADVANCED COMPUTING
Advanced Computing is an umbrella term covering emerging or cutting-edge
computational technology currently in development. The term can refer to both hardware
and software running on these machines. More recently, the term has expanded to include
network devices and the hardware and software platforms that connect them. The term
itself is intentionally nebulous given the rapid pace of change, as technologies achieve
mainstream success or fail to break through.
Currently, Advanced Computing refers to, but is not limited to the following range of
technologies:
•

Supercomputing, edge computing, cloud computing, storage of “big data”, and new
computing architectures;

•

Virtual reality (VR), augmented reality (AR), mixed reality (XR), and “the Metaverse”;

•

Trusted authentication, disaster recovery, computer forensics, and identity
management;

•

Digital convergence between cyber and physical systems;

•

Blockchains, “web3,” shared distributed edger, traceability, and trustless systems; and

•

Neuromorphic, edge, virtual systems, and 5G.

Typically included on this list are also artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing, and
the Internet of Things (IoT). For the purposes of this report, we detail them separately
below.
As of May 2022 , the leaders in Advanced Computing are the United States and China.
Many nation-states are leaders or close partners in a particular technology, including India
in data science, the UK in blockchains, and South Korea and Finland with 5G.
81

Advanced Manufacturing is another broadly-defined term referring to emerging
technologies related to manufacturing processes and materials. It is defined by
Manufacturing USA as the “use of innovative technologies to create existing products
and the creation of new products. Advanced Manufacturing can include production
activities that depend on information, automation, computation, software, sensing, and
networking.”82
An alternate definition provided by the European Commission’s Advanced Technologies
for Industries project states that “Advanced manufacturing technology encompasses the
use of innovative technology to improve products or processes that drive innovation. It
covers two types of technologies: process technology that is used to produce any of other
advanced technologies, and process technology that is based on robotics, automation
technology or computer-integrated manufacturing. For the former, such process
technology typically relates to production apparatus, equipment and procedures for the
manufacture of specific materials and components. For the latter, process technology
includes measuring, control and testing devices for machines, machine tools and various
areas of automated or IT-based manufacturing technology.”83
For the purposes of this report, Advanced Manufacturing includes the following
technologies:
•

Additive manufacturing, such as 3D printing;

•

Smart manufacturing;

•

Nanomanufacturing;

•

Robotics used in manufacturing;

•

Automation technology; and

•

Computer-integrated manufacturing.

81 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Technology and Innovation Report 2021.
82 Manufacturing.gov, Glossary: Advanced Manufacturing.
83 European Commission, Advanced Manufacturing Technology.
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The adoption and sophistication of current Advanced Manufacturing technologies varies
worldwide. South Korea, Japan, Germany, Singapore, and Sweden lead the way in robotic
manufacturing, for instance, while the United States and China are the clear leaders in
additive manufacturing, followed by the UK, Germany, and Singapore.84

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
The United States Department of Defense, in their 2018 AI Strategy, defines artificial
intelligence as “the ability of machines to perform tasks that normally require human
intelligence – for example, recognizing patterns, learning from experience, drawing
conclusions, making predictions, or taking action – whether digitally or as the smart
software behind autonomous physical systems.”85 For the purposes of this report, AI is
defined more loosely. In the words of computer scientist Elaine Rich, “AI is the study of
how to make computers do things at which, at the present time, people are better”.86
There are three main sub-categories of AI. The most common variety today is artificial
narrow intelligence (ANI), which some researchers refer to as “weak” AI. These algorithms
are goal-oriented and designed to perform a specific task. The “weak” notation is
misleading in that the current uses of ANI, while narrow, have proven robust and
successful. Some of the more promising examples of ANI include Amazon’s and Apple’s
voice assistants, Facebook’s facial recognition abilities, and OpenAI’s GPT-3 and
DALL-E 2 – all of which can spontaneously generate creative text and images from openended prompts.
Artificial general intelligence (AGI), on the other hand, has been dubbed “strong” AI. This
is the domain of machines that learn, understand, and act in ways that are analogous to
humans. They are able to think, strategize, and perform multiple tasks under uncertain
conditions without a priori knowledge or by being specifically designed to perform them.
AGIs do not currently exist, but predictions of their imminent arrival have been a hallmark
of the field.
Artificial super intelligence (ASI) is a hypothetical goal seen most often in science fiction
films and novels. These are machines that have transcended sentience and are capable of
genuine creativity, social skills, and wisdom.
For the purposes of this report, AI as an EDT includes the following sub-fields and related
technologies:

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Machine learning;
Deep learning;
Reinforcement learning;
Sensory perception and recognition;
Next-generation AI;
Safe and/or secure AI; and
Human-machine teaming.

As of May 2022, the U.S. Congressional Research Service assessed that narrow AI was
fully or partly incorporated into military applications, such as: intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance (ISR); logistics and supply operations; cyber operations; autonomous
and semi-autonomous vehicles; and command and control functions.87 Training a narrow
AI requires large datasets, and the process still struggles with opacity, training bias, and
lack of resiliency. For example, many AI applications, such as image recognition can be
fooled with small data changes imperceptible to the human eye.
China is the closest peer competitor to the U.S. in AI, having already developed
sophisticated language- and facial-recognition technologies for its domestic surveillance
network. AI-enabled autonomous swarm research and cyber operations are at the top of
the list of its ongoing R&D efforts.
Similarly, Russia seeks to arm at least 30% of its military equipment with AI-powered
robotics in the next five years, including research into ground-, aerial-, undersea-, and
naval-swarming. Russia’s AI research also prioritizes propaganda, misinformation, and
information warfare efforts against the United States. Part of this effort may be directed
at improving “deepfake” creation and distribution.

AUTONOMOUS ROBOTICS
“Autonomy” is the ability to independently decide and act. In robotics, autonomous
systems are able to perceive their environment, make decisions based on that data, then
perform an action, such as a movement or object manipulation accordingly — all without
human intervention.
For the purposes of this report, the following sub-components fall under the heading of
Autonomous Robotics:

84 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Technology and Innovation Report 2021.
85 U.S. Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 Department of Defense Artificial Intelligence Strategy, 5.
86 Rich, Artificial Intelligence and the Humanities.
87 Sayler, Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress, 2-8.
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Surface;
Air;
Maritime;
Space;
Swarms;
Weapons platforms; and
Uses in civilian critical infrastructure.

In 2020, the International Federation of Robots ranked Singapore, South Korea, Japan,
Germany, Sweden, Denmark, Hong Kong, Taiwan, the U.S., Belgium, and Luxemburg as the
world’s most automated countries.88 That year, average manufacturing robot density hit a
new global record of 113 units per 10,000 employees. Regionally, Western Europe (225)
and the Nordics (204) have the highest density, followed by North America (153) and
Southeast Asia (119).89
Top global manufacturers of industrial robots include ABB (Switzerland), FANUC (Japan),
KUKA (China), Mitsubishi Electric (Japan) and Yaskawa (Japan). Leading manufacturers
of humanoid robots include Hanson Robotics (Hong Kong, China), Pal Robotics (Spain),
Robotics (South Korea) and Softbank Robotics (Japan).90
In terms of research, the United States, China, and Japan have published the most
scientific papers, while the U.S. has a dominant lead in patenting, followed distantly by
South Korea and Germany.

BIOTECHNOLOGIES
As its name indicates, biotechnologies use cellular and biomolecular processes to develop
new technologies and products in agriculture, health, energy, and more. The goal with this
technology is to create biological factories that can be reprogrammed to produce tailored
outputs, which include biological weapons.
For the purposes of this report, biotechnologies include the following components:
•
•
•
•
•

Synthetic biology;
Genome editing;
Emerging pathogens detection and characterization;
Engineering of viral and viral delivery systems; and
Biomanufacturing and bioprocessing technologies.

Recent game-changers in the biotechnologies threat space include the increasing
availability of gene editing techniques, the falling costs of gene sequencing, and the

worldwide response to COVID-19 – all in terms of detection, vaccination, and other
protective measures.
Experts are divided on whether virology and genetic-manipulation techniques will mature
quickly enough and at a sufficient scale to be a significant concern by 2035. While
COVID-19 may have led to an unprecedented degree of interest and funding in these fields,
including the rapid development, manufacturing, and distribution of novel mRNA vaccines,
we predict that within a decade, funding, attention, and institutional knowledge may
dissipate, providing an adversary the opportunity to strike with a biological threat.
The Institute for Defense Analyses assesses that the U.S. efforts in biotechnology have
historically been developed in the private sector as a civilian or economic pursuit.91 In
the U.S., the biotechnology industry amounts to between 5%-7% of the U.S. GDP, and it is
growing around 10% annually, according to the U.S. National Academies of Science.92

CYBER
Cyber has continuously had a fluid meaning with beginnings in Norbert Weiner’s
pioneering work with cybernetics in the 1940s through further development by such
people as science fiction author, William Gibson’s, coinage of “cyberspace” in the 1980s.
This report uses the U.S. military’s definition outlined in Joint Publication 3-12, which
refers to it as “A global domain within the information environment consisting of the
interdependent networks of information technology infrastructures and resident data,
including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded
processors and controllers.”93
This definition of cyber focuses on the use of that domain as a platform and staging
area for attacks on enemy systems. For example, in a 2015 hearing of the U.S. House
Committee on Foreign Affairs, James A. Lewis, director of the Strategic Technologies
Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, explained cyber as “the
ability to remotely manipulate computer networks...The Internet and computers provide
cyber tools and techniques that counties use for influence, coercion and, potentially,
attack. Militaries will use cyberattacks to disrupt command and control, manipulate
software, degrade weapons performance and produce political or psychological effects.”94
88 International Federation of Robotics (IFR), Robot Race: The World´s Top 10 automated countries.
89 Ibid.
90 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Technology and Innovation Report 2021.
91 Carlson, Robert, Sbragia, and Sixt. Beyond Biological Defense: Biotech in U.S. National Security and Great Power
Competition.
92 Ibid.
93 Joint Publication 3-12, Cyberspace Operations.
94 U.S. Congress. House and Committee on Foreign Affairs, Cyber War Definitions, Deterrence, and Foreign Policy.
95 Voo, Hemani, Jones, DeSombre, Cassidy, and Schwarzenbach, National Cyber Power Index 2020.
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Cyber threats typically do not produce destructive effects similar to WMDs or kinetic
weapons, but instead seek to disrupt data and communications, create confusion,
damage networks and computers, and destroy machinery. Significantly, these attacks are
also targeted at military and government targets as well as critical civilian infrastructure,
such as was the case with Russia’s successful attack on Ukraine’s power grid in December
2015.

of Foreign Affairs found that “the European market for Internet of Things (IoT) solutions
is growing. Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands are
leading European IoT adoption, but Eastern European countries and the Nordics are
following closely.”97

For the purposes of this report, cyber threats, attacks, and warfare also include the
following components:

A review of the “state of the art” in IIoT found it in use across multiple sectors, including
“environmental monitoring, agriculture, construction, smart homes and buildings, disaster
management, smart grids, robotics, health care, automotive industries, and emergency
response systems.”98

•

The use of and attack on computer hardware, software, and networks;

HYPERSONICS

•

An attack on government, military, industrial, and public networks and data;

•

The disruption and destabilization of infrastructure, commerce, and civilian
psychology; and

•

Compromising cloud service providers, managed service providers, other third-party
data hosting providers, or supply chain attacks.

Hypersonics are ballistic weapons capable of flying at a minimum speed of Mach 5. Unlike
traditional ballistics, which follow a steady trajectory that enables the calculation of their
targets, hypersonics are able to maneuver in mid-air. This ability significantly complicates
attempts for both interception and evasive action. To date, there are no defenses against
hypersonics, and some experts question the technical feasibility of creating one.

Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs has developed The National
Cyber Power Index (NCPI), measuring 30 countries’ cyber capabilities in the context of
seven national objectives, using 32 intent indicators and 27 capability indicators with
evidence collected from publicly available data. The United States is at the top of the list,
followed closely by China, the United Kingdom, and Russia.

INDUSTRIAL INTERNET OF THINGS
The Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) is the subset of the Internet of Things (IoT) focused
on critical sectors and infrastructure. It represents a technology stack that combines
sensors, local bandwidth, data storage and processing, real-time analytics, and control
systems. The difference between IoT and IIoT is that attacks on and system failures by the
latter can result in life-threatening situations and potentially mass casualty events.
For the purposes of this report, we are most interested in the application of IIoT in the
following areas:
•
•
•

•
•
•

“Smart cities” and public-private infrastructure;
Government and municipal infrastructure; and
Manufacturing and supply chains.

The national leaders in general IoT deployments, as measured by spending, is the United
States, China, Japan, and Germany.96 In 2021, a report funded by the Netherlands Ministry

There are two sub-classes of hypersonics, each with distinct characteristics. The first is
a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) launched from a ballistic missile or rocket booster. The
Congressional Research Service (CRS) notes HGVs are steerable, normally detached at a
lower, flatter trajectory than ballistic payloads, and as a result makes it difficult to predict
the flight path.99 The United States is currently not developing HGVs for use with nuclear
warheads, although Russia and China likely are.100 The CRS also assesses that Russia
and China are building HGVs with the intent to meet their nation’s security interests, not to
compete with the U.S. development of HGVs.
The second sub-class are hypersonic cruise missiles (HCM) that rely on air-breathing
scramjet engines to accelerate to hypersonic speeds at the edge of Earth’s atmosphere.
The scramjet engine operates after the weapon has been launched from a traditional
booster or bomber, before accelerating to hypersonic speeds. HCMs are also
maneuverable and capable of evading layered ballistic defenses.101 HGVs and HCMs
primarily differ on their launch mechanisms and glide angles, but there are also technical
aspects at play.

96 Statista, Forecast Internet of Things (IoT) spending worldwide in 2019, by country.
97 CBI, The European market potential for (Industrial) Internet of Things.
98 Malik, Sharma, Singh, Gehlot, Satapathy, Alnumay, Pelusi, Ghosh, Nayak, Industrial Internet of Things and its
Applications in Industry 4.0: State of The Art
99 Sayler and Woolf, Defense Primer: Hypersonic Boost-Glide Weapons.
100 Ibid.
101 Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, Hypersonic Weapon Basics.
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For the purposes of this report, hypersonics refer to the entire system and supply chain
supporting the development and deployment of hypersonic weapons. This includes, but is
not limited to:
•
•
•
•
•

Propulsion systems;
Aerodynamics and control;
Materials;
Detection, tracking, and characterization; and
Defense.

The Switzerland-based Center for Security Studies has determined that both “Russia
and China are motivated to acquire hypersonic weapon capability not only to have more
long-range missiles and better nuclear deterrence, but also for their tactical use in a naval
contest, especially anti-ship missiles that can sink aircraft carriers.”102 This means that
hypersonics research and development are more encompassing than just replacing firststrike nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles.
The U.S., China, and Russia are leading hypersonic weapons development, while Australia,
Japan, Germany, India, South Korea, North Korea, and France are also developing
hypersonic weapons technology. Several of these countries, including France and China,
are collaborating with Russia.103
In the United States, the Navy, Air Force, Army, and DARPA are engaged in no less than
seven major hypersonic weapons and hypersonic technology programs estimated at over
3.2 billion USD (in 2021).104 None of these systems are yet programs of record, although
prototypes demonstrating various modes of employment (e.g., missile launched, seabased, air breathing, and low orbit technologies) have been in development for decades.105
According to the U.S. Congressional Research Service, Russia’s hypersonic program
includes two true hypersonic weapons (the Avangard and the ship-launched Tsirkon)
and one “maneuvering air-launched ballistic missile” (the Kinzhal) that poses similar
defensive challenges.106 The Avangard currently rides on the SS-19 Stiletto ICBM and
has been successfully tested in 2016 and 2018. Russian news claims the Avangard has
been cleared for “combat duty” in December 2019. Russia plans to move the weapon to
the Sarmat ICBM in the future. The Sarmat was last successfully tested in April 2022 and
reportedly can carry three Avangard glide vehicles. 107
China is researching hypersonic glide vehicles and has successfully tested both the DF-ZF
and the Starry Sky-2. China is also currently developing at least three other hypersonic
vehicle models: D18-1S, D18-2S, and D18-3S. Their investment in hypersonic research

includes at least 18 wind tunnels under control of the China Aerodynamics Research and
Development Center, another three hypersonic wind tunnels ran by the China Academy of
Aerospace Aerodynamics, and the country is building the JF-22 wind tunnel expected to
facilitate testing up to Mach 30 by 2022.108

QUANTUM INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES
As the name indicates, quantum information technologies harness the unique properties
of quantum mechanics for computation. In classical computing, a bit representing a 0 or 1
is the smallest unit of information, with long strings of bits compiled to create executable
code. In quantum computing, by contrast, a “qubit” can simultaneously exist as either a 0
or 1 or both, which is a state known as superposition.
Adding qubits produces an exponential growth in computing power that can quickly
outstrip classical computers in several critical areas, such as factoring large integers,
but with physical limitations. Silicon-based computing, on the other hand, operates in
many environmental conditions. Qubits can only maintain superposition when cooled
to fractions of a degree above absolute zero, which in turn requires complex and bulky
refrigeration techniques.
For the purposes of this report, the definition of quantum information technologies
includes the following components:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Quantum computing;
Materials, isotopes, and fabrication techniques for quantum devices;
Post-quantum cryptography;
Quantum sensing;
Quantum communication; and
Quantum networking and the Quantum Internet.

Since 2019, the U.S. National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) has allocated research
funds to establish and expand quantum research programs. The U.S. Navy and U.S. Air
Force have each designated their respective service research laboratories as a Quantum
Information Science Research Center, while the U.S. Army has declined to designate a
research center at this time.
102 Ibid, 3.
103 Tiron, Hypersonic Weapons: Who Has Them and Why It Matters. See also: Sayler, Hypersonic Weapons:
Background and Issues for Congress.
104 Kunertova, Weaponized and Overhyped: Hypersonic Technology.
105 Ibid.
106 Sayler, Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid.
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The NDAA also directs the DoD to conduct quantum technology risk assessments, and
to extend incentives to high school STEM programs to include quantum information
sciences in their programs. Since the majority of quantum research in the U.S. is done
through the private sector, the NDAA also directs DoD to improve partnerships with small
and medium enterprises on the leading edge of quantum R&D.
Elsewhere, both China and Russia have implemented formal programs to develop
quantum capabilities. In 2016, China launched the world’s first quantum satellite, Micius,
to study space-to-ground encrypted quantum communications. China has also invested
in a terrestrial quantum communication network more than 1,250 miles long. The
Congressional Research Service assesses that Russia is at least five to 10 years behind
the U.S. and China in quantum research, but the country has allocated nearly $800 million
to achieve toward its goals in the Russian Quantum Technologies Roadmap.109 Most of
both of these countries’ efforts are led by their respective governments.
Other entities that have made significant quantum investments include the U.K., Canada,
and European Union. The latter’s program has allocated $1.1 billion over a decade to
commercialize quantum advances.110 Australia, Germany, Netherlands, and Austria have
made similar, but smaller investments.
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M E L A N I E W. S I S S O N
Melanie W. Sisson is a fellow in the Foreign Policy program’s Center for Security, Strategy,
and Technology where she researches the use of the armed forces in international politics,
U.S. national security strategy, and military applications of emerging technologies.
Hi, my name is Melanie Sisson. I'm happy to be joining you today from the Brookings
Institution's Talbott Center for Security, Strategy and Technology, where I'm a fellow and to
present to you some research done on anticipating the effects of emerging technologies
on nuclear deterrence.
I've put on the slide here, the specific prompts that were addressed in this research.
And I do that both to orient us into the questions, but also so that I can point out that
the questions are really very direct. And then also to note that I've tried to answer them
equally directly. One other item as we get started, and this one is definitional. Throughout,
when I refer to artificial intelligence, I'm including advanced computing for purposes of
managing, processing and analyzing large volumes of data and machine learning, but I'm
not including general sentience. And when I refer to cyberspace, what I mean is systems
of digital connectivity that move data between and among electronic devices.
To consider how emerging and disruptive technologies or EDTs will affect state's
nuclear strategies - we have to begin by understanding what it is nuclear strategy is
intended to achieve. Since 1954, the United States has designed its nuclear strategy to
deter the use of nuclear weapons on itself and its treaty allies. And since 1967, also to
deter conventional attacks. Because we're in a world where other states are nuclear
armed, effective deterrence requires two things: a nuclear arsenal and secure second
strike capability. In other words, for nuclear deterrence to be effective, nuclear armed
competitors must all believe that each can absorb a first strike and still return nuclear
response. Effective nuclear deterrence in this way create stability - a condition under
which nobody has an incentive to strike first because there's no first mover advantage to
be had. Stability is achieved, in other words, when all nuclear states recognize that nobody

wins and everyone loses in a nuclear exchange. To date, states have achieved second
strike assurance by hiding and defending a subset of their nuclear arsenals by using
harden missile silos, rapid launch and dispersal, mobility, and the oceans.
Emerging technologies are degrading the effectiveness of these approaches. There are
more and more usable technologies that make more of the world more observable more
of the time. There are more and more usable technologies that make data more plentiful
and more useful. And there are more and more usable technologies that enable more
devices to act on the world independently of human intervention. As these technology
advance over time and as their potential is realized through integration, and here I'm
thinking of uncrewed platforms powered by compact and durable energy sources that are
equipped with high fidelity sensors and edge computing, including artificial intelligence,
their applications for purposes of intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance or ISR will
increasingly allow all states to better identify, monitor, track, and target nuclear assets.
This can happen intentionally and/or it also can happen as a byproduct of deployments
that are designed to acquire information for other purposes. Movement in this direction
is ongoing and as the United States and competitor militaries continue to modernize - it
increasingly will challenge secure second strike, terrestrial hiding will become increasingly
difficult to achieve, and the oceans also eventually will, as the saying goes, become more
transparent.
Defending nuclear assets also will become more difficult. In the first instance, hardening
isn't really a match for mass bombardment and to the extent that rapid launch relies upon
nuclear command control and communication systems or NC3, its integrity no longer can
be guaranteed. Advances in artificial intelligence are creating strategic risks in cyberspace,
which I usually characterize as the wild west of interstate interaction today. Cyberspace
is decentralized, it's everywhere at all times, it can be accessed by anyone and it's
bidirectional. Devices can receive and can push data. These features mean that insertions
of digital code that instruct devices to behave in particular ways can achieve a multitude
of adversarial cyber effects, including espionage, but also data corruption and system
disruption. NC3 is composed of technologies that sense, process, analyze, visualize, and
distribute digital information that enable communication and that power, those functions.
And these systems are far from immune from cyber attacks. In addition to creating risks
of nuclear accidents and unintended launches, the possibility of adversarial intrusions into
NC3 by state or non-state actors could make it possible to disable launch or to redirect
targeting. If an actor were to believe it had achieved a disabling or diverting cyber attack
on an adversary’s NC3, secure second strike assurance would dissolve and nuclear
deterrence would go with it. As with ISR, this outcome could occur either intentionally or
as an unintended result of system intermingling.
I noted before that the United States and its nuclear armed competitors will pursue EDTs
and systems of EDTs. And so all of them also should be expected to seek ways to counter
the effects of those tools and systems as they seek to ensure the survivability of their
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nuclear assets. China, with its limited arsenal, has the most reason to make adjustments
of scale. In particular, by establishing a robust nuclear triad. The United States and Russia
already have ample stocks of warheads and delivery systems and well-established
triads. For these countries, advances in ISR will increase the value of mobile air and seabased nuclear capabilities with ocean hiding remaining the most viable for the longest
period of time. Investments in land-based Intercontinental ballistic missiles or ICBMs by
contrast, and especially those in silos, can be argued to be useful for deterrence generally,
but they are not meaningful responses to emerging technologies. The great equalizer,
unfortunately, is in cyberspace and here all states and not just those with their own
nuclear assets, have reason to invest in offensive and defensive cyber capabilities that
could be deployed against NC3 systems.
I think that advances in ISR will create nuclear instability in the medium term. I think
terrestrial hiding and evasion through air mobility will become less possible relatively
quickly, and that sea-based nuclear assets will retain their currency longer, but not
indefinitely. My guess is that the nature of technology and technology transfer means
that states generally will make synchronous progress, but it's possible that one actor will
jump out ahead or will think that it has jumped out ahead or that others will think that it
has jumped out ahead. Any of those outcomes will degrade stability by either actually
or simply seeming to create a first strike incentive. Even more concerning are the nearterm risks in cyberspace. By near term, I mean now - today, as reports make clear that
states are actively undertaking cyber operations on each other's nuclear infrastructure.
Cyber defenses will never be impenetrable, and the risks posed by ISR, can't be addressed
adequately through adjustments to nuclear posture. This means that achieving the next
nuclear equilibrium will require coordination of behavior. States will have to agree to do
and not to do certain things. This means that the United States needs to seek to engage
China and Russia in conversations that will lead to the development of mutual approaches
to risk reduction. I'm not suggesting that this will be straightforward or easy. I am just
saying that it is necessary.
I think we can take some lessons from the cold war experience of arms control though. Of
course, the trick will be to adapt them to the new environment, to new technologies and
to new partners in China and Russia. Given the tenor of the U.S. relationships with those
states today, simply creating lines of communication and giving them a few repetitions
will be as important and possibly even more important in deciding which specific risks to
address first. If we need to choose one, it won't surprise you that I'd suggest beginning
with making any progress we can prohibiting the use of AI enabled technologies in
cyberspace to attack the nuclear enterprise.
I'll finish with one note about the DOD China military power report, because it contains an
important section on China's nuclear activity. I've heard and seen commentary suggesting
that China's expansion of its nuclear arsenal and development of its triad might indicate
a shift away from its long time, No first use policy. This of course is possible, but it's only

one of a number of possible explanations. China might be seeking nuclear parity, for
example, because it believes this will reduce its vulnerability to nuclear coercion. It might
also be anticipating the effect of emerging technologies and taking steps to increase the
survivability of its arsenal. And there might be other reasons. China's capabilities bear
close monitoring, no doubt, and so does its intent. But we would do well to remember that
understanding intent requires more than measuring capability. This is always important,
but I think especially important when it comes to nuclear strategy where the risks of arms
racing and the security spiral are pronounced and the consequences of getting it wrong
are so severe.

JOHN ARQUILLA
John Arquilla is Distinguished Professor Emeritus of Defense Analysis at the U.S. Naval
Postgraduate School. He is best known for developing the concept of cyberwar in the
early 1990s, and continues to contribute to the cyber discourse, most recently in his
Bitskrieg: The New Challenge of Cyberwarfare (Polity, 2021). Dr. Arquilla is presently
working on a study of the implications of advances in artificial intelligence for military and
security affairs.
Thank you so much, Colonel, for this opportunity to share a few thoughts with you on
these cyber issues and how they relate to weapons of mass destruction, and what I call
mass disruptive weapons as well. I think there are several topics here that might be of
interest to those in your program.
The first is basically to have a realization, as many hackers do, by the way, about the
complexity of cyberspace. One really doesn't know for sure, even if one tries to target
very carefully a specific kind of equipment or a system, you don't really ever know what's
exactly going to happen. And for me, a good example of this is when an autistic young
man from Britain who was interested, about 20 years ago, in finding out information about
UFOs and he thought the best place to go for that would be to search in the U.S. Air Force
files. So, he hacked in and while looking for information about UFOs, he just happened
to trigger a virus that shut down air defenses along the east coast and without any
intention of doing so, it also knocked out the supply and logistics system supporting the
Atlantic fleet. So, that's just an example of how you might aim to do one thing and other
unexpected things happen. This occurs as well in my book, Bitskrieg, which is a latter-day
analogy of the Blitzkrieg, the great military doctrine of the 20th century. Bitskrieg, that is
using bits and bytes to guide the bombs and bullets, will have, I think, a similar profound
effect on military affairs in the 21st century. But I use other examples, some of the early
Russian cyber attacks aimed at the Ukraine years ago knocked out port facilities in Italy
and other countries for appreciable periods of time.
One has to be aware of and to respect the complexity of cyberspace. I think hackers
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also find, even the black hat hackers, are drawn to cyberspace because of its beauty and
complexity. It is a wilderness of its own - that has its own sort of charms. And they're
drawn to it, some to do bad things and others to be helpful. And, of course, one of my
other crusades has been to try to encourage more active recruitment of the master hacker
community as other powers are doing. In fact, there's kind of an organizational race to
go right along with the arms races underway in the world, and that organizational race is
to build hacker networks and China, Russia, and other powers are doing that. The United
States, not so much yet. We're more interested in incarcerating hackers and I really think
we need to take a long second look at that. We do have some people with non-regulation
haircuts and body piercings in various units and commands here and there. But not
enough. That's the other problem. We have to be able to bring in people who can't be
vetted for a security clearance or might not meet physical standards of military service.
Anyway, then the takeaway is this complexity means that we have to be prepared, when
we use cyber abilities, for unintended effects to arise. I guess we could call it a kind of
collateral damage that may occur. We also have to be aware that when our own systems
are targeted, we have to be ready to respond and reconstitute when unexpected things
happen like that knocking out of air defenses on the east coast and the Atlantic fleet
supply. So, reconstitution is probably something we need to be aware of.
The corollary point here is that the more advanced thetechnologies of any military, the
more vulnerable they are to disruption. This is very different from the industrial age where,
you know, when you had a lot of tanks and a lot of artillery, you had a lot of power. The
more you could produce, the more power you had. The United States, after Pearl Harbor,
had a lot of its battleship fleet disabled, had a couple of carriers, realized that the aircraft
carrier was, through air power, now the key to Naval power. And so, we built another
hundred of these over the course of the rest of the war. Production and power went hand
in hand. But in an information age, the very things that make you more powerful also make
you more vulnerable.
And this I think is a great area of concern. It put an absolute premium on strongly
defending the advanced communications, sensing, information and management control
systems that modern militaries rely so heavily upon. So, hold on to that thought as well,
that now power and vulnerability go hand in hand. And this goes not only for national
military forces, but also for the very prosperity of a nation. The more reliant it is on
advanced technology, the more vulnerable it is to disruption. And for the United States,
this is an even more complicated problem because a lot of our infrastructure pipelines and
such – we know from the Colonial Pipeline incident, a lot of that infrastructure was put in
place prior to web and net connectivity. Yet they're all connected to the web and the net in
ways that make them vulnerable. So, this Colonial Pipeline built in the 1960s with the most
advanced software that could run it was from the 1970s. At the time of the incident, that
was very easily hackable and created a mass disruptive event along the Eastern seaboard
of the country.

The other thing I would say, and I'm sure all in the cyber business know this already, is
about the veil of anonymity that often enshrouds the cyber malefactor. And, even when we
think we have good forensic evidence, bad guys can always say, “we didn't do that” or “we
had no idea that people were using our territory to do bad things”. What this means is that
our ability to deter, particularly by means of retaliatory threats, is really terribly impeded.
And the attempt to use, as has been the case in cyber for quite some time, to use the
paradigm from the physical world about punitive deterrence, or even denial deterrence
really doesn't work in cyberspace.
So, we have to think in other terms. I think the simple answer is we have to get a lot better
at defense of our systems. And when I say systems, I mean, soup to nuts, not just the
combatant commands, the field services, but space systems (those that are very reliant
on cyber) and of course ground stations can be hacked. And, so we have to worry about
that. And there's even been some interesting work done on the vulnerability of command
and control systems for our nuclear arsenal. Of course, the Russians have always worried
about this. They've had a “dead hand,” automated system for their nuclear command and
control for several decades. And in fact, that was a system built again before web and
net connectivity. And, can't say more about their command and control, but they too have
concerns about these areas.
And if you can't deter the bad guys, you must shift to defense. Now, some talk in terms of
forward defense, the idea of preemptive actions – striking when under threat of imminent
attack – that's gonna be very, very hard. It's hard to figure out when an attack is coming,
in part, because they come out of the blue. A lot of the time in other areas where we know
intrusions are being made, often those are intelligence gathering and what a hacker does
to gain access, to be able to gather intelligence is observationally equivalent to what they
would do to get into a system and lay sleeper weapons, or prepare for an actual cyber
attack. So that's a very, very, very tricky business for preemption.
That leaves basically prevention action as our go-to strategy. And part of that prevention
is to use very strong encryption in what I call in, in my book, data mobility. Move things
around, don't just put 'em in the cloud. Remember that the cloud is just someone else's
computer, but the good news is it is somewhere else. And so you put it out there. Take
your really valuable information, put it out there in a strongly encrypted way. In fact, maybe
even break the document up into several pieces, put it in different parts of the cloud.
You're making the business of the Hacker that much harder. And this, by the way, is good
advice for commercial enterprises as well. I just saw the figures for 2021. It looks like
intellectual property theft cost in pirated and counterfeit goods and also in competitive
industrial areas where industrial secrets have been leaked out - the figure they give for that
is a cost of $2 trillion. Which is, you know, somewhere around 4 or 5% of global economic
product is being bled out through what I call in the book, strategic crime. Anyway, gotta
move things around, gotta keep things more strongly encrypted. This works for individuals,
institutions, commercial concerns and, of course, the military. I'm happy to say the
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Navy, with which I'm most familiar, has been moving very, very much more toward cloud
computing. Just remember this: data at rest are data at risk. So keep it moving - just like
in many tactical situations, you know, if you get ambushed the answer isn't to hunker down
under the Humvee - it's charge in the direction of the ambush. You gotta keep moving if
you're gonna deal with the problem.
In terms of some of the technological issues, 3D printing is something that we have to
keep a close eye on. The sophistication of this is increasing by leaps and bounds; And I
think they're getting close to an inflection point in terms of the ability to fabricate almost
anything except fissile material. And here's where advanced technology and proliferation
kind of come together where it looks like we're getting perilously close to a situation
where a proliferator can fabricate everything except the fissile material, in terms of putting
a weapon together. And by the way, I am critical of our ability to deter cyber action, but
I think deterrence (at a nuclear level) is still working reasonably well. That's in terms of
weapons of mass destruction, we know that they hit us, we hit them, nothing's gonna
be left but the cockroaches and maybe Cher – because nothing can destroy Cher in
my personal view. Which reminds me these comments are my views alone and do not
represent official defense policy - as if there could be any question about that.
In any event, the technological advances being made (including artificial intelligence
technologies) are lowering the barriers to proliferation, and this is going to have some
negative effect, I think, on keeping the nuclear club smaller as the years go by. In fact,
one has to think about the nuclear club as it is today and realize that our old calculations
about nuclear deterrence don't really count anymore. We don't lie awake at night, worrying
that Russians have several thousand nuclear warheads, but we're very concerned that
North Korea has a handful of them that might actually work and that Iran might get a few.
There's a whole new calculus of nuclear deterrence, and it's not so much that we fear
that Iran or North Korea would launch a nuclear assault on Los Angeles, or some other
city or valued area or ally or friend. It's that they can use the threat of nuclear escalation
to support other kinds of aggression. Right? When, when we think of Saddam Hussein
taking Kuwait in 1990, we knew we were gonna put a coalition together and push him out.
He didn't have a nuclear escalatory capability to threaten our attempt to intervene. One of
the reasons we're saying up front that we won't fight the Russians directly if they invade
Ukraine is because they are a nuclear power. And we don't want “The Guns of August” this
time around to be nuclear guns.
So, the point here is at even a small nuclear arsenal that a North Korea and Iran or some
other power might have, could give them a free rein for limited aggression, much as
Russia can and China may, when it comes to Taiwan. They might pull the same sort of
thing - some kind of limited, conventional aggression, buttressed by nuclear capabilities.
(Note: Subsequent to this interview, Putin brandished his nuclear weapons capability
to threaten against further NATO support for Ukraine). And it seems to me that that's a
whole new deterrence calculus. And it's one of the ways in which nuclear weapons, even

in small numbers can undermine conventional deterrence. So this is a significant problem
that we all need to think about. And it may raise the importance of gaining a capability to
disrupt nuclear command and control by cyberspace-based means. And I'm sure all sides,
in the nuclear competition, are thinking about that.
So, we've got this issue of the shadow of mass destructive weapons is still out there, but
they're really hard to use directly and deterrence is reasonable, but we have this whole new
range of mass disruptive weapons: the Stuxnets, the Tritons, the various Shamoons, et
cetera, a lot of mass disruptive weaponry that's out there and deterrence is very, very poor.
And again, this just comes back to my point that we've gotta get a lot better at defense,
because deterrence is not something we're going to be able to rely upon.
I’ve talked a little bit about 3D printing. I think it's also important to speak to the issues that
come out of the advances in so-called artificial intelligence. I prefer to think of it simply as
silicon-based intelligence, rather than calling it artificial. You know, we're human beings,
we are carbon-based intelligence, but silicon-based intelligence is coming. And I think it's
going to transform military and security affairs in the 21st century, the way the aircraft
transformed Land and Naval warfare in the 20th century. Now what's going on here? There
clearly is an arms race underway where both China and Russia (authoritarian societies)
have said, we're gonna invest heavily in this, we're gonna have smart hypersonic missiles,
we're gonna have tele-operated as well as automated ground combat systems and such.
And the liberal societies of the world are behind the curve on this, partly because of
concerns of an ethical and legal nature. Some of you are probably aware that the United
Nations has an entire initiative on the outlawing of lethal autonomous weapons systems.
So it's slowing the process. It's not helped by people like Elon Musk who says that the
robots are gonna attack us if we build them. And even the late Steven Hawking joined that
club as well. I'm more in the Michael Crichton club – he wrote a wonderful book about
electronic life a long time ago in which he said those fears are largely unjustified. I tend in
my book to agree with Crichton, and discussed this to some extent.
Well, look, we in the liberal societies aren't gonna get around our ethical and legal and
other discourses. We're gonna have to operate within them and move ahead and advance
with them. The best I can suggest is that in cyber defensive operations, we need AI to
be able to work autonomously. The pace, the tempo of operations can be incredibly fast,
beyond human operators’ capabilities. So when we're defending, probably should allow
full automated systems to work. When we decide to do something offensively, let's keep
humans in the loop. I think that's a good compromise for now, moving ahead. But one
thing we know for sure is that AI makes a big, big difference. And I would harken to the
December 2019 exercises at Fort Benning in which an opposing force is up against a
much larger, almost divisional size force. The smaller force was less than a brigade. And,
they didn't have automated weapons. What they had was a fully automated ISR system,
which allowed them to gain, gather, distill, distribute, and act upon information much more
swiftly than in the larger force – and they absolutely destroyed the larger force. You can
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probably get some unclassified analyses of the Fort Benning experiment. It is one of the
most telling examples of the power of AI.
Another interesting case, this time for aviation enthusiasts - is that the best Top Gun pilot
was put up against an AI pilot. They flew two simulators of the same aircraft, did five
dogfights and the robot shot down the human pilot each time and in all five dogfights,
the human pilot did not put even a single hit on the AI's plane. So, what that says to me
is we need to be thinking about units of the 21st century that blend humans, intelligent
machines, and probably tele-operated systems. Think of a squadron or an air wing that
mixes these in, think of ground forces that have this similar kind of mix, same thing with
Naval forces. And I think that's gonna be the great challenge.
I don't have concerns about actual war fighters being reluctant to rely upon or work with
robots. What we see is, people love their cars and such, we love our machines already.
They're gonna get along well with their bots. In fact, I have some pictures of American
soldiers, burying and giving decorations to their AIs or tele-operated systems that have
been destroyed in combat. And there's one that's even on display in the iRobot museum up
in, I think it's Medford, near Boston. It's this kind of integration of humans and intelligent
machines that I think is gonna be the key. And my guess is that this kind of skillful
blending is going to be even more effective than a force that would be of just intelligent
machines. We shall see, but that would be my prediction.
I think in the interest of time, someone said that it's hard for people to pay attention to
anything once a talk goes beyond 10 minutes. So, I think I'm already past that by a little
bit. The TEDx people say that 18 minutes is the limit. I may be a little closer to that. So let
me just close by suggesting that the era into which we're moving is one of tremendous
opportunity, but also of considerable challenge. We tend, when we think about cyber,
always to focus first on the issues of vulnerability. Let us also seize upon opportunity, the
opportunity for military transformation, the opportunity to build truly strategic defenses.
We never succeeded really in the strategic defense initiative that worked against nuclear
weapons, but we have a really good chance for a new SDI: a strategic defense initiative for
cyber. And that should be on our agenda as well.
Hang onto these notions of complexity, of power and vulnerability going hand in hand.
And just as a last thought, I reread The Guns of August recently, which if you haven't
read it before it's about the crisis of 1914 and why a massive war erupted (that nobody
really wanted - they wanted a nice limited war to punish the Serbs) - they got a big war
instead. Things got outta control in August 1914 in the Balkans. I think in some respects,
cyberspace is the new Balkans. President Biden put it well in a speech he gave last
November, in which he said, “if we're going to get into a real shooting war in the future,
it's probably going to start by some serious incident in cyberspace”. And I think there's
so much capacity for mischief-making in cyberspace. I think the President's intuition
is probably right and so we have to watch carefully. It's one of the reasons we have to

emphasize building those good defenses. Cyberspace may indeed be the latter-day
Balkans. So let us hold that in mind. And, with that, I want to thank Colonel Vanatta for
offering me this wonderful opportunity to share some thoughts and let me wish all of you,
every success in your endeavors. Thank you, over and out.
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Hello, I'm Sarah Jacobs Gamberini. I'm a Policy Fellow at the National Defense University
Center for the study of Weapons of Mass Destruction. I'm speaking in my own capacity
and not representing the views of the National Defense University, DoD or the U.S.
government. Today I'll talk a little bit about quantum sensing’s potential impacts on
strategic deterrence and modern warfare and its implications for WMD.
Quantum technology is an area of scientific inquiry that receives a lot of hype, public
interest, and media reporting. Because of its complexities and even spooky nature that
defies even many scientific minds, many media and public policy discussions tend to
lump quantum technologies together and talk broadly about “quantum”. When we think
of emerging technologies related to WMD, we often think about the implications of
synthetic biology, artificial intelligence, machine learning, drones, or hypersonics. Quantum
is usually put to the side, partly because it's extremely challenging to communicate
to non-physics audience and partly because the timelines associated with potential
availability are longer than some of the more present technologies that are not really
emerging technologies, but are here today. But also because quantum is too broad of
a concept to tackle without first breaking it down into the fields of quantum computing,
quantum communications and quantum sensing. Much attention is showered on quantum
computing and communication advances to transform commercial life and military
operations. Yet the specific area of quantum sensing has important implications for
deterrence and weapons of mass destruction. Quantum sensing has certain applications
to the military that require extra diligence, investment and imagination. It merits additional
discussion in the CWMD community.
So what is a quantum sensor? Like other sensors, it measures physical phenomena like
magnetic fields or acceleration, but quantum mechanics allows sensors to measure with
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higher sensitivity. They can have better long-term stability or smaller sensor size than
other alternatives.
There's a wide range of these sensors from traditional atomic clocks, accelerometers,
magnetometers, electrometers, gravimeters, and gravity gradiometers. And they can
measure a range of things like frequency, acceleration, rotation rates, electric and
magnetic fields, or temperature with high accuracy. Nearly anything that uses a sensor
may be a candidate for a quantum sensor. But it's not a monolithic field and tech
readiness levels vary greatly. On the one hand, technologies related to quantum sensing,
including atomic clocks have been around for decades and underlie things like GPS and
position, navigation and timing (PNT) technologies. On the other hand, there are quantum
sensors in the lab that if employed in the field could disrupt some of our long-held
thoughts on strategic stability and modern warfare.
Like many tech races, the first mover can exploit technological advantages on and off
the battlefield. Let's take China. Quantum is an area China is investing heavily and during
a period of great power competition, if the U.S. military fails to stay ahead in the race
to field and integrate new or improved quantum sensors, there could be technological
asymmetries for the United States. China's researchers are claiming they have a next
generation quantum radar system that can detect stealth bombers and track ballistic
missiles. There's been a lot of media hype about China developing a quantum radar, which
if developed would be powerfully disruptive. However, the technology is not mature.
Most agree that with today's quantum technology, quantum radars, like the one claimed
by China are unlikely. There have been successes in lab settings, but this capability is a
very long way off, if at all. And there are even questions whether they would provide any
improved capability over other radars, but we still need to consider the real or perceived
risks of falling behind China in an operational quantum radar race. From a deterrence
perspective, the ability for China to field a fully functioning quantum radar system capable
of detecting U.S. stealth aircraft would be disruptive to strategic stability in the region and
undermine the survivability of America's stealth capabilities.
But we have to be incredibly careful in considering what Chinese researchers are claiming
with a healthy dose of skepticism that allows us to confirm their claims. This type of
quantum advancement could one day help China detect submarines. If this happened,
it would place U.S. undersea deterrence at operational risk, including degrading the
survivable leg of the U.S. nuclear triad. Since deterrence is based on perception, increased
vulnerability due to degradation of stealth may reduce confidence in our ability to deliver
an assured second strike nuclear response in the event of a nuclear crisis. This action
would thereby undermine their credibility as a deterrent and erode their utility as a tool for
allied assurance and extended deterrence.
While understanding the threat of an adversary with this capability, it's also important
to imagine the benefits of acquiring this technology ourselves. Submarines could use

quantum inertial navigation and help map and detect undersea ridges or canyons, and
detect mines without relying on sonar, which can be detected by adversaries. There are
risks and opportunities to any of these applications.
Now, not all quantum is decades away. As I mentioned before, the technology that
underlies GPS is based on quantum in the form of atomic clocks. GPS is crucial for
navigation, but it can be jammed or spoofed. Taking it to the next level and using
quantum clocks might allow for orders of magnitude better precision. Quantum
clocks are so accurate in fact that they would not gain or lose a second in close to 4
billion years. If quantum sensors can provide new PNT functionality, it could enable
operations in previously denied or contested theaters like underwater or underground
or provide more precision navigation in jammed or denied environments. And from
where I sit at the WMD Center, one can imagine how these capabilities, once achieved,
could advance military capabilities to target, track and locate WMD, including mobile
missile tracking and targeting, hazardous material detection, and the entire spectrum of
disrupting an adversary’s ability to obtain and use a WMD. With the right imagination and
advancements, the field of quantum sensing may be leveraged for innovative solutions to
countering some WMD challenges.
Now, these advances could prove destabilizing if the United States and its competitors
do not possess the same capability; but on the other hand, quantum sensing applications
may offer the potential for increased strategic stability through reinforcement of crisis
stability architectures such as arms control treaties and agreements. Detecting nuclear
materials from afar using quantum sensors could offer a potentially improved range
of compliance verification measures needed for accurate standoff, nuclear treaty
compliance and verification activities. There are still some extremely hard and complex
engineering and physics problems for quantum sensing’s promise to come to fruition. This
includes the challenge of miniaturization. Something might show promise in the lab, but
transforming it into something that is compact, rugged, and autonomous requires funding
and time. Another impediment to getting sensors out of the lab is the fragility of quantum
system. Tiny movements, changes in temperature, or other environmental factors can
disrupt the system, which is a challenge when we're talking about putting them in the field.
But, if these engineering and physics challenges are overcome, quantum sensors could
one day improve precision and accuracy of missile capabilities for us - or our adversaries
like China who are already focused on improving their kinetic strike capabilities. So,
there's both promise and peril in the future of quantum sensing applications, determining
the technology's disruptive potential must factor in a number of things: Does the quantum
sensor provide a better sensing capability than existing fielded systems or deliver the
same capability at a far lower overall cost? Do we have the needed enabling technologies
required to move these sensors from lab to field use? So, it's important to balance the cost
and the gains
To conclude, for the U.S. military losing the race to field game changing quantum sensing
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applications could lead to technology asymmetries. While quantum sensing technologies
offer opportunities to transform modern warfare and certainly make the case for greater
attention - they also present challenges and risks and face extremely hard and complex
engineering and physics problems. We can't let that limit our imagination of what these
technologies could do, because the fact is our adversaries are investing and researching.
And if they overcome some of the engineering hurdles and are first to deploy some
of these technologies, it will potentially destabilize both deterrence architectures and
approaches to warfighting.
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Hi, my name's Genevieve Bell. And I'm coming to you from Canberra, Australia. It's always
a real privilege to get to participate in exercises like this. And I'm really sorry I don't get to
be there in person. So, I'm doing the next best thing. I'm sending you some small thoughts
that I hope are going to be really helpful and yes, I am sending them via PowerPoint.
But before I get going, I want to begin by acknowledging the Traditional Owners of the
land from which I'm speaking and pay my respects to elders past and present. I'm on
Ngunnawal land here in Canberra, Australia - land that was always sacred and has never
been ceded. I also know that this is going to be heard in lots of places, and I want to
pay my respects to the Elders and Traditional Owners of those places too. For me, it's
really important to think about where we start these conversations and where are the
places that we anchor ourselves. And for me, I'm lucky enough to be in a place that has
been continuously occupied for more than 60,000 years. And whenever I talk about the
future, as I plan to do today, I get to do so in a place where people have been talking
about, building and curating the future for well, as long as it ever was, and that is both an
extraordinary privilege and a huge responsibility.
So where would you start in talking about the future? Well, there's lots of places, but
for me, I always like to start with William Gibson. Gibson is a science fiction author
and a writer, and has given us incredible works like Neuromancer and, of course, the
term cyberspace. But back in 2003, he was being interviewed by a journalist from the
Economist magazine. And the journalist asked him, you know, basically what's the future
going to be.
And I reckon that journalist was secretly hoping to get some great explanation about

technologies and blinky lights and shiny things. And Gibson said something that I think
is extraordinarily provocative and really instructive when we want to orient ourselves to
the future. He said: “the future's already here, it's just unevenly distributed”. Like I said,
an extraordinary provocation because it suggests if we're paying enough attention and
we can find traces of the future already in the present of our lives, that if we look really
closely, we can see glimpses of what's to come. People usually use Gibson to talk about
technology. After all, most new technologies have realistically been years, if not decades
in the making. AI was first defined in 1956, the internet in 1968 and so on. But if Gibson's
injunction could also include how people behave and engage, I have to wonder where that
might lead us and what traces of many futures we could find in this present.
And I'm thinking about this present. So acutely particularly. So I'm coming to you at this
point from February 2022 in the future that is Australia. And I know here it's really tempting
and hugely desirable to think that the pandemic's just been a momentary blip and that
somehow we'll manage it and things will revert, or return, or resettle into some pattern we
recognize. Of course, another way to think about all of this is that the pandemic's been
an accelerant or an amplification of things that were already happening. It put tension
on the system – well, put tension on lots of systems. And all the behaviors and practices
that have emerged around the pandemic might then be worthy of examination rather than
thinking of them as an aberration or something that we hope we can get past - maybe we
should think about them as glimpses of a future that's already here.
And if you were to do that, I think there's five threads that emerge out of the pandemic
that might be really useful for how would think critically about the ways that individuals
and groups function and engage and in doing help frame the questions I know you're all
grappling with in a slightly new and different way. So, let's go.
One of the pieces of the future that you can see in the present is the relationship between
the local and the global. My suspicion is for a couple of decades, we've thought of that
as oppositional, we've talked about globalization or localization. I think one of the things
the pandemic has made really clear is that these things operate together and apart, and
that neither of them are coherent, nor is the relationship between them. We've seen the
rise of new global actors who have been gaining enormous authority. Whether that's the
World Health Organization, doctors, geneticists, we have seen a capacity to think about
giving people authority in ways that's simply not been the case before. We've also seen the
willingness of nation states, in particular, to shut their borders, to stop their citizens from
moving around and to do so under the umbrella of public health but at a scale that I think
we would not have anticipated even five or 10 years ago. We've also seen the importance
of local communities rising up and managing themselves against that backdrop. And we
have seen the interconnection between all of those systems made hyper-visible, whether
it's about plane routes, the way viruses travel, or the way supply chains do and don't
function. And if you are wanting to think about how groups’ behavior might be influenced
in the future, you have to be thinking about local and global tensions between them and
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the new actors that are being thrown up.
Building on that notion of the local and the global, one of the other things that has been,
I suspect, accelerated during the pandemic is the disconnection or the uncoupling of the
relationship between power and authority. How is authority understood or adhered to?
Who gets to have power? And where is it? Those have always been open questions, but
over the last two years, the complexities of all of that is infinitely more on display. Which
means that who gets to be the voice of authority, how that authority is manifested, and
who is listening is nowhere near as stable or as seamless as it seems. I also suspect
we have continued to see the fragmentation of the relationship between capitalism and
democracy. And I know that sounds heavy, but imagine that capitalism no longer needs
democracy to flourish and democracy doesn't quite know what to do about that. And now
imagine you are a group thinking about how you want to behave, where you derive power
from and how you might respond to authority or authority figures and you start to imagine
that some of the pieces of the puzzle are infinitely more complex. Oh yeah, and layer on
top of that, that we have seen the continued rise (and I would say acceleration) of moral
authority as opposed to the kind that comes through an obvious institution. I'm thinking
here of the “black lives matter” movement, but also the “me too” movement and the
various ways in which those have been contested and labeled and what it might mean to
think about the idea of counter-authoritarian or counter-authority moves and organizations
who see themselves as having power and authority but those are not formally structured,
but they are globally or nationally recognized.
One way to think about the rise of moral authority and the notions of moral authority
sits on another piece of the future that I think has been in sharp display recently, which
has to do with the ways in which narratives and stories are proliferating and the need
for coherence is diminishing. It is absolutely the case that a story and storytelling forms
have gotten shorter – so, I'm thinking here of TikTok or Twitter - the need for coherence
has given way to notions of image and action and movement. So, we're starting to see
symbolic regimes untethered from the ways that they have meaning and a host of new
narratives or perhaps old narratives resurrected around danger and fear, especially when
it comes from ideas of other, whether the other is a virus or people who don't look like us
or places that don't sound and feel like us. It's a mobilization of a very particular set of
stories, but think here about the rise of new channels, for information distribution, new
kinds of stories, and increasingly fragmented pieces of the story that no longer need to
ladder up to a narrative. And it makes it even easier to imagine how you might bring an
entire group of people along with you if you have a set of images, a short set of narratives
that have punch or power to them, but not necessarily coherence. It also means how you
resist or dismantle or unpack the power of those narratives is even harder than it once
was.
Of course, part of what's going on here is that we're also seeing a change in our notions
about time and the way time unfolds. Time is another thing that the pandemic has

disrupted and where the future is kind of just peeking through - it is that we've shifted our
sense of time and timeliness and our notions about how long things could or should take
and who gets to determine how long something takes and what are the rhythm of things.
Although, I guess one of the other ways of thinking about the consequences of all of this,
where I suspect it is the future on display - is that it turns out you don't have to impose
very much uncertainty on the system in terms of a timeframe or in terms of time before
you fundamentally destabilize the whole. So, part of where the future might be sitting on
display now has to do with the relationship between time and uncertainty. How much do
you need to undermine before the whole becomes even more fragile?
And last, but by no means least, I think the final piece of the future I have seen in the
pandemic is the rise of the non-human. We spent a lot of time before the pandemic talking
about what it meant to be human. We have spent a surprising amount of time during
the pandemic, thinking about non-human actors in relationship to the human. So not
understanding who humans are, but starting to look at the rest of the world around us,
whether that's about the behavior of viruses and ecosystems and the ecology, whether it is
also about the behavior of animals and even gods and forces unseen to us. I think one of
the unexpected tantalizing glimpses of the future I have seen of late has to do with what
happens when we stop thinking that it's all about the human and start imagining it's about
other things. And how those other things get mobilized for me, feels like an unexpected
source of both power and possibly confusion.
So that was a lot of words and a really quick drive through about the pieces of the future
I'm already seeing now. And I know you're sitting there thinking what am I going do with
all of that. The reality is that human beings change slowly, but catalyzing events like
the pandemic may accelerate a whole set of trends that were a long time in the making,
whether it's about how we think about power, how we think about the nation state, how we
think about communication, time, and even who we are and what our role is in society and
the world. All of those things are in movement and all of those things will shape groups
and the ways in which they think about themselves, their landscape, their enemies, and
how they might want to prosecute their case.
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U.S. Army’s Training and Doctrine Command. No author, living or dead, has more books
on the professional US military reading lists. His non-fiction books include Corporate
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It has been described by the creator of Lost and Watchmen as “A visionary new form of
storytelling—a rollercoaster ride of science fiction blended with science fact,” and by the
head of Army Cyber Command as “I loved Burn-In so much that I’ve already read it twice.”
I'm someone who wrestles with the future. And there's a challenge in that. There's a belief
that it is something that is impossible to predict. Indeed, a senior U.S. defense leader
described how trying to project the future was like “driving in the dark with your headlights
off.” As in that's something you ought not to do.
There are two problems with that. The first is that we don’t have a choice. Whatever role
you play, whether it is in training, acquisitions, strategy, budgets, etc. you have to make
assumptions about and decisions about the future. You have to drive in the dark.
The second is that there's an interesting pattern that happens when we look not towards
the future, but rather towards the past. When we've gotten the future incorrect, whether
on major intelligence failures like 9-11 or Pearl Harbor to doctrine or acquisition program
failures, consistently, the failure is not from a so-called “Black Swan.” It is not some kind
of unimaginable that no one could predict. Rather it is repeatedly what is thought of as a”
gray rhino”. It is a trend, a topic that was fairly obvious. But, it was just uncomfortable to
look at, to admit that it was in the room with us.
So, when it comes to the topic that I've been asked to speak to you about, technology and
security issues, what is it that lies in right in front of us, but is hard to wrestle with its full
importance?
I think the trends are fairly clear and obvious. It's the leap of game changing technologies
that are playing out over the next decade plus in the realm of artificial intelligence. We
are seeing breakthroughs in a technology that is something that we've waited for and
talked about for literally millennia. You can find discussions of artificial intelligence and
everything from ancient Greek mythology to old Judaic texts. Maybe you're a science
fiction person. Well, for over a century, we've been talking about this moment, when AI
becomes real.

To be clear, it is not just the software side of AI. It's also about the hardware side of
robotics and its advancement playing out in all sorts of shapes, forms, roles, and users.
But again, don't just think about this as a technology that might be out there in the field
and playing out in terms of security. It's also how it affects the broader economy and
society writ large. For example, Oxford University did a study of 702 different occupational
specialties and found that roughly 47% of them are at risk for complete replacement,
reduction, or drastic redefinition over the course of our lifetime.
Importantly, each of these areas have their military parallels. Again, so the real looming
change with robotics is not the so-called lethal autonomous weapons system, killer robots,
or nuclear weapons being controlled by AI that get so much discussion. It's about how AI
covers the entire spectrum of application, in everything from decision helping to military
medicine, to logistics you name it.
The shift is also another kind of change, not just in terms of the software and the
hardware, but what binds it together in terms of the network. We see this playing out in a
couple of key ways. One is in the weaponization of social media, where you've seen the
impact affect everything from politics to public health to battlefield behavior to even being
wrapped up in the story of mass killings going after hundreds of thousands of people.
This area is gonna get even more challenging in the coming years because of one of those
prior topics, artificial intelligence. The line between what is real and what it is not is already
very tough to figure out now. It will be even more so as we blend in greater levels of AI –
what is popularly known as “deep fakes.”
But there's a second key change in terms of the network. It's the shift of the internet from
being about merely communication, which was game changing enough, to the concept of
the internet of things. It's an idea that originates in 1999 and is becoming real now, where
we are using the network to control the operations of everything from smart cars, smart
power grids, thermostats to the individual parts of systems. Now, that will open up huge
possibilities, of over $11 trillion in value, but it'll also open up new risks. It doesn't just
drastically grow the attack surface of what you might go after. It also changes the kind of
effect that you might have with a digital attack, where you're not stealing information or
spreading information, even if it's false. In this case, you are causing kinetic change in the
world, physical damage.
We're also seeing a whole change in terms of the very approach of computing itself. When
you think about quantum technology, such as a project that we are doing with NATO ACT,
we will see the ripple effect in forms of computing, communication, encryption changes to
sensors.
My point in this quick tour is that if you pull back and think about it, we have a massive
rethink of not just technology and its possibilities and perils, but also what it means for
the battlefield itself. Now that is very bold to say, but again, look back in history. Why
should we think these changes in everything from AI to robotics to quantum are somehow
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gonna be less in their effect than say the machine gun in 1914 or the tank and the airplane
in 1939. And, in fact, shouldn't they be something more, because we're talking about a
technology that unlike ever before is always improving, ever more intelligent, ever more
autonomous?
So what can we do about it? Well, I would argue there's a series of measures that we
need to undertake. One: Education and awareness is now a core task of leadership. For
example, in the case of AI, 91% of leaders say AI is the most important game changing
technology that’s out there. 17% - though - say they understand AI, how it works, what
are its ramifications and its dilemmas. That is a massive delta between what you think
is going to be important and how well you understand it. And it's not just specific to
AI; it's any of these new areas. It's not just about looking at yourself, it's looking at your
organization and asking, “Not just what is important, but how well do we understand it?”
Second: Every aspect of this is not just a story of technology. It's a story of people. And
so, how are we looking at how we handle talent management? In all the human questions,
everything from recruiting to assessment, are we making changes that are equivalent to
these other changes that are going on out there? And, if not, why would we expect the
human side to keep pace?
Third: The key issue of trust in all of this. But it's the dual meaning of trust. You can think
of trust as a kind of emotional state, as in “I trust you.” But it also has a definition in
terms of how engineers might think of it. Does it behave in an expected manner? Does it
match the way that we understand the world? So think about it this way. You can “trust”
someone, but you can also “trust” that someone is a liar and that they're always going to
lie to you. And so with that expectation that they will always lie, you can operate effectively
in the world, even if you don’t trust them. And so these two meanings of trust are the key
to not just integrating the technology and using it to its full effect. But also these two
meanings of trust are how any adversary is going to go after us.
Fourth: another part of this in terms of these dual issues of trust, but also a larger sweep
of change - is how it will affect what we're thinking of as multi domain operations and the
task of multi domain integration. Essentially, this is how the technology is going to affect
not just overall security, but battlefield behavior. And when you get inside this, it also cuts
to the heart of the new concepts and doctrines that we need out there.
What is our vision of the technology and our relationship with it in terms of everything
from trust to the uses that we make of it?
For, example, is it a tool that we are using? Or is that technology not just merely a tool, but
it is something equivalent to a teammate, a partner, a part of the organization, a wingman?
Or, is it beyond the equivalent of a tool or a partner, but an autonomous agent that we
delegate out there? And not just that we delegate it out there in a single form, but also
maybe we delegate it out there in terms of a massive number, a swarm that has agency

of its own? How we answer these visions, is again, key to the future, whether we're talking
about the future of cyber war, air warfare, etc. and also how they come together.
Fifth: But it also means that we need to undertake another kind of change. We need to
change how we visualize and train for the future. Too much of how we approach it right
now is validation: validating existing concepts, existing technologies. Or is is validating
our existing relationships, the kind of exercises that we love to do. “We're allies, let's go
out there together and show how much we like each other and can work together” That
definitely has value, don’t get me wrong. But we also need to do more of the kind of
exercises that we saw back in the 1920s and 1930s, whether you're thinking of the British
Experimental Mechanized Force or the American Army’s Louisiana Maneuvers. The goal
was not just to figure out the difference between horses and mechanization, but how is
this technology best used in everything from the doctrine to the tactics. But the big lesson
from that period is again, it's about the people. It is about figuring out who's thriving in
these exercises with what kind of mentality and training? And then the most important
lesson is not just learning the lesson, but how do you actually implement them after the
exercise? Because sometimes the insights get implemented and a lot of times they don't.
As part of this, you should also be seeking out lessons in terms of not just what works,
but what doesn't - before you actually commit. This image is an example from U.S. Navy
exercises in the 1920s, where they wanted to learn about the new concept of an aircraft
carrier. There were two different approaches to it that you can see here. The USS Patoka
on the left was the aircraft carrier for blimps. And the USS Langley on the right was the
aircraft carrier was for planes. Now compare that approach, where they actually went
out there and wrestled with the varied approaches, to how we would do it today, where
we already commit to not just the concept, but entire ship classes before we've actually
figured out what works or not. It is better to learn during experiment then later on in a war.
Seventh: You also wanna learn from other people's wars. So again, go back in history and
the example of how the Blitzkrieg seemingly surprised its foes. And yet, it was all tested
out in the open in the Spanish Civil War.
So, what about those other nations’ wars out there today? What can we learn from the.
Everything from what's happening in Libya to Ukraine, to, as you see on the right, the
war between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Through very skillful use of bringing together
electronics, cyber, unmanned warfare, the kinetic and the digital side, the Azeris were
able to take out, at least according to open source intelligence, 46% of Armenian armored
vehicles and 93% of their artillery missile systems in just a matter of weeks. That kind of
change is important, not just for that conflict, but what it means for all the other future
conflicts out there.
Eighth: We also need to change the way that we visualize and communicate. There are
more effective manners than producing white papers that people don't wanna read, or
they don't digest the insights from it. We've been using a practice that we call “useful
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fiction.” It brings together non-fiction analysis and research with the oldest communication
technology of all – narrative. You can think of useful fiction in a different way as being
akin to a morning smoothie. Science fiction and techno thrillers are like a milkshake;
they're entertaining, they're tasty, they're fun. At the other end of the spectrum, you've got
the vitamins, kale, something that's good for you. That's that research, that's that strategy
paper. Useful fiction is like a morning smoothie. It takes the kale, the vitamins of the
insight, but wraps it within a tasty package.
An example of the potential of this is a project we did with the Australian military that you
see here. They had a 21 page report on defense education enterprise reform to deal with
some of these new issues that we've been talking about. It's a great report, but it wasn't
striking with a desired effect. So we worked with them and took its three key themes and
37 key insights of that report and turned it into a narrative and a piece of art called “An Eye
for a Storm.” It took the key ideas they wanted to share, but blended them into a story that
follows a young officer from war college to an exciting mission, an embassy evacuation in
the wake of a tsunami. In terms of the impact of it, it's been read by over 14,000 readers,
all the way up to the head of the entire Australian military and six current or recently retired
U.S. four stars. By bringing in narrative, we were able to reach an audience that a typical
white paper would not be able to. And, if you can do this kind of approach on a topic as dry
as defense education enterprise reform, you can do it on any topic,.
Tenth: Finally, we need to kill our sacred cows. What is the equivalent to the battleship in
1941 or the horse cavalry in the 1930s? What is that technology that is not ready for the
future war, probably not ready for the present of war?
But, again, it is not just about the technology. What are those organizational structures
that were developed for the past, but aren't appropriate to the present and future? Hint:
you can identify sacred cows by not just what's not ready, but what is it hard for us to talk
about out loud?
And, so with that, I know I've thrown a lot at you in a limited amount of time. So, I would
leave you with just one key takeaway: Think of all of the change that's going on out there
around us, whether it's technology, security, politics, society… Given all that change, any
nations, organizations, or individuals that look at that change and decide to stay still? They
will be choosing to lose the future through their inaction. And I hope none of us do that.
Thank you.
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Greetings for the United States Air Force Academy. My name is Colonel Beth Makros. I'm
a professor of military and strategic studies here at USAFA. My background is primarily
from weapons of mass destruction within the nuclear operations enterprise. I have been
a planner at STRATCOM in the J5 writing the O-plans for many of our nuclear war plans.
I have served as the commander of the air operation center to STRATCOM’s JFAC, and
then I have over a decade of flying B2, nuclear capable bombers. So, my approach to
this conversation of weapons of mass destruction will largely be how does it impact our
nuclear operations.
Before we get into more specific emerging and disruptive technologies, I'd like you to
consider two things and keep in the back of your mind two considerations. The first one
is to realize that nuclear weapons are largely in existence for the purpose of deterrence.
And when we talk about deterrence, we're really talking about the efforts to shape the
thinking of an adversary or more specifically the decision calculus of the decision maker
from that adversary. So it's getting into the cognitive processes for each decision maker or
makers for a given adversary and understanding what might cause them to make certain
risk calculations or decisions. So you want to consider, for each of these technologies,
sort of does this technology change, or how does this technology change the decision
maker's calculus as far as what he or she or the group would likely do? And does it cause
an inadvertent escalation so that they might be more incentivized to use their weapons of
mass destruction? This second thing to realize is that deterrence and strategic stability
largely exist because of an assured retaliatory strike or often you'll hear it called second
strike capability. No one country has the ability to completely eliminate the weapons of
mass destruction for another country, the way it stands. And that keeps us in somewhat
of a stable atmosphere. So, when considering new emerging and disruptive technologies,
how might that impact the strategic stability that already exists? Might it impact the
retaliatory strike? Might it impact the assured use of a weapon? So again, if a country
is concerned that you might be negating my retaliatory strike capability or my ability
to employ my weapons, might there be a first user or first mover impetus to use those
weapons before they lose those weapons. So those are two things to consider as we talk
through each of these technologies.
So, the first technology I'd like you to consider is artificial intelligence and autonomous
weapons. So, what is in the realm of possible here? Well, autonomous weapons could
be used to launch and loiter for long periods of time looking for certain patterns of life
or recognition of weapons systems or behaviors or be programmed to use when X event
happens. So currently, as we think about the stability of weapons of mass destruction,
there's this gap of time when an event happens before a decision maker makes a decision
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whether or not to use a weapon of mass destruction or respond to the use of a weapon
of mass destruction. That's the time where they're using human cognitive processes to
sort of do risk analysis and decision making. But if we introduce this idea that there's
autonomous weapons out there just loitering for an event to happen, and they are
programmed to strike immediately then does that potentially negate that humanness or
the human in the loop for making a decision when we're thinking about weapons of mass
destruction? What if we give up that decision making to autonomous weapons or AI, how
might that impact our strategic stability? If I think you might be negating my ability to use
my weapons of mass destruction, does that shorten the timeline between detection of an
event and the execution of event in using WMD? And how does that change the decision
making on that cognitive processing for a decision maker? Does it take it out of their
hands totally?
The second technology I would consider that I think has massive implications for
weapons of mass destruction is quantum computing and the use of quantum physics
and sensing. So right now, when we talk about quantum computing, what's in the
realm of possible for the near future? It’s computing at speeds that improve secure
communications and encryption and navigation (precision, navigation, and timing). All of
those things can massively change the way in which we execute our weapons of mass
destruction, because it allows us to be potentially more precise or the ability for us to have
such incredible encryption that no one would be able to get inside that decision making,
but the same is true for our adversaries. They might be able to break our encryption and
see what is happening long before we could ever make an execution.
The second thing is to think about detection. So again, I mentioned, I flew stealth bombers.
The stealth world relies heavily upon the ability to evade or at least be under some type
of radar cross section threshold so that we can maintain a stealth for penetrating into
adversaries areas that we would like to potentially use the weapons on. Well, in quantum,
that ability to sense might override what we know to be the stealth technology that we rely
upon. So what if in the quantum physics they're able to use the quantum particles in order
to detect stealth. Does that negate stealth altogether? What does that mean? Particularly
for our submarines, that we highly rely upon for that second strike capability.
Okay. The fourth technology is the use, uh, or I'm sorry. The third technology is the use of
hypersonic weapons. So hypersonic weapons, anything that goes up above five times the
speed of sound or five mach. So, but these new hypersonic weapons that we're seeing,
whether we're talking about glide vehicles or scram jet type of technologies. They really
are able to maneuver in a way that is quite different than ballistic missiles. So, we can see
ballistic missiles. We can see the launch, we can see the threat band as we start to see
that it's trajectory. And then as we get dual phenomenology and we see it on radar, we can
create an ellipse knowing where that ballistic missile is going - in sufficient time that we
can move our aircraft or potentially launch our intercontinental ballistic missiles so that
they're no longer under threat. But with hypersonics, those are maneuverable. And while

not traveling at the speeds that the ballistic missiles are - still traveling at fast speeds. So
what does that mean? One that they can potentially negate our ability to launch, because
we don't know where that weapon is going to - so they can negate our assured strike. But
the second one is what if it can potentially take out your command and control facilities
or your command and control capabilities. So you no longer have the assured strike
capability. You no longer can talk to your weapons. You no longer know where a weapon is
heading to and what the impact of that weapon might be.
And the final technology is just the increased use of space and cyber on our weapon
of mass destruction and on the systems that enable our assured, secure weapons,
particularly in the nuclear enterprise. So the nuclear use is highly, highly dependent on
the national command and control and communications (NC3 capabilities). It is a system
that is secure and persistent. It is the ability to detect, decide and execute an order from
the president to use weapons. NC3 resides or requires a large number of space assets
to do that. So that ability to take out space assets for the U.S. and impact our national
command and control and communication system is one that would be very concerning
for the U.S.
Okay. I hope that is helpful in getting some thoughts on different technologies. Again,
I think artificial intelligence, autonomous weapons, quantum computing and sensing,
hypersonic weapons, and the use of space and cyber to attack our command and control
authority are things that we are greatly concerned about for our ability to use weapons of
mass destruction in the future. I wish you the very best wish I could be there with you all in
this endeavor. Take care.
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I'll kick this off. Thank you. So again, when it comes to weapons of mass destruction and
kind of the current ranking of first nuclear, second cyber and third chemical, I completely
acknowledge that these are important areas. These tend to be areas that are number one
outside of my domain of experience. When it comes to nuclear, I'll just put that whole thing
in a box and move it somewhere else, because I'm not a nuclear scientist.
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Cyber I think is absolutely essential today because it is one of the emerging domains
of warfare that is within reach of just about any participant, from a single individual to
a nation state. We're seeing it play out today in the real world, in Ukraine, we've seen,
certainly attacks in the U.S. and other places. Very important and will no doubt be
enhanced by the continuing advancement of machine learning, AI and other technologies.
But again, not my complete area of experience. So I'll put that in a box and just say it is
important.
Chemical is not something I particularly worry about because that requires significant
manufacturing capability to affect large populations. Chemical attacks can certainly
happen on a smaller scale. Chemical accidents can occur and affect local populations,
but for a mass destruction event, at a global level, I don't worry too much about chemical.
The area that I have been speaking about and highly concerned about is actually
biochemical warfare, or what some people might think of as biological warfare. I look
at biological systems as being completely programmable as genetic technologies
have continued to advance. And what I mean there is the ability to sequence animals,
plants, people, et cetera. That technology has advanced at a remarkable rate over the
last 20 years. We have seen this with the human genome project. The first genome
costing billions and literally producing a single consensus genome. To today being able
to get a clinical grade genome in hours for a few hundred dollars. So that is, the ability
to read genomes has far outpaced our ability to even fully comprehend the risk. The
ability to analyze genetic data is moving at a remarkable rate again, assisted by cyber
technologies, machine learning and AI. But it's the ability to write genetic programs using
DNA synthesizers that is also moving at a super exponential rate and opens the ability of
programming cellular and cell-free biological systems, viruses, and virus-like particles to
essentially anyone that is willing to put in a bit of time, effort and investment, like cyber,
from a single individual to a nation state. I look at that as being the biggest risk factor as a
weapon of mass destruction today because these tools and technologies and capabilities
are here now.

defenses for self-replicating particles (like a virus or a virus like particle) and I think those
gaps still exist today, and I think they will continue to exist without global cooperation
and massive investment in detection and remediation technologies. I point out that a lot
of my thinking is very similar to the author and technologist, Rob Reid, who has spoken
eloquently on the risks of viruses and virus-like particles and their potential abuse.
The only thing that scares me in bioengineering as a weapon of mass destruction is a
virus or virus-like particle because these have very small genomes or genetic constructs
when it comes to engineering. So, the technology already exists. They're not expensive to
make, and you can make combinatorial libraries of these agents trivially. So, making large
combinatorial libraries, running them through filters of infectivity and pathogenicity will
quickly allow the production of something that is truly scary, even a potential civilization
stopper. So, it's only viruses and virus-like particles that keep me up at night. The idea of
a scientist doing an experiment that accidentally produces one of these particles, follows
them out of the lab and potentially spreads around the world is a real and valid concern.
We may not detect something like that till well after it's spreading and starting to cause a
problem. As we're aware, some people believe that is what actually happened with COVID.
I am particularly concerned that we don't have proper tracking and accounting of virus
engineering and virus-like particle engineering in labs around the world. It is largely
research and development directed by individuals and companies with very little
accountability and tracking, except for a small number of select agents. I think this is
naive. There are billions of natural viruses. Humans are just one target, plants and animals
are other targets. So, it is relatively straightforward to do this work. And again, it keeps
me up at night because we're just so blind to the work that's being done, any viruses that
are circulating naturally, any viruses that may be engineered and circulating. We also have
so few therapies and responses for a virus infection. We know that we made history by
producing COVID vaccines in nine months. That’s, let's say, eight and a half months too
long to respond to something urgent. We absolutely have to shorten the development path
for countermeasures.

My previous company designed and built viruses from scratch targeting cancer cells. I
was astounded by the pace of synthetic biology and the genetic engineering technologies
to do that. In the last few years, it has become trivial to design and build a virus really for
a few thousand dollars and a few weeks of work. And this opens the possibility of making
virus like COVID but also viruses that are much more infectious and potentially much

So between the lack of detection systems and the lack of speedy countermeasures, I
think this is one of the largest risk factors and will remain a risk factor until we harden and
bolster those systems. Which I believe is an absolute essential over the next 10 years.

more deadly or pernicious. For example, weaponizing some sort of neurodegenerative
disease. This is, in my opinion, the most significant near-term risk for a weapon of mass
destruction, because it could be achieved by even a single individual. It is not prohibitive
in terms of cost and because it is a self-manufacturing, self-replicating, and really selfspreading vector. I think the asymmetry between production and defense is gigantic today.

U.S. G OV E R N M E N T E M P LOY E E

COVID taught us that we simply did not have the right detection systems and the right

Today, I want to start as we have to start every one of these by saying these are my own
opinions. These are not the opinions of the Department of Defense, the Air Force or the
U.S. government.
Now for your question today: which is what is the future implications of emerging
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destructive technology on WMD warfare? We've got a few trends that I think would be
helpful for you to focus on. Among those clearly, from an air force perspective, is going to
be exquisite technologies, right? So right at the top of that list are hypersonics. If you're
not looking at hypersonics and the destructive capability of hypersonics, what can be
done with them, who has them, who will have them and different timelines associated
with those hypersonic productions at scale and what they look like in warfare, what that
decision time means and the shrinking decision time means across the spectrum warfare.
You’ve really got to take a real serious look at that.
From a general perspective, think of shrinking decision times when you're thinking about
WMD. This isn't a, we don't have even the old, you know, hours or days or months, we were
talking minutes, we're talking seconds in some cases, depending on whatis occurring,
right. And we know this from the cyber realm.
Okay. Uh, another thing that we're gonna hit for you guys, I think is probably gonna be
pretty important here, clearly bio weapons. All right. So from CRISPR for gene editing the
entire, you know, there's a lot of different ways these be made, not just by governments,
but by non-state actors as well at a relatively easy level. Now the scale of these and what
can be done, varies widely. But we want to, to think about here is: what are the effects?
So what might they go after, besides what you normally think of, um, kind of a caveat to
this is think a little bit about from a sustainment progress or a sustainment point of view,
uh, life sustainment, what needs to happen in order for things to live for things to exist. If
you wanna think about lethality, what needs to happen for life? And how might you target
those key natural resource or key requirements. Think of Maslow's hierarchies of needs
and what needs to happen for that to occur. So that's something to keep in the back of
your mind when you're going through the process today.
Some other keys we wanted to hit for you today. We're talking clearly nuclear, you cannot
think about the nuclear about WMDs and the nuclear arsenal. If we're not thinking about
where that's going, who has it, scaling on nuclear, what that means, um, from small to
large and everything in between. Um, and then within that, I think what's a key variable
through all of WMDs is the idea of asymmetries of will or ethical asymmetric are part
of that. So someone's willingness to use it. What might some nation states or non-state
actors be willing to do that others may not. Where are those barriers and how are they
changing and how are they shifting? How are those norms eroding or being eroded or
being pushed back? What can be done differently - from treaty bodies, uh, and the way
we're organized, um, you know, how effective are these actually being and how might they
be in the future and what's being done to undermine them, uh, or to strengthen them. So
that's something we might want to wanna probably give a little bit of time too.
Along with that, we'd be remiss if we didn't speak a little bit towards, uh, pushing the
future forward on the technological front. Um, and in cyber, I think quantum is a game
changer. Two big game changers on the tech front - one is energy and the ability to store

unconstrained energy, as that comes down the line, we're probably not looking out at
10 years for that, but cheaper, more effective, portable energy is one big thing to look at
for move maneuver. Also, what that means for directed energy. So that's something you
also wanna be thinking - kinetics, but if you aren’t thinking the non-kinetic, you, you're not
thinking warfare in the future. We really wanna make sure you're thinking about how cyber
and WMDs and all the kinetics all work together, you know, as a series in warfare and what
that means. Series or in parallel, depending on how you want to deploy them.
Another key point, uh, one to raise just a little bit, before we hit the five minute mark: is
think about resiliency as well. At the end of it, we can think about stopping the WMDs, but
we also need think about the after effects from any attack. If we can't stop it, how do we
bounce back?
So two other quick points, one do not presume sanctuary anywhere at any time, right?
That's what the war of the future may well look like now. Oftentimes we think of North
America as its own safe block, right? The Homeland is secure. We can't think that way
anymore. We need to think about a world that's interconnected in a way where all the
different systems are linked. Within that, another key that I think you should think about
as well as supply chains. And not just how we think about supply chains now: how they
can slow information or slow material from flowing from one place to another and key
resources from getting to what you need, but also think out how they can support what
you need to get done. How do you make supply chains resilient? How do you make them
get what you need on time, where you need it? How do you use them in a way that builds
that belts and suspenders? That extra safety, that extra resiliency to get to where you need
to go and help you protect all of your assets, wherever they are.
I think these are the key points that we wanted to hit for you guys going forward. We might
have a few more, uh, as we go, but I think this is really what we wanted to get across at
the moment. So without further ado, good luck today, have a fantastic Threatcasting
experience. We really look forward to reading and seeing your report. Good luck.
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APPENDIX III

A HISTORY OF THE
N AT I O N - S TAT E

A brief selection of historical events and case studies are provided below, which cover
nearly four centuries of state and non-state power struggles. These anecdotes from
1618-2015, help illustrate the relative “newness” of the concept of nation-states and how it
continues its evolution today in an era of modern competition.
1618. In 1618, the Thirty Years War began. This exclusively religious war savaged Europe.
Conflict was vicious, pervasive, and crossed all borders and boundaries - as every side
fought for religious universality and religious solidarity.
1648. In 1648, the Peace of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years War. The Peace of
Westphalia was not a single treaty, but rather a collection of agreements. A devastated
European continent ultimately agreed to disagree, establishing a basic order that we
reference today. In Kissinger's words, "The Peace of Westphalia became a turning point
in the history of nations because the elements it set in place were as uncomplicated
as they were sweeping. The state, not the empire, dynasty, or religious confession, was
affirmed as the building block of European order. The concept of state sovereignty
was established."111This new order enshrined the principles of multiplicity and balance
of power. Equilibrium became a primary goal of international relations. The inherent
sovereignty and legitimacy of states formed a foundation for this order, which mostly
held together for nearly two hundred years. The concept applied only in Europe, however.
Colonies in Asia, Africa, and America were thought to have no such sovereignty, and
Westphalia placed no limits on company-states. Colonialist exceptions eventually led to
the system's collapse.
1757.
Case Study - English East India Company Wins the Battle of Buxar
Chartered in 1600, the English East India Company (EIC) came fully into its own in the 18th
century, growing into a behemoth quasi-state that ruled huge portions of the world. One
renowned historian argues that the Battle of Buxar was the critical moment of change

for the EIC. By defeating three Mughal armies at this battle, "the Company was left the
dominant military force in north-east India.... The Company, which had started off as an
enterprise dominated by privateers and former Caribbean pirates, had already transformed
itself once into a relatively respectable international trading corporation, with a share price
so reliable, its stock was regarded almost as a form of international currency. Now the
Company was transformed a second time, not just as a vehicle of trade operating from
a scattering of Indian coastal enclaves, but as the ruler of a rich and expansive territorial
empire extending across South Asia."112
1792. In 1792, the French National Assembly proclaimed support for revolutions
everywhere, undermining the Westphalian principle of sovereignty. This new crusade,
secular and ideological, revived some of the sectarian fervor that had fueled the Thirty
Years War. In the minds of revolutionary leaders, the principles of liberty and equality
trumped earlier state legitimacy.
1815. The "revolutionary leader" model was called into question as the 1815 Congress
of Vienna ended the Napoleonic Wars. European states scrambled to establish a new
balance of power that placed the necessary constraints on French aggression. The
resulting agreements merged a number of smaller central European states to better
preserve the balance of power. The system, set out by the Congress of Vienna, had two
main components: the Quadruple Alliance of Britain, Prussia, Austria, and Russia was to
defend the territorial order, while the continental Holy Alliance of Prussia, Austria, and
Russia focused on maintaining internal order in an effort to avoid excessive liberalism and
revolution.113
1852.
Case Study - Pinkerton’s National Detective Agency was Founded
Pinkertons were much more than private detectives--they were infiltrators, enforcers,
fixers, even considered a “lynch mob for hire”. "In an age of new market discipline and
territorial expansion [1852-1937], Pinkertons served as a quasi-official extension of the
state where the state had little other representation. As rapid industrialization triggered
bloody labor conflict, the agency became, for all intents and purposes, capital's private
army." The Pinkertons were a critical force in strike-breaking and terrorizing labor on behalf
of late 19th century industry, leading one historian to argue that the agency "was a pivotal
institution in the formation of American monopoly capitalism. Through the Pinkertons,
American capitalism implemented and enforced new structures of order on industrial
frontiers .... The state, at the federal and local level, not only refused to limit the scope and
111 Kissinger, World Order, 26.
112 Dalrymple, The Anarchy: The East India Company, Corporate Violence, and the Pillage of an Empire, 201.
112 Kissinger, World Order, 65.
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power of the agency but also actively legitimized the Pinkertons by hiring and deputizing
the agents. The state both exercised its power and contracted out its authority through its
use of the agency."114
1871. In 1871, the end of the Franco-Prussian War unified Germany and stabilized the
previously fluid balance of powers. When Otto von Bismarck united Germany, his concept
of world order centered on nationalism and power rather than the balancing principles of
the Holy Alliance. Germany rapidly defeated France in the Franco-Prussian war, annexing
Alsace-Lorraine. Bismarck proclaimed the German Empire from the Hall of Mirrors at
Versailles. No longer a fluid balance of powers, Europe became a web of fixed alliances
and began a pattern of confrontation and industrial military armament.
1918. The 1918 Treaty of Versailles ended World War I. A punitive, but also oddly lenient,
treaty was imposed on Germany. France, Britain, and the U.S. crafted a new world order
based around international law and the resolution of conflict through a League of Nations.
Unfortunately, there was no enforcement built into the system, and nations rapidly
began disobeying its terms. Britain and the U.S., disillusioned by the war, retreated into
isolationism, leaving France to take responsibility next to a badly wounded and seriously
upset Germany. Europe was deeply impacted by this for two decades. Britain and France
responded to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire by drawing their own map of the Middle
East and splitting the remains, setting the stage for yet another anticolonial fight.
1945. In 1945, The second world war ended in the defeat of Nazi Germany and Imperial
Japan. During the course of the war, however, the allies inadvertently ignited a spark of
future conflict by openly arming and supporting national liberation movements where they
challenged Axis foes. This broke the international consensus around the illegitimacy of
revolutionary violence. Anticolonial movements began to build momentum, drawing on the
rhetoric and conduct of national liberation, as laid out during WWII. The Nuremburg Trials
"exploded the longstanding conceit that national policies, however odious, were to be
imputed only to the nation itself and not to the individuals who shaped and enacted them"
and established the concept of a "war of aggression”. Thomas notes that "the implication
was clear: not all wars were legitimate, and leaders could be held to account for pursuing
illegitimate ones... in the space of a few traumatic years, the use of military force went
from a sovereign right to an action that is illegal in all but certain narrowly defined
circumstances."115
1967.
Cast Study – Florida Creates the Reedy Creek Improvement District
Walt Disney pushed for Reedy Creek during the initial planning of Disney World. It was

finally created the year after his death. As the intended site for the visionary Experimental
Prototype Community of Tomorrow (EPCOT), Disney believed that Reedy Creek needed
total autonomy and his heirs got it. The Disney Company is the effective and functional
government in Reedy Creek, providing all municipal services, and subject only to county
and state property taxes as well as elevator inspections.
1987.
Cast Study - A.Q. Khan Network Sells Uranium Enrichment Technology to Iran
After ensuring that his own nation had the bomb, Pakistani nuclear engineer and spy
Abdul Qadeer Khan, decided to sell information, sourcing, and materials. He maintained
the network of suppliers he assembled to facilitate the Pakistani program and set up an
independent base of operations in Dubai. He began by selling nuclear information and
materials to Iran and moved on to North Korea and Libya. By the end of the 1990s, Khan's
sales team "was setting up booths at arms fairs around the world and advertising his
willingness to sell both conventional weapons and centrifuge technology .... Catalogues
listed everything you needed for a nuclear program even 'complete ultracentrifuge
machines’. Those who inquired were told that there would be no problem selling items to
foreigners."116 IAEA director, general Mohammed El-Baradei, referred to this network as
the "Wal-Mart of private-sector proliferation”. Khan's career as the world's most prolific
proliferator of nuclear weapons technology led George Tenet to describe him as "at least
as dangerous as Osama bin Laden”.117 By the time the U.S. confronted Pakistan over his
activities in 2003, Khan had ensured that the world's nuclear standoff would no longer
exclude the Islamic world, and accumulated a mountain of attention, power, and money.
1992. In 1992, the Soviet Union collapsed, and the bipolar international system became
rapidly unipolar.
2015.
Case Study - The Wagner Group Deploys to Syria
Vladimir Putin delegated the planning of the Russian intervention in Syria to master
strategist General Valery Gerasimov. In a skillfully crafted effort to avoid the failures of
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Gerasimov "helped craft a light footprint strategy
that included a mix of airpower and maneuver elements" that kept Russian troops out
of the ground war through a balance of Syrian forces, Lebanese Hezbollah, and private
114 O'Hara, Inventing the Pinkertons, or Spies, Sleuths, Mercenaries, and Thugs: Being a Story of the Nation's Most
Famous, 2, 3.
115 Thomas, The New Dogs of War: Nonstate Actor Violence in International Politics, 29.
116 Corera, Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan
Network, 107.
117 Ibid, xii-xiv.
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forces.118 Wagner offered the advantages of having Russian troops involved on the
ground without the disadvantages of casualties, atrocities, and criminal activity, etc. These
became private corporate matters and not the responsibility of the Russian government.
While we have no known access to internal Wagner documents, PSMC contracts often
include a clause exempting operatives from local criminal enforcement. According to
one contractor, "Wagner is no ordinary private military company. It is a miniature army.
We had it all, mortars, howitzers, tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel
carriers."119 While Gerasimov's strategy succeeded in its goal of increasing Russian power
in the Middle East, there are some signs that the Russian army may have been dealing
with some unintended consequences. A former Wagner mercenary who fought alongside
Russians in Syria and Ukraine, told Reuters that losing the Battle of Kyiv was inevitable,
since the current Russian Army has never directly fought a powerful enemy.120 Gerasimov
may have outsmarted himself by keeping his troops out of combat in Syria, as they were
essentially unbloodied.
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118 Jones, Three Dangerous Men: Russia, China, Iran, and the Rise of Irregular Warfare, 65-66.
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